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Abstract 
This dissertation consists of three essays on decision making strategies. In the first essay, we 
analyze the determinants of expansions and contractions of shopping centers using a unique dataset of 
property level data for shopping centers in eleven metropolitan areas over the period from 1995 through 
2005. We find that shopping centers with large operating costs are less likely to expand and are more 
likely to contract. Higher expected revenue increases the likelihood of expansion and decreases the 
likelihood of contraction. We find weak support for Grenadier’s theory that a larger number of 
competitors reduces the value of option to wait and increases the likelihood of both expansion and 
contraction. The market share of competitors reduces the likelihood of increasing the number of stores as 
suggested by the theory of strategic positioning. 
In the second essay, we examine the intra-metropolitan location decisions of retail stores by 
focusing on the opening of a comprehensive list of department (“anchor”) stores in the United States. The 
nonparametric K-density procedure shows that new stores are more dispersed than existing stores; their 
locations depend on existing competitive conditions. By applying a conditional logit model (CLM), we 
find that the location choices of new anchors can be explained by zoning, population, CBD and highway 
proximity, potential revenue and revenue growth, cannibalization, competition and localization 
economies. The CLM-based K-density confidence intervals effectively explain actual location patterns 
within three miles. 
 In the third essay, we find that the probability of intentional accounting misstatements 
(irregularities) increases with the level of investor beliefs about business conditions but decreases 
when the beliefs are sufficiently positive. Further, the proportion of independent directors with 
Tingyu Zhou – University of Connecticut, 2014 
accounting expertise is a decreasing function of investor beliefs, and the likelihood of 
irregularities is decreasing in the proportion of independent directors with accounting expertise. 
Finally, stock market reaction to accounting restatements is positively related to the proportion of 
independent directors with accounting expertise. These findings underscore the effectiveness of 
accounting expertise of independent directors in reducing the incidence and severity of corporate 
misconduct. 
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Expansions and Contractions of Major US Shopping Centers  
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1. Introduction 
Shopping centers play a vital role in the U.S. economy. Seventy percent of U.S.’s GDP is 
attributed to consumer spending and forty percent of consumer spending is conducted at shopping 
centers.
1
 One of the most important economic decisions made by a developer of a shopping center is 
the irreversible decision to expand or to contact. However, academic literature that examined 
redevelopment of shopping centers is very limited. To the best of our knowledge, only one study 
(Peng and Thibodeau (2011)) examines property level redevelopment decision for commercial real 
estate; it finds that their model is not significant for retail properties.
2
 We contribute to the literature 
by analyzing the determinants of expansions and contractions of shopping centers using a unique 
dataset of property level data for shopping centers in eleven metropolitan areas over the period from 
1995 through 2005.  
Our study of the contraction decision is particularly timely: even before the global financial 
crisis (GFC) investment professionals noted a trend away from regional and super-regional centers 
with full line department stores and towards smaller “life style” centers emphasizing a small town or 
village shopping experience. In some cases this involved converting enclosed malls with high Heating, 
Ventilating, and Air Conditioning (HVAC) costs to open air centers. In other cases regional centers 
have been replaced by “power centers” characterized by big box retailers.3 This is sometimes referred 
to as “demalling.” Our study is further motivated by the GFC. Higher unemployment and reduced 
retail spending has caused discussion of too much retail space per customer. One way to deal with the 
high operating costs generated by excess retail space is to reduce the size of the centers. 
We examine two types of irreversible decisions: substantial change in the number of stores and in 
Gross Leasable Area (GLA thereafter). Since the change in GLA involves greater degree of 
irreversibility, this analysis provides one method of controlling for the cost of changing the center.
4
 
                                                 
1
 The 40% estimate is based on Bureau of Labor Statistics numbers analyzed by Fanning (2005). 
2
 Other empirical studies examine new construction rather than capital expenditures for existing properties. See 
Peng and Thibodeau (2011) for detailed review of this stream of literature. 
3
 Morris Newman (1999), writing for The Los Angeles Times says “As shoppers find other ways to buy 
merchandise, several traditional shopping centers--including that famous playground for Valley girls, the former 
Sherman Oaks Galleria--are being converted to such new hybrids as entertainment centers, "big box" retail 
centers, office buildings, schools and even housing.” 
4
 Change in the number of stores is associated with relatively small costs of repositioning of walls. However, it 
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We separately analyze large and small shopping centers since it is likely that large shopping centers 
are above equilibrium size and small shopping centers are below equilibrium size. Moreover, large 
shopping centers provide greater agglomeration economy for consumers. Furthermore, shopping 
centers might build excess capacity to signal the ability to attract customers and the willingness to 
compete for market share and thus deter the entry of competitors. Therefore, determinants of 
expansion and contraction decisions might differ for small and large shopping centers. 
Large shopping centers in our sample have higher operating costs and higher expected revenue 
than small shopping centers. Large shopping centers have more stores (113 versus 33), however store 
size of larger shopping centers is less than half of that of small shopping centers. Although large 
shopping centers have more competitors, the market share of the competition is smaller than that of 
the competitors of small shopping centers. 
We rely on several theoretical frameworks to guide our empirical analysis. Real options theory is 
one of the most widely researched theories applied to the analysis of the irreversible investment 
decisions. The purchase of real estate includes embedded real options to alter the bundle of structural 
characteristics. Value derives from the flow of utility and/or rents from the existing property 
characteristics and from the right but not the obligation to alter the structure. The call (put) option is 
the right but not the obligation to increase (reduce) the scale of investment at a given location 
(McDonald and Siegel, 1986). Location is not subject to alteration: ownership of land confers the 
right but not the obligation to make changes to the structure. Dixit (1989) provides a simple 
theoretical framework, in which a fixed cost can be paid to go out of business and eliminate operating 
losses. If the factory is not operating, a different cost can be paid to re-enter. Thus there are two states 
for the investment: operating or not operating. The former gives rise to the put option, which is in the 
money when variable costs are above revenues, while the latter has value for the call, which is in the 
money when value exceeds the cost of entry.
5
 Real options theory predicts that the increase in costs 
                                                                                                                                                        
requires costly and irreversible renegotiation of leases. Change in GLA involves high construction costs. Both 
types of redevelopment involve disruption of existing retailing.  
5
 The literature contains numerous empirical studies of the call option for housing:  i.e., the option to tear 
down and rebuild a larger or more luxurious structure, or to substantially renovate. The tear down option is the 
subject of Rosenthal and Helsley (1994); Dye and McMillen (2007); Rosenthal (2008); Clapp and Salavei 
(2010); Clapp, Bardos and Wong (2011). Vacant land (zoned commercial and residential) has been studied by 
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and (or) a decrease in expected revenue lower the value of call option but increase the value of put 
option. 
Bulan, Mayer and Somerville (2009) point out that it can be difficult to distinguish the exercise 
of an option at the point in time when NPV=0 from the exercise after a delay, when NPV>0. In real 
option theory, the NPV=0 point corresponds to a certainty world, where risk is zero and therefore the 
value of option to wait is zero. In contrast, when uncertainty is greater than zero the exercise takes 
place when NPV>0 and the option to delay is valuable; risk is important empirically. We show that a 
real options theoretical framework is more general than the NPV framework: i.e., the NPV rule is a 
special case of a barrier control policy.
6
 
Our data are not well suited to distinguishing whether expansions and contractions take place 
when NPV=0 or NPV>0. Therefore, most of our analysis focuses on the determinants of the trigger 
point net of the value of option to wait, such as revenue and costs. However, our general framework 
allows us to separately consider some evidence supporting the role of uncertainty in delaying 
investment decisions. 
We find that an increase in operating costs and a decrease in revenue lower the probability of 
expansion but increase the probability of contraction. Small shopping centers with large stores are 
more likely to provide greater variety of stores to customers while leaving the footprint in place. 
Large shopping centers with large stores adjust with both decreases of the footprint and increase in the 
number of store. This suggests that large shopping centers have greater flexibility in responding to 
changing market conditions. For small shopping centers the decision to change GLA is largely driven 
                                                                                                                                                        
Quigg (1993); theory derives from the seminal work of Titman (1985). Commercial property call option 
exercise has been studied by Childs, Riddiough and Triantis (1996) and by Schwartz and Torous (2007). 
Empirical studies of put option have focused on mine openings and closings (Brennan and Schwartz 1985; Moel 
and Tufano 2002). The salient point here is the relatively high operating costs that can be saved by shutting 
down. Most housing and office properties would bear substantial operating costs (property taxes, insurance, 
security) even if shuttered, so an owner with an over-improved property has little choice but to wait for 
depreciation to reduce the value of the investment. Glaeser and Gyorko (2005) study asymmetrical investment 
decisions in housing. 
6
 Dixit and Pindyck (1994, pp 139-40) point out that real option theory is relevant in a certainty world because 
the flexibility to delay a project has value. Certainty is a special case of the real options model: when risk 
approaches zero, then the NPV rule becomes the only relevant consideration. When risk is significantly greater 
than zero, then the NPV determinants (costs and revenues) are still relevant. 
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by potential revenue, while the decision to change the number of stores is mainly a function of cost. 
These results are consistent with the certainty case of classical real options model (e.g. Dixit (1989)). 
If the value of option to delay is non-zero, then the trigger point for expansion will increase by 
the value of call option and the trigger point for contraction will decrease by the value of put option. 
For provide some support for the presence of non-negative put and call options. First, we find that 
both expansion and the contraction in GLA are less likely for large malls in MSAs with greater 
uncertainty about real estate prices. Second, Grenadier (1996) suggests that the value of both call and 
put option is reduced by competition: i.e., any value to the delay option is reduced as decision making 
is forced towards the NPV rule. An industry leader will exercise her option earlier than implied by real 
options framework to reap the additional profits from leadership. We find support for Grenadier (1996) 
in our univariate analysis. Shopping centers that expand in GLA, but not the number of stores, have 
more competitors than the rest of the sample. Contractions in both GLA and number of stores have 
more competitors. The coefficient on number of competitors in multivariate analysis is only 
marginally significant in some models, but is of expected sign: the number of competitors reduces the 
value of option to wait and increases the likelihood of both expansion and contraction. The result is 
stronger for small shopping centers.  
Lastly, we examine whether strategic deterrence (see, for example, Salvo (2010)) can explain 
shopping center renovation decisions. Shopping centers may expand in anticipation of competitive 
entry and contract in response to entry. We find support for this theory for large shopping centers: 
market share of competition reduces the likelihood of exercise of both call and put options. The result 
is stronger for expansions. 
Overall, our hypotheses better explain contractions for large shopping centers and expansions for 
small shopping centers, suggesting that large shopping centers are above equilibrium size and small 
shopping centers are below equilibrium size.  
The paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, this paper provides first evidence on 
the determinants of redevelopment decisions for shopping centers. Second, our analysis uses a unique 
dataset of geographically diverse property level data that spans a ten year time period. Third, we 
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simultaneously examine both expansions and contractions. Finally, our analysis focuses on 
redevelopment rather than new construction, which has received considerably more attention in the 
literature.  
The paper proceeds as follows. Next section reviews relevant theoretical framework and 
develops hypotheses. Section 3 discusses the data. Section 4 presents univariate analysis. Multivariate 
analysis and robustness tests are discussed in Section 5, and the role of the delay option is explicitly 
addressed. Section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Theoretical Background and Hypotheses  
A number of theories provide a framework for evaluating expansion and contraction decisions of 
US shopping centers. We include several relevant theoretical perspectives because the study of 
shopping center expansions and contractions is a new area of inquiry, without previous theory or 
empirical work that is directly relevant.
7
 These theories provide a basis for identifying relevant 
explanatory variables and functional forms; these allow us to explore our database.  
 
2.1 Classical Option Exercise Model 
Dixit (1989) proposes a theoretical framework analyzing entry and exit decisions. Investment 
decisions are irreversible and entail sunk costs. Suppose there is a project with avoidable operating 
cost w per unit of time. The investment requires a sunk cost k to enter. If the investment is made, the 
abandonment requires a one-time sunk cost l to exit.   is the rate of interest. P is the revenue of 
the project per unit of time. If the firm believes that P will be unchanged, it should invest if
kwP   , where the right hand side is the annualized full cost of the investment. Similarly, if the 
project starts operation, it should be abandoned as soon as P satisfies the following inequality:
, 0L LP w l W whereW     . This is the NPV rule, which holds under certainty. The costs of 
                                                 
7
 Cho and Shilling (2007) examines the real option applications on shopping center leases. Peng and Thibodeau 
(2011) examine the association between interest rate changes and capital expenditures for retail properties and 
find it to be insignificant. 
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investment provide the “irreversible” component to the investment decisions.8 
In the NPV framework of Dixit (1989), it must be true that 0 L HW P W   . If P falls below 
LW then the put option is rationally exercised and the supply of the product falls.
9
 If P rises above 
HW then the call option is rationally exercised and the supply of the product increases. Most of our 
evidence focuses on the determinants of P , 
 H
W
 
and LW ; as such, it is consistent with this 
certainty model.
 
In this certainty model we have the following two equations: 
: ( ) HExpand if P w k W             (1) 
: ( ) LContract if P w l W             (2) 
 
Dixit’s model with a valuable option to delay 
Equations (1) and (2) are special cases of Dixit’s general model where risk is significantly greater 
than zero. When uncertainty is added in the form of a stochastic process for P , Dixit shows that a 
rational investor will follow a barrier control policy. PH and PL are two trigger values of investment 
and abandonment, where PH > PL. The investment should be made as soon as P > PH and abandoned 
as soon as P < PL. The trigger value of investment is higher than the full cost because the value of 
delay is sacrificed when the real option is exercised.  
: H H HExpand if P W D P             (3) 
Here, 0HD   is a measure of the value of the option to delay expansion because of uncertainty. 
 Similarly, the trigger value of abandonment is lower than the full cost when we consider that 
stochastic increases in price may make the project profitable in the future. 
 : 0L L LContract if P W D P             (4) 
Here, 0LD   is a measure of the value of the option to delay contraction because of uncertainty. 
                                                 
8
 I.e., the firm can go in and out of business depending on P, but the costs imply that the firm may not enter the 
market even when it is profitable for existing firms, and may not exit even when price is below variable costs. 
9
 A change in supply is one of the distinguishing features between real options and financial options. In this 
regard, real options are like stock warrants. 
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 The model assumes that P is varying stochastically between the two barriers, 
LP and HP . 
Changes in supply together with boundary assumptions ensure that price does not stray outside this 
range.  
As a result, there is a “hysteresis” where an idle firm does not invest and an active firm does not 
exit when price is between HP  
and LP . This area of inaction gets larger the higher the variance of the 
stochastic process and it responds in known ways to other parameters of the model.  
In this study, we focus on how different characteristics affect the trigger values  HW  
and LW . 
Note that the NPV rule implies a band of inaction when price falls between the two trigger points; 
inaction arises because of the irreversible costs of expansion and contraction. Empirically it is difficult 
to distinguish whether exercise occurs when NPV=0 (equations (1) and (2)) or when NPV>0 
(equations (3) and (4)) and the value of option to delay is positive. We provide limited evidence 
regarding the presence of option to delay in section 5.3.  
As the scale of operation for a given type of shopping center
10
 increases, cost increases and 
marginal revenue decreases because the existing shopping center might be at an optimal scale. We 
expect that an increase in w and (or) a decrease in P lower the likelihood of expansion but increase the 
likelihood of contraction. As a result, we expect a negative (positive) relation between shopping 
center scale and the probability of expansion (contraction).  
In this paper, the dependent variables are constructed based on the change of GLA and number of 
stores. This allows us one measure of the cost of option exercise: it is costlier to change GLA than to 
change number of stores holding GLA constant. Construction costs for changing number of stores by 
moving internal partitions are not high. However, the cost of negotiating and renegotiating leases is 
high, and changing the number of stores disrupts existing business. Changing the amount of GLA, on 
the other hand, requires obtaining permits, pouring foundations and other construction costs as well as 
disrupting existing tenants. Thus, we hypothesize that both changes involve irreversibility but that the 
amount of irreversibility is greater for GLA change. 
                                                 
10
 Shopping center types (e.g., community, regional or superregional) will be discussed below. 
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When shopping centers add or subtract GLA or stores they are exercising exchange options: i.e., 
they are exchanging the existing configuration of the real asset for another.
11
 A major cost of the 
exchange is the sacrifice of revenue from existing space or stores. We proxy this cost – i.e., a portion 
of WH and WL in equations (1) and (2) – with average size: GLA/store (store_size). I.e., we divide the 
total GLA in the center by number of stores.  
Our store_size variable is in addition to the cost control we obtain by separating GLA change 
from store change. A third control for cost is provided by the enclosed dummy (enclosed).
12
 This 
allows us to evaluate evidence for the “demalling” trend: enclosed malls are said to reduce HVAC 
costs by converting to open air (“lifestyle” or “power”) centers. These shopping center types typically 
have less GLA and fewer stores. 
Because store_size has GLA in the numerator and number of stores in the denominator,
13
 its 
effect on GLA expansion will be different than its effect on store expansion. An increase in store_size 
increases the cost of GLA expansion because GLA is already relatively large; the exchange of the 
revenues from the existing GLA for the revenues from the new expanded GLA is likely to result in 
relatively small net gain. The reverse is true for expanding stores because the relatively large GLA can 
be more readily subdivided to allow for more stores. This reasoning leads to:     
H1-Expansion: Store_size is negatively (positively) associated with the probability of expansion 
in GLA (number of stores). Enclosed is negatively associated with the probability of expansion in 
both GLA and number of stores.  
H1-Contraction: Store_size is positively (negatively) associated with the probability of 
contraction in GLA (number of stores). Enclosed is positively associated with the probability of 
contraction in both GLA and number of stores. 
We use ordered logit as the main empirical specification for testing our hypotheses, in which 
contraction is coded is -1 and expansion is coded as +1.  
Ordered logit implications of H1: Store_size is negatively (positively) associated with the 
                                                 
11
 The internal configuration of the shopping center (i.e., mix of stores and placement of stores within the 
structure) has received some attention in the literature. See, for example,: Shulz and Stahl (1996), Carter (2009) 
and Benjamin, Boyle and Sirmans (1990 and 1992). 
12
 Enclosed is considered as one of the features of the shopping center design in Sirmans and Guidry (1993). 
13
 Both are measured at the beginning of the period. 
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dependent for GLA (number of stores). Enclosed is negatively associated with the dependent for both 
GLA and number of stores. 
Our proxy for revenue (WATS) is based on the trade area of each shopping center: i.e., the 
geographical area providing most customers.
14
 The trade area will depend on the size and type of the 
shopping center as discussed below.  
H2-Expansion: WATS is positively associated with the probability of expansion in GLA and 
number of stores. 
H2-Contraction: WATS is negatively associated with the probability of contraction in GLA and 
number of stores. 
Ordered logit implications: WATS is positively associated with the dependent, regardless of 
whether it is change in GLA or number of stores. 
 
2.2 Strategic Option Exercise - Grenadier 
Grenadier (1996) suggests that an industry leader tries to exercise the option earlier and reap the 
additional profits from leadership. This reduces the value of both call and put option: i.e., it moves the 
market towards the NPV point. The value of waiting (“hysteresis” in Dixit’s model) is reduced.  
Grenadier’s theory implies that the number of competitors in the trade area is a relevant variable. 
i.e., the theory starts with the classic predictions; increased competition tends to set the C and A 
values in equations (1) and (2) to zero. The theory is based specifically on number of competitors 
(Compet_ttl).
15
 
H3-Expansion: Number of competitors in the trade area is positively associated with the 
probability of expansion in GLA and number of stores. 
H3-Contraction: Number of competitors in the trade area is positively associated with the 
probability of contraction in GLA and number of stores. 
Ordered logit implications: offsetting effects imply insignificant coefficients regardless of 
                                                 
14
 WATS is the weighted average market share within a trade area. See the Appendix for detailed calculations. 
Benjamin, Boyle and Sirmans (1992), Pashigan and Gould (1998) and Carter (2009) show a positive relation 
between sales per sq ft and rent per sq ft. Mejia and Benjamin (2002).   
15
 Bulan, Mayer and Somerville (2009) use the number of competing residential projects as the measure of 
competition in their real option framework.  
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whether we are evaluating changes in GLA or number of stores. 
 
2.3 Strategic Positioning 
We use the term “strategic positioning” to refer to expansions in anticipation of competitive entry 
or contractions in response to entry. Game theory has yielded an extensive literature predicting 
strategic entry deterrence. In this branch of the literature, capacity expansion by an incumbent 
provides a credible threat for prospective entrants. By paying the cost of the expansion, the incumbent 
firm signals that they have the capacity to attract customers and the willingness to compete for market 
share.  
Salvo (2010) develops a model applying strategic deterrence to a domestic monopolist (or group 
of oligopolists) facing the threat of entry by a foreign firm. The domestic firms will expand 
production to satisfy the entire domestic market at a price point just below the price that would invite 
entry. Production will be expanded and contracted in response to demand shocks, but price will 
remain at the point of deterrence. This is relevant to shopping centers, where a center with relatively 
large amount of retail square footage can expand or contract retail lines (i.e., reconfigure existing 
space) in response to demand shocks. Positive demand shocks can lead to more GLA in an effort to 
saturate the market before competitors can gain entry. It takes a strong negative demand shock, 
perceived as permanent, to reach the abandonment point for GLA indicated by equation (2).
16
 
Seminal theory related to entry deterrence is provided by Stahl (1982). Shopping centers are 
generated endogenously simply by introducing a fixed cost (or other non-convexity) into the 
transportation costs of consumers. It follows that the one stop shopping provided by shopping centers 
is valuable to consumers, and they are willing to pay more for it. In effect, shopping centers provide a 
valuable agglomeration economy for consumers. An immediate implication for our research is that 
potential revenue per square foot of retail space, P in the model, increases with the size of the 
shopping center, and it will depend on bundling different types of goods together in a way that is 
valuable to consumers. For example, neighborhood centers might be anchored by a grocery store and 
                                                 
16
 Note that the l cost term can drive the abandonment point far below variable costs. 
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include shoe repair (or other personal services) and a beauty salon. A larger community center might 
be anchored by a junior department store and include a pharmacy or home improvement center. In 
both cases, bundling is designed to increase P .  
These agglomeration economies have been directly related to entry deterrence by Choi and 
Stefanadis (2006). The way in which a firm bundles its goods and services can provide significant 
barriers to competitive entry. They show the application to Microsoft’s attempt to bundle software so 
as to discourage entry and GE’s proposed merger with Honeywell. Here, we propose that shopping 
centers accomplish the same thing by building excess space that can be occupied by a changing mix 
of tenants.
17
 
Another example of the strategic placement game is termed “predatory (or competitive) 
placement.” A center will enter, expand or reconfigure so as to cut off the flow of traffic to a 
competing center. I.e., by providing attractive intervening opportunities it obtains shoppers who 
formerly went to the rival center. This is just one example of the kind of market-filling placement 
discussed by Stahl (1982) and by Salvo (2010).   
Empirically, we model strategic positioning with a variable measuring the market shares of rivals 
within the subject’s trade area.18 We measure the market share of competing centers at the beginning 
of the observation period – i.e., before the subject decides to expand or contract. The logic of strategic 
positioning predicts a negative relationship between the market share of competitors within the trade 
area and the subject’s probability of expansion, and a positive effect on the probability of contraction. 
The logic is that a prior space filling move by competitors, measured by market share, will limit the 
probability that the subject center will expand, and possibly force a contraction. 
H4-Expansion: the market share of competitors in the trade area is negatively associated with the 
probability of expansion in GLA and number of stores. 
H4-Contraction: the market share of competitors in the trade area is positively associated with 
the probability of contraction in GLA and number of stores. 
                                                 
17
 Smith and Hay (2005) have an interesting application to the agglomeration economies of independent owners 
(“streets” of independent retailers), shopping centers and “supermarkets,” defined as a single store that offers 
many different product lines (e.g., butcher, baker, pharmacy and bank) within the store.  
18
 Of course, we control for center type (e.g., regional or community). 
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Ordered logit implications: the market share of competitors in the trade area is negatively 
associated with the dependent, regardless of whether it is based on change in GLA or number of 
stores. 
Note that H4 is differentiated from H3 by emphasizing market share, not number of competitors. 
Grenadier’s theory (H3) deals specifically with number of competitors which drive the market away 
from oligopoly and towards strategic competition. On the other hand, H4 is based on agglomeration 
economies associated with market share. 
It might be argued that number of competitors and market share of competitors are highly 
correlated, obviating the theoretical distinction between number of competitors and market share of 
competitors. In this case, the signs of the expected coefficients differentiate the two sets of hypotheses. 
Grenadier’s theory predicts a positive sign on the call option and it has no prediction for ordered logit, 
whereas strategic positioning predicts a negative association with the likelihood of expansion and on 
the ordered logit coefficient. Both predict a positive association with the likelihood of contraction. 
 
2.4 Alternative Hypotheses 
Our discussions with real estate professionals suggest a large number of hypotheses intended to 
explain expansion and contraction of shopping centers. Most of these are consistent with the above 
hypotheses. For example, one common hypothesis is that the trend away from enclosed malls and 
towards power centers or lifestyle centers is motivated by a desire for cost savings. Effective rental 
cost for tenants is their base rent, possibly a percentage of sales, and common area (CAM) charges. 
CAM can be a large part of total rent. 
 The desire to reduce CAM is just one aspect of the real options theories, H1 – H4; w in 
equations (1) and (2). Thus, we assert that the theoretical framework we have provided has richer 
implications than institutional hypotheses. 
Our research is motivated by our unique database, allowing us to analyze expansion and 
contraction decisions. If the hypotheses H1-H4 yield incorrect or inconclusive predictions, then the 
data may suggest an alternative explanation supported by the professional retail literature. Any results 
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supporting our hypotheses will be conservative since there are many impediments, such as delays in 
obtaining permits and neighborhood opposition, to shopping center owners acting in their best 
economic interests. 
 
3. Data 
We test our hypotheses using shopping center data from the Directory of Major Malls (directory 
or DMM thereafter). DMM reports shopping center characteristics for over 50 Metropolitan Statistical 
Areas (MSAs) for shopping centers with GLA of more than 250,000 square feet.  We analyze 343 
shopping centers in eleven MSAs. We choose MSAs that are included in the Case and Shiller price 
index and have the greatest number of shopping centers. We define that a shopping center is located in 
a particular MSA based on the Standards for Defining Metropolitan and Micropolitan Statistical Areas 
published by The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) in 2000.
19
 We obtain directories for the 
following years: 1995, 2000, 2002 and 2005.
20
 For 223 (65%) of shopping centers in our sample the 
first record appears in 1995 directory, for 76 (22%) shopping centers the first record appears in 2000 
directory and for remaining 44 (13%) shopping centers – in 2002 directory. DMM reports name, 
location, design (open-air or enclosed), GLA, number of stores, site area, year opened, year of last 
renovation, etc. Some information, such as proposed expansion data, is self-reported by the managers 
and is considered subjective so we do not include it in our analysis.  
For each shopping center we require at least 2 entries in directories so that we can determine 
whether an expansion or a contraction took place. It should be noted that some shopping centers are 
missing in some directories. Unless demolished before 2005, shopping centers with year opened 
before 1995 should be recorded in all four directories, shopping centers with year opened between 
1995 and 2000 should appear in 2000, 2002 and 2005 directories, and so forth. We check all the 
                                                 
19
 The 11 MSAs include (1) Boston-Cambridge-Quincy, MA-NH Metropolitan Statistical Area; (2) 
Charlotte-Gastonia-Concord, NC-SC Metropolitan Statistical Area; (3) Cleveland-Elyria-Mentor, OH 
Metropolitan Statistical Area; (4) Denver-Aurora, CO Metropolitan Statistical Area; (5) Las Vegas-Paradise, NV 
Metropolitan Statistical Area; (6) Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington, MN-WI Metropolitan Statistical Area; (7) 
San Diego-Carlsbad-San Marcos, CA Metropolitan Statistical Area; (8) San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa Clara, CA 
Metropolitan Statistical Area; (9) Seattle-Tacoma-Bellevue, WA Metropolitan Statistical Area; (10) Tampa-St. 
Petersburg-Clearwater, FL Metropolitan Statistical Area; and (11) Portland-Vancouver-Beaverton, OR-WA 
Metropolitan Statistical Area.  
20
 We used the 2002 Directory to verify and revise variables from the 2000 Directory. 
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observations to ensure that our results are not affected by survivorship bias.
21
 We focus on a stacked 
sample of two five-year time intervals: 1995-2000 and 2000-2005. In that way, we assume that each 
observation come to our sample independently, although one shopping center might be counted at most 
twice from 1995-2000 and 2000-2005. This assumption is reasonable because, even for a same 
shopping center, a stacked sample captures changes in the local market environment from one time 
period to the next. 
We collect the latitudes and longitudes for all the shopping centers using the geographic 
information system (GIS). We then use Haversine formula to calculate the distances between 
shopping centers to surrounding census tracts and shopping centers to its competitors. Distances based 
on Haversine formula are great arc distances instead of road distances. Road distances vary with 
topographical conditions and methods of transportation and hence are more difficult to measure. 
 
4. Summary Statistics 
 Table 1 describes the variables collected and calculated from the DMM, the US Census and S&P. 
We use the latitude and longitude coordinates for each shopping center in the GIS system to define the 
trade area. Trade area is the geographical area from which most sales originate. The shopping center 
size and characteristics are major factors that delimit the trade area. An exact trade area is difficult to 
define because it relies on a complex of parameters such as uniqueness of retailer, variety of 
transportation, consumer perception, etc. Our classification comes principally from the International 
Council of Shopping Centers (ICSC thereafter), which is a leading global trade association of the 
shopping center industry. We define a shopping center as “large” if it has a GLA greater than 600,000 
sq ft and number of stores greater than 40, which is the upper bound of a community center. The 
remaining malls are classified as “small”.22 Similarly, a trade radius is assigned to each shopping 
                                                 
21
 It means that all the shopping centers were not demolished in 2005. We do not consider the change of 
ownership as a failed case. The directory assigns an identification number to each shopping center. The 
identification number does not change as the owner or name changes. 
22
 ICSC clearly defines the range of GLA and number of stores, and trade areas for different types of shopping 
centers. The ICSC definition is different from Carter (2009). Some papers, such as Gatzlatt, Sirmans and Diskin 
(1994) and Carter and Vandell (2005) only focus on certain types of shopping centers. 
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center based on its type according to the ICSC standard.
23
  
 We use store size (scaled by 1,000 sq ft) and enclosed dummy as proxies for cost of renovation 
in H1. Competition is captured by the number of competitors within trade areas in order to address 
Grenadier’s model of strategic option exercise, which is stated in H3-Expansion and contraction 
hypotheses. In addition, we calculate the average market shares for competitors within 5 miles to test 
H4-Expansion and contraction. 
Table 2 shows the summary statistics of a pooled sample of five-year spans of 1995-2000 and 
2000-2005.
24
 Panel A includes continuous variables. Panel B presents statistics for dummy and 
MSA-level variables. Panels C through E compare the differences between two sub-samples: large 
and small shopping centers, expansions in GLA and contractions in GLA, expansions in number of 
stores and contractions in number of stores. Panel F compares each type of renovation with no change. 
Chi-square tests are used to test the independence of the sub-samples. To define expansion and 
contraction, we compare the first and the last observation of the sample period and construct four 
renovation dummies, a dummy equal one if GLA increased (decreased) by 10% or more (GLA_exp 
and GLA_con, respectively) and zero otherwise; a dummy equal to one if the number of stores 
increased (decreased) by 10% or more (store_exp and store_con, respectively). All changes are 
calculated by comparing the first and the last observation of the time span; level variables are for the 
first year. For example, GLA and number of stores in Table 2 Panel A are from DMM 1995 for 
1995-2000 time span observations and are from DMM 2000 for 2000-2005 observations. We focus on 
the first year we observe the shopping center so that prior shopping center characteristics can be 
allowed to predict subsequent renovation.  
Table 2 Panels A and B show descriptive statistics for the sample. As shown in Panel A, an 
average shopping center in our sample is classified as a large shopping center with GLA of 612,115 sq 
ft and 76 stores. Mean shopping center increased GLA but decreased the number of stores, however 
the median shopping center did not change either GLA or the number of stores. The average store size 
                                                 
23
 We apply 6 miles for community centers, 5 miles for power centers, 15 miles for regional shopping centers 
and 25 miles for super regional shopping centers. Note that community centers are power centers are classified 
as small shopping centers and regional and superregional malls are classified as large shopping centers.   
24
 Our results are similar when we use 5-year spans of 1995-2000 and 2000-2005, a 10-year span of 1995-2005 
and a pooled sample of 5-year spans of 1995-2000 and 2000-2005.   
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is 11,950 square feet. WATS mean suggests that the potential revenue per sq ft from an average 
household within trade areas is about $1.84. An average shopping center competes with twelve 
shopping centers in its trade area.  
Table 2 Panel B shows that forty six percent of shopping centers are enclosed. Slightly more than 
half of our sample consists of large shopping centers. Our sample includes 113 expansions (55 in GLA 
and 53 in the number of stores) and 175 contractions (58 in GLA and 117 in the number of stores). In 
general, investors are equally likely to change GLA and number of stores for expansions but more 
likely to change number of stores for contractions as suggested by much greater proportion of store 
contractions in all the sub-samples. The imbalance in the irreversible investments indicates that 
investors are ambitious in expansion by changing the shopping center footprint but conservative in 
contraction by only altering the tenant profile. This phenomenon could be explained by strategic 
deterrence because, once the scale-indication investment is made, it has value in deterring competitive 
entry. I.e., it poses a credible threat of high attractive power (agglomeration economies) and low 
prices due to scale economies. 
MSA-level variables show that our observations are fairly equally distributed across eleven 
MSAs. Comparatively, the distributions of renovations show more variations. For example, some 
MSAs, such as Minneapolis and Boston have a greater percentage of expansions and contractions. 
Case Shiller growth rate (growth5) and standard deviation (std5) variables are used to test the basic 
prediction of uncertainty version of Dixit’s model. They are available only at MSA level. Because we 
pool two five-year sample periods, we choose the annualized Case-Shiller growth rate and standard 
deviation in the middle year of the first and last observations. We use the alternatives of 1-year, 3-year 
and 5-year average within the middle year. As a result, each MSA has 2 observations for annualized 
growth and standard deviation. MSAs, such as Cleveland and San Diego, with higher growth rates 
also have higher risks. 
Panel C compares sub-samples of small and large shopping centers. It is likely that many large 
shopping centers are above equilibrium size while many small shopping centers are below equilibrium. 
As a result, large shopping centers might be more likely to contract and small shopping centers might 
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be more likely to expand. Therefore, we analyze large and small shopping centers separately. T-test 
and Wilcoxon test are used to test the differences in sample mean and median of continuous variables, 
respectively. Chi-square test is used to test the independence of two sub-samples for binary variables.  
In Panel C, an average small shopping center has GLA of 346,000 sq ft and 33 stores and an 
average large shopping center has GLA of 847,000 sq ft and 113 stores. A greater store size of small 
shopping centers, together with a greater fraction of store contractions in large shopping centers, is 
consistent with the current trend of power center conversions.
25
 Large shopping centers have more 
competitors and capture greater market share so they have smaller average weighted average market 
share of competitors within 5 miles (compet_share). A proxy for revenue per sq ft, WATS, is much 
greater for large shopping centers than small shopping centers.
26
 The difference of WATS between 
small and large shopping centers is consistent with the retail agglomeration economies theories in 
Ghosh (1986) and West, Von Hohenbalkon and Kroner (1985). Large shopping centers are much more 
attractive to shoppers, so they have higher sales volume per sq ft.
27
 A smaller store_size together with 
a higher WATS of large shopping centers is also consistent with Carter (2009) and Pashigan and Gould 
(1998) that smaller stores tend to have higher sales and rent per sq ft. Chi-square tests show that there 
is a significantly higher proportion of enclosed malls among large shopping centers. Large shopping 
centers are more likely to renovate except for store expansion. In conclusion, the differences in 
characteristics between small and large shopping centers highlight the importance of controlling for 
shopping center type in the regression analysis. 
Table 2 Panels D and E examine sub-samples by type of renovation. Our hypothesis, 
H1-Expansion, is supported by a significantly smaller store_size of GLA-expansion shopping centers 
when compared to shopping centers that experienced contraction (Panel D). Shopping centers that 
have large store sizes as measured by GLA/store face lower revenue loss from contraction.
28
 Turning 
                                                 
25
 Power centers became quite common in recent years. A power center usually refers to a shopping center with 
200,000 to 800,000 square feet of gross leasable areas that contains three or more big-box retailers or 
department stores and a number of smaller retailers. Movie center conversion refers to the renovation in which 
the shopping center owners take the movie center out and add more retailers. 
26
 We present both the absolute value and the log value of WATS. While we use log value of WATS in 
regressions, the results are similar when we use absolute value.  
27
 Benjamin, Boyle and Sirmans (1992) also conclude that the larger the centers, the higher the rents. 
28
 This is an exchange option, so revenue loss from any change is part of the cost of exercise. 
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to expansion in number of stores compared to contraction in number of stores (Panel E), we find that 
relation for the cost of exercise is reversed: it is relatively inexpensive to expand stores (expensive to 
contract) when store size is large. Panel E confirms that this is a significant effect, supporting H1. 
Enclosed proportions support hypothesis 1 only for expansion in number of stores but not expansion 
in GLA because the proportion of enclosed shopping centers for GLA expansions is not significantly 
greater than for GLA contractions. This might be explained by the agglomeration economies in 
enclosed shopping centers. Sirmans and Guidry (1993) find that enclosed shopping centers have 
higher rents because they provide more variety and thus have higher ability to attract customers. 
However, expansions on store scale do not have significant effects on boosting rental revenue. In that 
way, enclosed shopping centers have higher incentives to expand their GLA scale instead of store 
scale.  
H2-Expansion and H2-Contraction predict that proxy for revenue per sq ft is positively 
(negatively) associated with the probability of expansion (contraction) in GLA and number of stores. 
As shown in Panels D and E, GLA-expansion and store-expansion shopping centers WATS is greater 
than that for the full sample, which is consistent with H2-Expansion. Although we do not find a 
smaller WATS in store-contraction shopping centers, WATS in GLA-contraction shopping centers is 
smaller than for the full sample consistent with H2-Contraction. Consistent with H3-Expansion and 
H3-Contraction, we find that number of competitors is greater in each type of renovations than the 
whole sample. Because of the offsetting effect, the mean and median are not significantly different 
between expansion and contraction sub-samples in both cases. The coefficients of compet_share 
provide little evidence on the strategic positioning as most of the tests on mean and median 
differences are insignificant.   
The offsetting effect highlights the importance of comparing each type of renovation with no 
change in Panel F. Consistent with H1, store_size is significantly negative in GLA expansion and store 
contraction and significantly positive in store expansion. Consistent with H1, proportion of enclosed 
shopping centers is higher in store contraction than in no change sub-sample. A higher proportion of 
enclosed shopping centers in the GLA-expansion sub-sample seems to contradict H1 but can be 
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explained by agglomeration economies. Although WATS is insignificantly different for contractions 
when compared to no change, it is significantly higher for expansions on both GLA and number of 
stores as predicted in H2. Competition is higher for both expansions and contractions than no change 
sub-sample, supporting H3. Lastly, market share (compet_share) does not differ for the sub-samples.  
Overall, Panels D and E suggest that renovation decisions on GLA and number of stores should 
be examined separately. The decisions on renovation of GLA and number of stores might be explained 
by different factors in different ways. For example, store_size is significantly smaller in 
GLA-expansion than GLA-contraction but significantly greater in store-expansion than 
store-contraction. In addition, WATS difference is significant in GLA change but not in store change 
sub-samples. 
  
5. Results 
In this section we perform multivariate tests of our hypotheses. We employ three types of 
logistics regressions: ordered, multinomial and simple logit.
29
 Ordered and multinomial logit allow us 
to jointly consider expansions and contractions. The dependent variable in these models equals -1 for 
contractions and +1 for expansions. Ordered logit is the most appropriate model for our analysis 
because there is a natural order to our dependent variable: when put option is in the money the call 
option is out of the money and vice versa. Similarly, even when the value of option to wait is zero, 
HW  
and LW  are not equal. Therefore, when a shopping center hits upper bound  HW  
it will be 
above lower bound LW . Moreover, the results are easy to interpret. Multinomial model lifts some 
restrictions by allowing for asymmetric effect of explanatory variables on decision to expand or 
contract. However, multinomial model does not consider the order of the dependent variable, and it 
assumes independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA). 
 
 
                                                 
29
 Prior literature also used hazard models to examine the determinants of time between renovations (Bulan, 
Mayer and Somerville (2000)). Our data is not well suited for such tests because we observe a shopping center 
only at three points during a ten year interval. Moreover, the directory does not provide reliable data on the year 
built and year since last renovation, variables essential to hazard analysis.  
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5.1. Multivariate analysis – Ordered logit 
Table 3 shows ordered logistic regression for the stacked sample of 1995-2000 and 2000-2005. 
Since changing number of stores is less costly than changing the amount of GLA, we separately 
analyze change in GLA and change in the number of stores to better control for cost of irreversible 
decision. The dependent variable in the analysis of changes in GLA is gla_reno and equals -1 if GLA 
decrease by 10% or more and +1 if GLA increase by 10% or more during the observation period; and 
zero otherwise. The store_reno variable is constructed in the same manner for store size.  
In Model 1, we focus on testing the implications of irreversible investment theory (hypotheses 1 
and 2). To test hypothesis 1, we include two measures of cost in our model: store_size and enclosed. 
We expect negative association between these variables and gla_reno, and positive association with 
store_reno. To test hypothesis 2, we include WATS, which proxies for revenue per square foot. We 
expect positive association of WATS with both gla_reno and store_reno. We allow for different effect 
for large and small shopping centers by including large dummy and interacting it with WATS and 
store_size. All continuous variables are standardized to the mean of zero and the variance of one. 
Therefore, the coefficients show change in the likelihood of expansion or contraction given a one 
standard deviation change in explanatory variable.  The marginal effects of each coefficient for large 
shopping centers are shown at the bottom of Table 3.   
We find that for both small and large shopping centers the sign of the coefficient on store_size is 
as predicted by hypothesis 1: negative for gla_reno and positive for store_reno. However, for large 
shopping centers this coefficient is significant only in gla_reno regression while for small shopping 
centers it is significant only in store_reno regression.
30
 When stores are large, the cost of developing 
additional GLA is high, whereas the cost of reconfiguring GLA for additional stores is relatively small. 
The results suggest that small shopping centers are more likely to increase the number of stores the 
bigger the initial store size, whereas this variable has no significant effect on change in GLA. I.e., 
costs and benefits are such that small shopping centers with big stores optimize by leaving their 
footprint unchanged while subdividing the space so as to give customers a greater variety of stores. 
                                                 
30
 See marginal effects for large shopping centers in Table 3. 
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Large shopping centers, on the other hand, are more likely to decrease GLA as store size gets bigger, 
reducing their footprint. For large shopping centers, the response of number of stores to the store size 
variable is the same as small shopping centers.  Thus, large shopping centers adjust with both GLA 
decreases and with store increases whereas small shopping centers only use the latter. These results 
are consistent with hypothesis 1. Although the coefficient on the enclosed dummy is not significant in 
either model, the sign is negative and consistent with H1 that enclosed malls are less likely to expand 
and more likely to contract.  
We find support for hypothesis 2. For small shopping centers a proxy for revenue per square foot, 
WATS, is positive and significant in gla_reno regression and is positive but insignificant in store_reno 
regression.
31
 Combined with the findings for store_size, this suggests that for small shopping centers 
the decision to change GLA is largely driven by potential revenue, while the decision to change the 
number of stores is largely a function of cost.  For large shopping centers both the decision to 
increase GLA and the decision to increase number of stores is positively associated with WATS, 
suggesting that expected revenue is an important consideration for expansion decisions. Note that for 
large shopping centers the decision to change GLA is determined by both costs and revenue (as 
suggested by negative coefficients on store_size and WATS). However, only expected revenue proxy 
(WATS) and not the cost proxy (store_size and enclosed) are significant at explaining the decision to 
change number of stores for large shopping centers. Overall, the results suggest that large shopping 
centers have more room to maneuver than small shopping centers and respond to changing market 
conditions by altering both number of stores and the footprint of the shopping center. 
Model 2 tests whether predictions of Grenadier’s theory can help explain the decision to 
redevelop. We include compet_ttl and its interaction with large to Model 1. We find that total 
competition does not explain decision to change GLA or number of stores for either small or large 
shopping centers, rejecting hypothesis 3. The rest of the results remain robust to inclusion of these 
variables. 
To tests hypothesis 4, we include the average of the WATS of competitors within 5 miles of the 
                                                 
31
 Note that the p-value is .26, suggesting that an increased sample size will produce a significant positive sign. 
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subject shopping center (compet_share) and interaction of compet_share with large dummy (see 
Model 3). Since compet_share and compet_ttl are likely correlated, we exclude compet_ttl from 
Model 3. We find support for hypothesis 4 only for large shopping centers in store_reno regression. 
The coefficient on compet_share is negative and significant; this suggests that large market share of 
competitors increases the probability of contraction of the number of stores. This follows from central 
place theory which says that a larger share for competitors shrinks the customer base and reduces 
optimal size. The rest of the results are unaffected with an exception of the negative coefficient on 
enclosed dummy becoming significant in store_reno, providing further support for hypothesis 1.  
Table 4 shows separate analysis for large and small shopping centers. For large shopping centers, 
positive coefficient on store_size becomes significant in store_reno regression (Models 1 and 2), and 
enclosed dummy becomes significant in Model 2, providing support for hypothesis 1. For small 
shopping centers results in Table 4 are similar to those in Table 3.  
Overall, we find the decision of a shopping center to expand or contract is best explained by 
classical theory of irreversible reinvestment, rather than by number of competitors and the market 
share of the competition.
32
 
 
5.2. Multivariate analysis – multinomial and simple logit 
So far our analysis employed ordered logistic regression. The advantage of this approach is that 
we were able to simultaneously consider the exercise of both expansions and contractions and account 
for natural ordering of put and call decisions. However, ordered logit does not allow for asymmetric 
effect of explanatory variables. Moreover, the IIA assumption is required. In this section, we replicate 
Table 4 using multinomial logistic regression, which produces separate coefficient for expansions and 
contractions, while considering these decisions simultaneously.  
Table 5 suggests that the effect of all explanatory variables on gla_reno and store_reno differs 
for NPV put and NPV call options. One new result in Table 5 is that large shopping centers are more 
likely to contract: the total effect for large dummy is positive and significant for contractions for both 
                                                 
32
 Section 5.4 discusses the evidence supporting the presence of option to wait.  
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gla_reno and store_reno regressions in all three models. However, the total effect for large dummy is 
not significant for expansions, suggesting that large shopping centers are equally likely to expand as 
small shopping centers. Interestingly, none of the variables are significant in explaining contractions 
of small shopping centers in Table 5. At the same time, the results for expansions of small shopping 
center in multinomial logit (Table 5) are very similar to results using ordered logit (Table 4): revenue 
proxy WATS is increasing the likelihood of expansion in GLA and cost proxy store_size is increasing 
the likelihood of expansion in number of stores. This suggests that the significance in ordered logit 
comes from the relation of WATS and store_size with expansion but not the contractions of the small 
shopping centers.  Similarly, for large shopping centers we find that there is more significance in 
expansion rather than contraction models (see net effects for WATS and store_size). Overall, 
multinomial logit suggests that theory of irreversible investment better explains contraction decisions 
of large shopping centers and expansion decisions of small shopping centers, suggesting that large 
shopping centers are above equilibrium size and small shopping centers are below equilibrium size. 
Table 6 performs multinomial logit analysis separately for large and small shopping centers. For 
large shopping centers WATS and store_size are highly significant in explaining contraction in both 
GLA and number of stores in the direction predicted by hypothesis 1.  WATS decreases the likelihood 
of GLA and number of store contraction, suggesting that higher expected revenue makes the shopping 
center less likely to contract. Consistent with Hypothesis 2, store_size increases the probability of 
contraction on GLA but decreases the probability of contraction on number of stores. Total 
competition becomes marginally significant at 9% in the GLA contraction model, suggesting that 
greater number of competitors makes the contraction more likely. This supports hypothesis 3. 
Interestingly, for large shopping centers none of the variables are significant in the expansion on 
GLA model, although the p-values are all below 30% suggesting that a larger sample size might result 
in more power. In Table 5 WATS is positive but WATS for large shopping centers is much higher than 
small shopping centers so the effect becomes not as prominent as in general model. 
In Models 2 and 3 negative coefficient on store_size becomes significant in GLA expansion 
model, supporting hypothesis 1: large shopping centers with high operating costs are less likely to 
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expand. Store_reno regressions for expansions provide support for hypotheses 1 and 2: enclosed malls 
are less likely to expand number of stores; shopping centers with high expected revenue are more 
likely to expand number of stores as suggested by positive coefficient on WATS. We also find support 
for hypothesis 4: higher market share of competitors decreases the likelihood of expansion on the 
number of stores. 
The decision to contract for small shopping centers is explained only by number of competitors 
– greater number of competitors forces small shopping centers to increase the probability of 
contraction (Table 6, Panel B). The decision to expand for small shopping centers is associated with 
more variables: expansion in GLA is positively associated with WATS and compet_ttl; expansion in 
number of stores is positively associated with store_size. Overall, multivariate logit shows that for 
large shopping centers our hypotheses better explain contractions while for small shopping centers our 
hypotheses better explain expansions, supporting our contention that large shopping centers are above 
equilibrium and small shopping centers are below equilibrium. 
 
5.3 Evidence for the value of the option to delay 
Equations (3) and (4) apply to the more realistic assumption of a stochastic process for price, P .  
In this case, the higher the variance of the process, the higher the “wedge” between the NPV rule and 
the real option rule. This wedge is represented by HD  (expansion option) and LD (contraction 
option). The purpose of this section is to summarize the evidence pertaining to the role of uncertainty 
in adding value to the option to delay. 
Our data is not well suited to directly test the predictions of real options theory of positive 
association of uncertainty and the value of options to expand and contract because we do not have 
property level measure of uncertainty. However, we are able to provide some limited evidence that 
suggests the presence of option to wait to redevelop. First, we re-estimate models in Tables 3 and 4 
replacing MSA dummies with MSA level measures of drift (growth5) and variance (std5) of house 
prices obtained from Case and Shiller Indexes. We find that for large malls the coefficient on std5 is 
negative and significant in gla models, suggesting that higher uncertainty about real estate prices 
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delays redevelopment. Coefficient on growth5 is positive but not significant for large malls in any of 
the models. Coefficient on neither variable is significant for small malls.  
Second, as discussed earlier, we find some support for Grenadier’s model: greater number of 
competitors increases the likelihood of contraction, especially for small malls. Grenadier’s model 
assumes that the value of option to delay is non-negative and that competition reduces the value of 
this option forcing the exercise.  
 
5.4 Robustness tests 
In this section we perform several robustness tests. We estimate simple logit regressions, which 
consider the decision to expand and contract independently. In terms of Dixit’s theory, this is 
supported if the call option is deep out of the money when the put option is in the money, and vice 
versa. As a robustness test, simple logit avoids the IIA assumption made by multinomial logit: simple 
logit assumes the independence of two decisions whereas multinomial logit assumes dependence.  
Tables 7 and 8 show simple logit results. The dependent variable in the first column is gla_exp, 
which equals one if GLA increased by 10% or more and zero otherwise. Note that contractions are 
assigned the value of zero in this model. Similarly, in gla_con model, decrease in GLA of more than 
10% is assigned a value of one and the rest of the observations, including expansions, are coded as 
zeros. The results in Table 7 are similar to those in Table 5, suggesting that our inference is not 
affected by whether decision to expand and contract are considered as independent or jointly 
determined. The results in Table 8 differ just slightly from the results in Table 6: coefficient on WATS 
and store_size in GLA expansion regression becomes significant in all models, providing further 
support for hypotheses 1 and 2. 
We perform several other robustness tests. First, we change the threshold for major renovation 
from 10% to 5% and 3%. Our results remain robust to these alternative definitions of expansions and 
contractions. Second, we perform analysis on continuous measures of renovation: percent change in 
GLA and percent change in number of stores and obtain similar results.  We report results using 10% in 
the body of the paper because high threshold allows us to focus on major renovations and minimizes the 
  
27 
 
influence of noisiness in the data.  
 
6. Conclusion 
To summarize, we find the decision to expand or contract is best explained by standard theory of 
irreversible investment. Shopping centers with large operating costs are less likely to expand and are 
more likely to contract. Higher expected revenue increases the likelihood of expansion and decreases 
the likelihood of contraction. For small shopping centers the decision to change GLA is largely driven 
by potential revenue, while the decision to change the number of stores is largely a function of cost.  
We find weak support for Grenadier’s theory that large number of competitors reduces the value of 
option to wait and increases the likelihood of both expansion and contraction. The result is stronger 
for small shopping centers. Market share of competition reduces the likelihood of increasing the 
number of stores as suggested by the theory of strategic positioning (Salvo, 2010). Our hypotheses 
best explain contraction decisions of large shopping centers and expansion decisions of small 
shopping centers, suggesting that large shopping centers appear to be above equilibrium size and 
small shopping centers are smaller than equilibrium. Our results are robust to estimating expansions 
and contractions jointly or independently.  
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Appendix: Calculation of WATS 
To test the implications of potential revenue on the expansion and contraction decision 
(Hypothesis 2) we first calculate WAMS (weighted average market share within a trade area) as the 
sum of income adjusted gravity potential for each tract in shopping center’s trade area. We assume the 
following trade area for different types of shopping centers: a 40 mile radius for that superregional 
shopping centers, a 20 mile radius for regional shopping centers, and a 10 mile radius for community.  
We calculate gravity potential for each tract j in each shopping center’s i trade area. 



N
i 1 ij
i
ij
i
ijij
distance
GLA
distance
GLA
GPpotentialGravity 
 
where distance is the distance between the shopping center and the center of the tract. If the 
distance is less than 1 mile, then it is set to 1 mile. Otherwise the distance equals the actual distance. N 
is the number of shopping centers competing for tract j. For example, when there are 3 shopping 
centers (Shopping center 1, Shopping center 2, and Shopping center 3) and 3 tracts (Tract A, Tract B 
and Tract C), and Shopping centers 1 and 2 compete for Tract A, then the formula for the gravity 
potential for Shopping center 1 Tract A is as follows: 
 
2A
2
1A
1
1A
1
1A1A
distance
GLA
distance
GLA
distance
GLA
GPpotentialGravity 


 
In this example there are only two shopping centers competing for tract A’s sales. So the 
denominator should have only two terms. Note that gravity potentials for each tract will add up to one. 
Next, we adjust gravity potential by tract’s scaled net income. 















Mi
1j
j
j
ijij
TI
TI
*GPGP Adjusted Income
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TIj is the total income for tract j from 2000 decennial Census. Mi is the number of tracts in 
shopping center i’s trade area. If in our example Shopping center 1 is competing for all three tracts 
(Tract A, B and C), then Income Adjusted GP1A is calculated as follows. 








CBA
A
1A1A
TITITI
TI
*GPGP Adjusted Income
 
WAMS is then calculated as the sum of Income Adjusted GPij across all tracts in shopping 
center i’s trade area: 



iM
j 1
ijii GP Adjusted IncomeWAMSShareMarket  Average Weighted
 
In our example, WAMS for Shopping center 1 is calculated as follows: 
1C1B1A1 GP Adjusted IncomeGP Adjusted IncomeGP Adjusted IncomeWAMS   
Our proxy for potential revenue per sq ft for a shopping center, WATS, is WAMS multiplied 
by population weighted household income in the trade area and then divide by its GLA. WATS simply 
measures how much per sq ft does an average household within the trade area will spend in shopping 
center i.  
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Table 1: Variable Definition 
 
This table summarizes variable definitions. Shopping center characteristics and renovations are 
estimated and tracked from Directory of Major Malls (DMM). Trade areas are delineated from the 
geographic information system (GIS). Demographic data are collected from the US Census Bureau.  
 
Variable 
Name 
Variable Definition 
Source of 
data 
 
Explanatory variables 
 
gla Gross leasable area (sq ft)  DMM 
   
gla_change Percentage change of GLA between the first and last observations DMM 
   
number_stores Number of stores  DMM 
   
store_change Percentage change of number of stores between the first and last 
observations 
DMM 
   
year_opened Year the shopping center was opened DMM 
   
store_size 
(1,000 sq ft) 
GLA divided by number of stores then divided by 1,000 DMM 
   
enclosed Indicator variable: 1 if the shopping center is enclosed, 0 if the 
shopping center is open 
DMM 
   
WATS Weighted average trade area income per sq ft, a proxy for revenue 
generated per sq ft. Log of total population-weighted median 
household income multiplied by weighted average market share within 
a trade area and then divided by GLA. 
Latitudes and longitudes for all the shopping centers are hand-collected 
by using the geographic information system (GIS). Haversine formula 
is used to estimate the distance between the shopping center and 
surrounding tracts within its trade area. Median household income is 
from the US Census. 
DMM,  US 
Census, GIS 
   
type_large Indicator variable: 1 for regional (GLA from 400,000 to 800,000 sq ft 
and number of stores from 40 to 80) and super regional shopping 
centers (GLA greater than 800,000 sq ft and number of stores greater 
than 80), 0 for community center (GLA from 200,000 to 400,000 sq ft; 
number of stores from 15 to 40) and power center (GLA less than 
400,000 and number of stores less than 15 or GLA from 400,000 to 
600,000 and number of stores from 15 to 40) 
DMM 
   
   
compet_ttl Total number of competitors within the trade area. 
Latitudes and longitudes for all the shopping centers are hand-collected 
by using the geographic information system (GIS). Haversine formula 
is used to calculate the distances between shopping centers to 
surrounding census tracts and shopping centers to its competitors. 
DMM, GIS 
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compet_share Weighted average market share of the competitors within 5 miles. 
Latitudes and longitudes for all the shopping centers are hand-collected 
by using the geographic information system (GIS). Haversine formula 
is used to calculate the distances between shopping centers to 
surrounding census tracts and shopping centers to its competitors. 
DMM,  US 
Census, GIS 
   
growth5 5-year average of annualized Case-Shiller growth rates around the 
mid-year of the observation period 
S&P 
   
stdev5 5-year average of annualized Case-Shiller standard deviations around 
the mid-year of the observation period 
S&P 
 
Renovation variables 
 
gla_exp Dummy variable: 1 if GLA increased by 10%, or more 0 otherwise DMM 
   
gla_con Dummy variable: 1 if GLA decreased by 10% or more, 0 otherwise DMM 
   
store_exp Dummy variable: 1 if number of stores increased by 10% or more, 0 
otherwise 
DMM 
   
store_con Dummy variable: 1 if number of stores decreased by 10% or more, 0 
otherwise 
DMM 
   
gla_reno Categorical variable: -1 if GLA decreased by 10% or more and +1 if 
GLA increased by 10% or more, 0 otherwise 
DMM 
   
store_reno Categorical variable: -1 if number of stores decreased by 10% or more 
and +1 if number of stores increased by 10% or more, 0 otherwise 
DMM 
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Table 2: Summary Statistics 
 
The summary statistics are based on a pooled sample of 1995-2000 and 2000-2005. Variables are computed 
from the DMM 1995, 2000, 2002 and 2005. Panel A includes continuous variables. Panel B presents 
dummy and MSA-level variables. HH-income is the average household income for census tracts around our 
sample shopping centers according to the US Census 2000. Growth5 and Stdeb 5 is 5-year Case Shiller 
growth rate and standard deviation around the mid-year of our observations. Panel C to E compare 
sub-samples by type, GLA renovation and store renovation. Panel F provide t-statistics and Wilcoxon 
statistics based on the comparison between each type of renovation and no change. t-tests and Wilcoxon 
tests are used to test the differences in sample mean and median, respectively. Chi-square tests the 
independence of two samples. *Significant at 10%. **Significant at 5%. ***Significant at 1%. 
 
Variable Mean Median 
Lower 
Quartile 
Upper 
Quartile 
Std Dev N 
Panel A: Continuous variables 
gla (sq ft) 612,115 456,337 310,000 875,604 379,927 599 
gla_change (%) 0.94 0 -0.19 0.57 18.05 599 
number _stores 75.61 56 30 118 56.29 599 
store_change (%) -0.97 0 -1.88 0 24.76 598 
store_size (1,000 
sq ft) 
11.95 8.13 6.30 12.11 12.85 599 
year_opened 1978.15 1979 1967 1990 13.64 599 
WATS (absolute) 1.84 1.46 0.77 2.47 1.68 599 
WATS (log) 0.35 0.38 -0.26 0.9 0.71 599 
compet_ttl 11.55 9 3 19 9.05 599 
compet_share 0.08 0.07 0.05 0.1 0.07 599 
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Panel B: Dummy and MSA-level variables 
 
Variable # % 
enclosed 273 46% 
type_large 318 53% 
gla_exp 55 9% 
gla_con 57 10% 
store_exp 53 9% 
store_con 110 18% 
 
 
MSA 
 
 
# 
 
 
% 
HH- 
Income 
Mean 
Growth5 
 
Mean 
Std5 
 
Mean 
gla_exp 
 
# (%) 
gla_con 
 
# (%) 
store_exp 
 
# (%) 
store_con 
 
# (%) 
Portland 26 4% 57,206.55  9.78% 2.21% 5 (9.09%) 1 (1.82%) 4 (7.27%) 6 (10.91%) 
LasVegas 35 6% 50,948.81  3.47% 1.46% 4 (7.27%) 3 (5.45%) 4 (7.27%) 1 (1.82%) 
Minneapolis 57 10% 47,053.99  3.76% 1.49% 6 (10.91%) 9 (16.36%) 3 (5.45%) 21 (38.18%) 
Charlotte 48 8% 52,897.72  6.63% 1.33% 6 (10.91%) 5 (9.09%) 3 (5.45%) 7 (12.73%) 
Cleveland 57 10% 46,528.88  12.77% 2.25% 5 (9.09%) 9 (16.36%) 6 (10.91%) 10 (18.18%) 
Boston 83 14% 54,647.51  8.37% 1.62% 8 (14.55%) 7 (12.73%) 8 (14.55%) 21 (38.18%) 
Denver 56 9% 49,270.20  7.30% 1.56% 2 (3.64%) 4 (7.27%) 4 (7.27%) 15 (27.27%) 
SanDiego 56 9% 52,889.73  13.77% 2.22% 4 (7.27%) 1 (1.82%) 6 (10.91%) 5 (9.09%) 
SanJose 73 12% 65,571.23  12.72% 2.70% 2 (3.64%) 8 (14.55%) 2 (3.64%) 16 (29.09%) 
Seattle 47 8% 53,699.98  8.75% 1.58% 7 (12.73%) 8 (14.55%) 9 (16.36%) 8 (14.55%) 
Tampa 61 10% 40,829.78  10.88% 1.42% 6 (10.91%) 3 (5.45%) 4 (7.27%) 7 (12.73%) 
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Panel C: Difference in means and median for large and small shopping centers 
 Small shopping 
centers(N=281) 
Large shopping centers 
(N=318) 
t-test Wilcoxon 
test 
Variable Mean Median Std Mean Median Std t- Z 
gla (sq ft) 346,075 310,000 127,600 847,200 841,000 373,812 -22.47*** -18.05*** 
gla_change (%) 1.26 0 18.49 0.65 0 17.67 0.41 -0.72 
number _stores 32.83 30 19.62 113.42 114.5 50.82 -26.16*** -19.83*** 
store_change (%) 2.02 0 29.06 -3.62 0 19.88 2.74** 3.53*** 
store_size  
(1,000 sq ft) 
16.71  11.24  17.42  7.74  7.28  2.37  8.56*** 
8.76*** 
year_opened 1982.41 1987 12.98 1974.38 1974 13.12 7.52*** 7.40*** 
WATS (absolute) 0.95 0.79 0.61 2.63 2.27 1.91 -22.85*** -17.20*** 
compet_ttl 4.38 3 3.71 17.89 18 7.51 -28.41*** -18.52*** 
compet_share 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.06 2.32** 2.54** 
 # %  # %  Chi-square  
enclosed 46 16.37%  227 71.38%  ***  
large 0 0.00%  318 100.00%  ***  
gla_exp 15 5.34%  40 12.58%  ***  
gla_con 15 5.34%  42 13.21%  ***  
store_exp 24 8.54%  29 9.12%    
store_con 29 10.32%  81 25.47%  ***  
 
 
Panel D: Difference in means and median for GLA expansion and contraction 
 GLA expansion (N=55) GLA contraction (N=57) t-test Wilcoxon 
test 
Variable Mean Median Std Mean Median Std t- Z 
gla (sq ft) 606,710 500,000 314,041 763,625 670,000 404,751 -2.3** -1.93* 
gla_change (%) 33.93 17.83 40.44 -23.3 -20.16 12.43 10.05*** 9.12*** 
number _stores 90 80 50.45 87.12 85 47.32 0.31 0.25 
store_change (%) 11.14 0 49.47 -9.13 0 23.76 2.75** 2.46** 
store_size  
(1,000 sq ft) 
9.36  6.60  12.01  10.29  8.91  7.50  -0.49 
-3.35*** 
year_opened 1977.67 1978 14.75 1973.77 1972 15.97 1.34 1.46 
WATS (absolute) 2.56 2.11 2.58 1.77 1.63 1.14 2.79** 2.27** 
compet_ttl 14.09 13 8.73 15.42 16 8.64 -0.81 -0.91 
compet_share 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.08 0.06 0.07 0.00 0.13 
 # %  # % Chi-square 
enclosed 32 58.18%  31 54.39%    
large 40 72.73%  42 73.68%    
store_exp 18 32.73%  5 8.77%  ***  
store_con 15 27.27%  19 33.33%    
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Panel E: Difference in means and median for Store expansion and contraction 
 Store expansion (N=53) Store contraction 
(N=110) 
t-test Wilcoxon 
test 
Variable Mean Median Std Mean Median Std t- z 
gla (sq ft) 602,732 470,000 375,452 700,344 612,500 400,399 -1.52 -1.84** 
gla_change 
(%) 
14.51 3.59 33.52 -1.99 0 13.15 3.46*** 3.61*** 
number _stores 67.04 67 48.37 96.75 86 64.67 -3.28** -2.89*** 
store_change 
(%) 
44.86 30.43 52.45 -27.41 -21.88 17.15 9.78*** 10.31*** 
store_size 
(1,000 sq ft) 
17.30  9.86  20.45  8.71  7.13  6.30  2.99*** 2.73*** 
year_opened 1981.62 1989 14.19 1972.76 1972 13.14 3.82*** 4.00*** 
WATS 
(absolute) 
2.17 1.66 2.54 1.92 1.77 1.21 0.67 0.25 
compet_ttl 12.79 13 9 14.75 15 9.25 -0.53 -0.68 
compet_share 0.08 0.07 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.09 -1.29 -1.46 
 # %  # %  Chi-square  
enclosed 22 41.51%  69 62.73%  ***  
large 29 54.72%  81 73.64%  **  
gla_exp 18 33.96%  15 13.64%  ***  
gla_con 5 9.43%  19 17.27%    
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Panel F: Difference in means and median for renovation and no change 
 GLA-exp = 1 (N=55) 
versus 
GLA-exp = 0 (N=544) 
GLA-con = 1 (N=57) 
versus  
GLA-con = 0 (N=542) 
store-exp = 1 (N=53) 
versus 
store-exp = 0 (N=546) 
store-con = 1 (N=110) 
versus  
store-con = 0 (N=489) 
Variable t-test Wilcoxon test t-test Wilcoxon test t-test Wilcoxon test t-test Wilcoxon test 
gla (sq ft) -0.13 0.55  2.99*** 3.42***  -0.19 -0.35  2.59** 3.10***  
gla_change 6.65*** 12.78***  -14.93*** -12.99***  3.2*** 4.86***  -2.36** -0.64  
number 
_stores 
2.19** 2.63***  1.89* 2.47***  -1.33 -1.21  3.91*** 4.54***  
store_change 1.98* 2.11**  -2.71*** -2.27**  6.96*** 13.29***  -16.79*** -18.05***  
store_size  -1.67* -3.87***  -1.6 0.94  2.06** 1.67*  -4.58*** -3.58***  
year_opened -0.25 -0.03  -2.21** -2.29**  1.87* 2.27**  -4.73*** -4.69***  
WATS 4.15*** 3.78***  -0.19 0.23  1.82* 1.71*  1.37 1.46  
compet_ttl 2.26** 2.41**  3.54*** 3.58***  1.05 0.87  4.05*** 4.09***  
compet_share -1.12 -1.44  -1.08 -1.15  -0.38 -1.39  0.48 -1.22  
 
GLA-exp 
=1 # (%) 
GLA-exp 
=0 # (%) 
Chi- 
sq 
GLA-con 
=1 # (%) 
GLA-con 
=0 # (%) 
Chi- 
sq 
store-exp 
=1 # (%) 
store-exp 
=0 # (%) 
Chi- 
sq 
store-con 
=1 # (%) 
store-con 
=0 # (%) 
Chi- 
sq 
enclosed 32 (58%) 241 (44%) ** 31 (54%) 242 (45%)  22 (42%) 251 (46%)  69 (63%) 204 (42%) *** 
large 40 (73%) 278 (51%) *** 42 (74%) 276 (51%) *** 29 (55%) 289 (53%)  81 (74%) 237 (48%) *** 
gla_exp 55 (100%) 0 (0%) N.A. 0 (0%) 55 (10%) N.A. 18 (34%) 37 (7%) *** 15 (14%) 40 (8%) * 
gla_con 0 (0%) 57 (10%) N.A. 57 (100%) 0 (0%) N.A. 5 (9%) 52 (10%)  19 (17%) 38 (8%) *** 
store_exp 18 (33%) 35 (6%) *** 5 (9%) 48 (9%)  
53 
(100%) 
0 (0%) 
N.A
. 
0 (0%) 53 (11%) N.A. 
store_con 15 (27%) 95 (17%) * 19 (33%) 91 (17%) *** 0 (0%) 110 (20%) 
N.A
. 
110 
(100%) 
0 (0%) N.A. 
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Table 3: Ordered Logistic Regression – Full Sample 
 
Ordered logistic regressions are based on a pooled sample of 1995-2000 and 2000-2005. Variables 
are computed from the DMM 1995, 2000, 2002 and 2005. See Table 1 for variable definitions. 
Continuous variables are normalized with zero mean and unit standard deviation. gla_reno equals -1 
if GLA decreased by 10% or more and +1 if GLA increase by 10% or more during the observation 
period and 0 otherwise. store_reno equals -1 if number of stores decreased by 10% or more and +1 
if number of stores increase by 10% or more during the observation period and 0 otherwise. Total 
effect of large shopping centers equals the sum of all standardized coefficients associated with large 
shopping centers multiplied by the median value of the non-standardized variable. Net effect tests 
whether the sum of a standardized coefficient and its large-shopping center dummy equals zero. 
p-value is reported below coefficient estimates. Robust variance estimator is used to adjust data 
clustering. Fixed effect in MSA level is used. MSA dummy coefficients are not reported in the table. 
/cut1 is the estimated cutpoint on the latent variable used to differentiate contraction from no change 
and expansion when values of the predictor variables are evaluated at zero. /cut2 is the estimated 
cutpoint on the latent variable used to differentiate contraction and no change from expansion when 
values of the predictor variables are evaluated at zero. p-values are reported in parentheses.* 
Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1%. 
  
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 gla_reno store_reno gla _reno store_reno gla _reno store_reno 
enclosed -0.08  -0.42  -0.01  -0.44  -0.13  -0.50* 
 (0.79) (0.12) (0.97) (0.11) (0.65) (0.07) 
type_large -2.20*** -0.71  -1.90*** -0.68  -2.27*** -0.80* 
 (0.00) (0.12) (0.00) (0.22) (0.00) (0.08) 
WATS 0.65*** 0.22  0.69*** 0.24  0.67*** 0.23  
 (0.01) (0.26) (0.00) (0.23) (0.01) (0.24) 
WATS*large 0.15  0.62*** 0.15  0.59** 0.16  0.65*** 
 (0.61) (0.01) (0.61) (0.01) (0.58) (0.01) 
store_size -0.02  0.26** 0.00  0.27*** -0.02  0.27** 
 (0.82) (0.01) (0.97) (0.01) (0.81) (0.01) 
store_size*large -3.76*** 0.89  -3.69*** 0.83  -3.92*** 0.70  
 (0.00) (0.36) (0.00) (0.40) (0.00) (0.48) 
compet_ttl    -0.27  -0.11    
    (0.47) (0.80)   
compet_ttl*large    0.10  0.17    
    (0.81) (0.70)   
compet_share       0.02  -0.05  
       (0.80) (0.73) 
compet_share*large       -0.35  -0.33  
       (0.19) (0.11) 
/cut 1 -3.32*** -2.59*** -3.07*** -2.52*** -3.39*** -2.69*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
/cut 2 1.67*** 1.67*** 1.93*** 1.74*** 1.63*** 1.60*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
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Table 3 (continued) 
 
Total effect  -32.71*** 6.76*** -30.94* 7.82  -34.10*** 5.11*** 
(Large shopping 
centers) 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.11) (0.00) (0.00) 
         
Net effect         
WATS 0.80*** 0.84*** 0.84*** 0.83*** 0.83*** 0.88*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
store_size -3.78*** 1.15  -3.69*** 1.10  -3.94*** 0.97  
 (0.00) (0.23) (0.00) (0.24) (0.00) (0.31) 
compet_ttl    -0.17  0.06    
    (0.44) (0.99)   
compet_share       -0.33  -0.38** 
       (0.21) (0.04) 
Prob>chi2 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
Pseudo R2 0.075 0.079 0.077 0.079 0.079 0.085 
Obs 599 599 599 599 599 599 
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Table 4: Ordered Logistic Regression by Size Category  
 
Ordered logistic regressions are based on a pooled sample of 1995-2000 and 2000-2005. Variables 
are computed from the DMM 1995, 2000, 2002 and 2005. See Table 1 for variable definitions. 
Continuous variables are normalized with zero mean and unit standard deviation. Panel A includes 
only large shopping centers (regional and super regional) and Panel B includes only small shopping 
centers (community and power centers). Gla_ reno equals -1 if GLA decreased by 10% or more and 
+1 if GLA increase by 10% or more during the observation period and 0 otherwise. Store_ reno 
equals -1 if number of stores decreased by 10% or more and +1 if number of stores increase by 
10% or more during the observation period and 0 otherwise. p-value is reported below coefficient 
estimates. Robust variance estimator is used to adjust data clustering. Fixed effect in MSA level is 
used. MSA dummy coefficients are not reported in the table. /cut1 is the estimated cutpoint on the 
latent variable used to differentiate contraction from no change and expansion when values of the 
predictor variables are evaluated at zero. /cut2 is the estimated cutpoint on the latent variable used to 
differentiate contraction and no change from expansion when values of the predictor variables are 
evaluated at zero. p-values are reported in parentheses. *Significant at 10%; **Significant at 5%; 
***Significant at 1%. 
 
Panel A - Large shopping centers 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 gla_reno store_reno gla _reno store_reno gla _reno store_reno 
enclosed -0.35 -0.49 -0.27 -0.59* -0.43 -0.62* 
 (0.28) (0.12) (0.43) (0.07) (0.19) (0.05) 
WATS 0.78*** 0.94*** 0.80*** 0.93*** 0.82*** 1.01*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
store_size -2.97*** 1.62* -2.87*** 1.49 -3.11*** 1.44 
 (0.00) (0.07) (0.00) (0.10) (0.00) (0.12) 
compet_ttl    -0.16 0.2   
    (0.45) (0.25)   
compet_share       -0.28 -0.39** 
       (0.19) (0.01) 
/cut 1 -1.23** -2.29*** -1.27** -2.24*** -1.28** -2.38*** 
 (0.02) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) 
/cut 2 3.03*** 1.55*** 3.00*** 1.61*** 3.01*** 1.51*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
Prob>chi2 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
Pseudo R2 0.0798 0.0950 0.0813 0.0973 0.0853 0.1064 
Obs 318 318 318 318 318 318 
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Panel B - Small shopping centers 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 gla_ reno store_ reno gla_ reno store_ reno gla_ reno store_ reno 
enclosed 0.32 -0.87 0.34 -0.86 0.32 -0.87 
 (0.52) (0.13) (0.54) (0.14) (0.52) (0.13) 
WATS 0.85** 0.39 0.86** 0.41 0.85** 0.39 
 (0.04) (0.18) (0.04) (0.17) (0.04) (0.18) 
store_size -0.024 0.33*** -0.014 0.33*** -0.025 0.33*** 
 (0.89) (0.00) (0.93) (0.00) (0.89) (0.00) 
compet_ttl    -0.12 -0.08   
    (0.87) (0.88)   
compet_share       0.01 -0.02 
       (0.96) (0.91) 
/cut 1 -4.37*** -2.70*** -4.25*** -2.63*** -4.37*** -2.71*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
/cut 2 2.18*** 2.38*** 2.30* 2.44*** 2.18** 2.37*** 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.05) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
Prob>chi2 0.10 0.00*** 0.08* 0.00*** 0.13 0.00*** 
Pseudo R2 0.1043 0.0828 0.1045 0.0829 0.1042 0.0828 
Obs 281 281 281 281 281 281 
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Table 5: Multinomial Logistic Regression – Full Sample 
Multinomial logistic regressions are based on a pooled sample of 1995-2000 and 2000-2005. 
Variables are computed from the DMM 1995, 2000, 2002 and 2005. See Table 1 for variable 
definitions. Continuous variables are normalized with zero mean and unit standard deviation. 
Gla_ reno equals -1 if GLA decreased by 10% or more and +1 if GLA increase by 10% or more 
during the observation period and 0 otherwise. Store_ reno equals -1 if number of stores 
decreased by 10% or more and +1 if number of stores increase by 10% or more during the 
observation period and 0 otherwise. Total effect of large shopping centers equals the sum of all 
standardized coefficients associated with large shopping centers multiplied by the median value 
of the non-standardized variable. Net effect tests whether the sum of a standardized coefficient 
and its large-shopping center dummy equals zero. p-value is reported below coefficient 
estimates. p-value is reported below coefficient estimates. Robust variance estimator is used to 
adjust data clustering. Fixed effect in MSA level is used. MSA dummy coefficients are not 
reported in the table. p-values are reported in parentheses.* Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 
5%; *** Significant at 1%. 
 
Full Sample       
 (1) (2) (3) 
 gla_reno store_reno gla_reno store_reno gla _reno store_reno 
-1       
enclosed -0.17 0.32 -0.37 0.29 -0.15 0.38 
 (0.62) (0.29) (0.32) (0.37) (0.67) (0.21) 
type_large 2.48*** 1.31*** 1.44* 0.66 2.57*** 1.40*** 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.06) (0.26) (0.00) (0.01) 
WATS -0.1 -0.2 -0.28 -0.53 -0.12 -0.22 
 (0.84) (0.62) (0.60) (0.25) (0.81) (0.61) 
WATS*large -0.88 -0.74* -0.85 -0.45 -0.86 -0.77* 
 (0.11) (0.09) (0.14) (0.34) (0.11) (0.09) 
store_size -0.13 -0.29 -0.23 -0.36 -0.1 -0.34 
 (0.65) (0.34) (0.47) (0.23) (0.68) (0.31) 
store_size*large 2.48*** -1.25 2.40*** -1.14 2.61*** -1.05 
 (0.00) (0.15) (0.00) (0.18) (0.00) (0.25) 
compet_ttl    1.08* 1.15**   
    (0.07) (0.03)   
compet_ttl*large    -0.55 -1.12**   
    (0.42) (0.04)   
compet_share       -0.33 0.15 
       (0.26) (0.29) 
compet_share*large       0.47 0.11 
       (0.27) (0.62) 
intercept -3.78*** -3.37*** -2.96*** -2.66*** -3.82*** -3.50*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
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Table 5 (continued) 
Total effect 22.31*** -9.13***  15.68**  -18.86***  23.50***  -7.42***  
(Large shopping 
centers) 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Net effect         
WATS -0.98*** -0.94*** -1.13*** -0.98*** -0.98*** -0.99*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
store_size 2.35** -1.54* 2.17*** -1.5* 2.51*** -1.39* 
 (0.00) (0.05) (0.00) (0.06) (0.00) (0.10) 
compet_ttl    0.53* 0.03   
    (0.10) (0.87)   
compet_share       0.14 0.26 
         (0.27) (0.62) 
0 base outcome 
+1 (1) (2) (3) 
 gla_reno store_reno gla _reno store_reno gla _reno store_reno 
enclosed -0.3 -0.51 -0.43 -0.61 -0.38 -0.61 
 (0.42) (0.23) (0.27) (0.15) (0.32) (0.15) 
type_large -0.76 0.33 -1.45* -0.37 -0.76 0.24 
 (0.34) (0.64) (0.09) (0.66) (0.32) (0.72) 
WATS 1.34*** 0.37 1.29*** 0.26 1.33*** 0.38 
 (0.00) (0.22) (0.00) (0.45) (0.00) (0.21) 
WATS*large -1.05** 0.11 -1.03** 0.19 -1.03** 0.11 
 (0.02) (0.75) (0.02) (0.63) (0.02) (0.76) 
store_size  -0.11 0.33*** -0.21 0.26** -0.11 0.33*** 
 (0.62) (0.00) (0.32) (0.03) (0.62) (0.00) 
store_size*large -2.83* 0.098 -2.94* -0.1 -2.84* -0.12 
 (0.07) (0.95) (0.06) (0.95) (0.05) (0.92) 
compet_ttl   0.73 0.65   
   (0.14) (0.30)   
compet_ttl*large   -0.49 -0.31   
   (0.35) (0.64)   
compet_share     -0.03 0.07 
     (0.89) (0.70) 
compet_share*large     -0.36 -0.54 
     (0.30) (0.11) 
intercept -2.11*** -2.41*** -1.44* -1.83** -2.04*** -2.37*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.05) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
Total effect -24.17 1.17 -30.15 -3.9 -24.27 -0.73 
 (0.96) (0.55) (0.48) (0.57) (0.84) (0.56) 
Net effect       
WATS 0.29* 0.48* 0.26 0.45 0.3 0.49** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.25) (0.09*) (0.16) (0.04) 
store_size -2.94 0.428 -3.15** 0.16 -2.95** 0.21 
 (0.19) (0.77) (0.04) (0.91) (0.04) (0.88) 
compet_ttl   0.24 0.34   
   (0.34) (0.21)   
compet_share     -0.39 -0.47 
     (0.30) (0.11) 
Prob>chi2 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
Pseudo R2 0.1378 0.1201 0.1473 0.1264 0.1431 0.1270 
Obs 599 599 599 599 599 599 
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Table 6: Multinomial Logistic by Size Category  
 
Multinomial logistic regressions are based on a pooled sample of 1995-2000 and 2000-2005. 
Variables are computed from the DMM 1995, 2000, 2002 and 2005. See Table 1 for variable 
definitions. Continuous variables are normalized with zero mean and unit standard deviation. Panel A 
includes only large shopping centers (regional and super regional) and Panel B includes only small 
shopping centers(community and power centers). Gla_ reno equals -1 if GLA decreased by 10% or 
more and +1 if GLA increase by 10% or more during the observation period and 0 otherwise. Store_ 
reno equals -1 if number of stores decreased by 10% or more and +1 if number of stores increase by 
10% or more during the observation period and 0 otherwise. p-value is reported below coefficient 
estimates. Robust variance estimator is used to adjust data clustering. Fixed effect in MSA level is used. 
MSA dummy coefficients are not reported in the table. p-values are reported in parentheses. * 
Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1%. 
 
Panel A - Large shopping centers 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 gla_reno store_reno gla _reno store_reno gla _reno store_reno 
-1       
enclosed 0.07 0.3 -0.21 0.29 0.13 0.38 
 (0.89) (0.42) (0.68) (0.44) (0.79) (0.31) 
WATS -1.06*** -1.06*** -1.21*** -1.05*** -1.09*** -1.11*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
store_size 2.48*** -1.66** 2.27*** -1.66** 2.69*** -1.52* 
 (0.00) (0.04) (0.01) (0.04) (0.00) (0.08) 
compet_ttl    0.60* 0.01   
    (0.09) (0.99)   
compet_share       0.17 0.28 
       (0.61) (0.13) 
intercept -2.39** -2.26*** -2.68*** -2.26*** -2.38** -2.32*** 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
0 Base outcome 
1       
enclosed -0.47 -0.88* -0.57 -1.12** -0.58 -1.06** 
 (0.30) (0.07) (0.21) (0.02) (0.21) (0.03) 
WATS 0.26 0.56** 0.24 0.63** 0.29 0.62** 
 (0.28) (0.04) (0.32) (0.03) (0.22) (0.02) 
store_size -2.38 1.33 -2.54 1.09 -2.45* 1.03 
 (0.12) (0.38) (0.10) (0.50) (0.09) (0.46) 
compet_ttl    0.19 0.46   
    (0.46) (0.14)   
compet_share       -0.38 -0.52* 
       (0.19) (0.06) 
intercept -2.88*** -1.25 -2.94*** -1.41 -2.80*** -1.25 
 (0.01) (0.18) (0.00) (0.13) (0.01) (0.16) 
Prob>chi2 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
Pseudo R2 0.1470 0.1190 0.1566 0.1226 0.1539 0.1301 
Obs 318 318 318 318 318 318 
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Panel B - Small shopping centers 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 gla_reno store_reno gla 
_reno 
store_reno gla _reno store_reno 
-1       
enclosed -1.45 0.67 -1.83* 0.48 -1.48 0.69 
 (0.15) (0.20) (0.08) (0.41) (0.13) (0.19) 
WATS 0.12 -0.21 -0.2 -0.58 0.06 -0.2 
 (0.87) (0.60) (0.84) (0.25) (0.94) (0.62) 
store_size  -0.06 -0.27 -0.27 -0.33 -0.05 -0.31 
 (0.84) (0.35) (0.46) (0.27) (0.86) (0.33) 
compet_ttl    1.65* 1.18**   
    (0.06) (0.05)   
compet_share       -0.43 0.11 
       (0.26) (0.46) 
intercept -2.40*** -2.84*** -1.11 -2.09** -2.39*** -2.93*** 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.32) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) 
0 Base outcome 
1       
enclosed -0.32 -0.1 -0.82 -0.14 -0.34 -0.13 
 (0.68) (0.91) (0.41) (0.88) (0.68) (0.88) 
WATS 1.17** 0.62 1.03** 0.47 1.14** 0.64 
 (0.01) (0.16) (0.02) (0.35) (0.02) (0.17) 
store_size -0.03 0.36*** -0.28 0.29** -0.03 0.36*** 
 (0.92) (0.00) (0.34) (0.04) (0.92) (0.00) 
compet_ttl    1.67* 0.67   
    (0.08) (0.31)   
compet_share       -0.12 0.08 
       (0.52) (0.66) 
intercept -1.43* -2.86*** 0.26 -2.21* -1.40* -2.90*** 
 (0.07) (0.01) (0.83) (0.06) (0.09) (0.01) 
Prob>chi2 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.0*** 
Pseudo R2 0.1873 0.1268 0.2123 0.1384 0.1927 0.1284 
Obs 281 281 281 281 281 281 
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Table 7: Logistic Regression – Full Sample 
Logistic regressions are based on a pooled sample of 1995-2000 and 2000-2005. See Table 1 for variable definitions. Continuous variables are 
normalized with zero mean and unit standard deviation. gla_exp equals 1 if GLA increased by 10% or more during the observation period and 0 
otherwise. gla_con equals 1 if GLA decreased by 10% or more during the observation period and 0 otherwise. store_exp equals 1 if number of 
stores increased by 10% or more during the observation period and 0 otherwise. store_con equals 1 if number of stores decreased by 10% or more 
during the observation period and 0 otherwise. Total effect of large shopping centers equals the sum of all standardized coefficients associated with 
large shopping centers multiplied by the median value of the non-standardized variable. Net effect tests whether the sum of a standardized 
coefficient and its large-shopping center dummy equals zero. p-value is reported below coefficient estimates.  p-value is reported below 
coefficient estimates. Robust variance estimator is used to adjust data clustering. Fixed effect in MSA level is used. MSA dummy coefficients are 
not reported in the table. p-values are reported in parentheses. * Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1%. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 gla_exp gla_con store_exp store_con gla_exp gla_con store_exp store_con gla_exp gla_con store_exp store_con 
enclosed -0.26 -0.14 -0.56 0.37 -0.37 -0.32 -0.66 0.35 -0.35 -0.11 -0.67 0.44 
 (0.47) (0.69) (0.18) (0.22) (0.33) (0.37) (0.12) (0.27) (0.36) (0.75) (0.12) (0.15) 
type_large -1.07 2.55*** 0.13 1.28*** -1.68** 1.56** -0.5 0.7 -1.07 2.66*** 0.04 1.39*** 
 (0.17) (0.00) (0.85) (0.01) (0.04) (0.04) (0.56) (0.24) (0.14) (0.00) (0.96) (0.01) 
WATS 1.33*** -0.2 0.39 -0.24 1.30*** -0.38 0.3 -0.56 1.32*** -0.22 0.4 -0.25 
 (0.00) (0.68) (0.20) (0.56) (0.00) (0.46) (0.39) (0.22) (0.00) (0.64) (0.19) (0.55) 
WATS*large -0.93** -0.81 0.26 -0.75* -0.90** -0.78 0.33 -0.46 -0.91** -0.79 0.26 -0.78* 
 (0.03) (0.13) (0.44) (0.08) (0.03) (0.17) (0.39) (0.32) (0.03) (0.13) (0.45) (0.08) 
store_size  -0.1 -0.12 0.35*** -0.33 -0.19 -0.22 0.29** -0.41 -0.11 -0.1 0.34*** -0.39 
 (0.65) (0.67) (0.00) (0.26) (0.37) (0.49) (0.02) (0.17) (0.65) (0.71) (0.00) (0.25) 
store_size 
*large 
-3.17** 2.79*** 0.36 -1.25 -3.26** 2.73*** 0.16 -1.11 -3.19** 2.93*** 0.11 -1.02 
(0.03) (0.00) (0.80) (0.15) (0.03) (0.00) (0.91) (0.19) (0.02) (0.00) (0.94) (0.26) 
compet_ttl     0.66 1.04* 0.55 1.08**     
     (0.19) (0.08) (0.38) (0.05)     
compet_ttl 
*large 
    -0.46 -0.53 -0.22 -1.08*     
    (0.37) (0.44) (0.74) (0.05)     
compet_share         -0.02 -0.32 0.06 0.15 
         (0.92) (0.27) (0.74) (0.28) 
compet_share 
*large 
        -0.38 0.5 -0.57* 0.15 
        (0.27) (0.24) (0.08) (0.47) 
intercept -2.11** -3.91** -2.41*** 3.46*** -1.51** -3.13** -1.90** -2.82*** -2.04*** -3.96*** -2.36*** -3.61*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
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Table 7 (continued) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 gla_exp gla_con store_exp store_con gla_exp gla_con store_exp store_con gla_exp gla_con store_exp store_con 
Total effect  -27.2 24.92*  3.16 -9.17***  -32.67 18.69 -1.05 -18.22**  -27.38 26.22***  0.99 -7.19***  
(large shopping centers) (0.72) (0.06) (0.94) (0.00) (0.25) (0.21) (0.46) (0.01) (0.85) (0.00) (0.79) (0.00) 
 
Net effect 
                
WATS 0.40** -1.01*** 0.65*** -0.99*** 0.40* -1.16*** 0.63** -1.02*** 0.41** -1.01*** 0.66*** -1.03*** 
 (0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.05) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
store_size -3.27** 2.67*** 0.71 -1.58** -3.45** 2.51*** 0.45 -1.52 -3.3** 2.83*** 0.45 -1.41 
 (0.02) (0.00) (0.62) (0.04) (0.02) (0.00) (0.76) (0.05) (0.01) (0.00) (0.73) (0.09*) 
compet_ttl      0.2 0.51 0.33 0.01     
      (0.44) (0.11) (0.21) (0.98)     
compet_share           -0.40 0.18 -0.51* 0.30* 
           (0.18) (0.56) (0.06) (0.08) 
Prob>chi2 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
Pseudo R2 0.1250 0.1460 0.0829 0.1444 0.1290 0.1599 0.0891* 0.1497 0.1322 0.1498 0.0919 0.1508 
Obs 599 599 599 599 599 599 599 599 599 599 599 599 
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Table 8: Logistic Regression by Size Category 
 
Logistic regressions are based on a pooled sample of 1995-2000 and 2000-2005. See Table 1 for variable definitions. Continuous variables are 
normalized with zero mean and unit standard deviation. p-value is reported below coefficient estimates. Robust variance estimator is used to 
adjust data clustering. Fixed effect in MSA level is used. MSA dummy coefficients are not reported in the table. p-values are reported in 
parentheses. * Significant at 10%; ** Significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1%. 
 
Panel A Large shopping centers 
 (1) (2) (3) 
  gla_exp gla_con store_exp store_con gla_exp gla_con store_exp store_con gla_exp gla_con store_exp store_con 
enclosed -0.45 0.14 -0.91* 0.38 -0.51 -0.12 -1.16** 0.39 -0.57 0.21 -1.10** 0.47 
 (0.30) (0.76) (0.07) (0.30) (0.25) (0.81) (0.02) (0.30) (0.21) (0.65) (0.03) (0.20) 
WATS 0.41* -1.10*** 0.75*** -1.11*** 0.42* -1.25*** 0.82*** -1.10*** 0.44** -1.14*** 0.81*** -1.16*** 
 (0.06) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.05) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
store_size -2.80* 2.80*** 1.65 -1.78** -2.92* 2.62*** 1.39 -1.76** -2.88** 3.03*** 1.31 -1.62* 
 (0.06) (0.00) (0.28) (0.03) (0.05) (0.00) (0.39) (0.03) (0.04) (0.00) (0.35) (0.07) 
compet_ttl      0.14 0.58 0.5 -0.04     
      (0.60) (0.11) (0.12) (0.87)     
compet_share           -0.4 0.22 -0.58** 0.32* 
           (0.17) (0.51) (0.03) (0.08) 
Intercept -3.18*** -2.42*** -1.41 -2.46*** -3.23*** -2.70*** -1.57* -2.45*** -3.09*** -2.42*** -1.39 -2.53*** 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.14) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.10) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.12) (0.00) 
Prob>chi2 0.08* 0.00*** 0.09* 0.00*** 0.04** 0.00*** 0.09* 0.00*** 0.03** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
Pseudo R2 0.1051 0.1702 0.0905 0.1167 0.1062 0.1868 0.1024 0.1168 0.1161 0.1735 0.1102 0.1257 
Obs 318 304 318 301 318 304 318 301 318 304 318 301 
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Panel B Small shopping centers 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 gla_exp gla_con store_exp store_con gla_exp gla_con store_exp store_con gla_exp gla_con store_exp store_con 
Enclosed -0.21 -1.38 -0.23 0.69 -0.64 -1.69* -0.26 0.51 -0.21 -1.39 -0.27 0.71 
 (0.79) (0.17) (0.79) (0.19) (0.51) (0.10) (0.77) (0.37) (0.79) (0.15) (0.75) (0.17) 
WATS 1.16** -0.05 0.63 -0.26 1.03** -0.33 0.5 -0.62 1.12** -0.13 0.65 -0.25 
 (0.01) (0.95) (0.15) (0.52) (0.02) (0.73) (0.31) (0.22) (0.02) (0.84) (0.16) (0.54) 
store_size -0.02 -0.04 0.37*** -0.31 -0.25 -0.24 0.32** -0.38 -0.02 -0.03 0.37*** -0.35 
 (0.93) (0.89) (0.00) (0.27) (0.39) (0.54) (0.02) (0.19) (0.94) (0.92) (0.00) (0.26) 
compet_ttl      1.54* 1.54* 0.56 1.10*     
      (0.10) (0.08) (0.39) (0.06)     
compet_share           -0.11 -0.41 0.07 0.11 
           (0.55) (0.29) (0.68) (0.48) 
intercept -1.52* -2.69*** -2.92*** -2.93*** 0.07 -1.45 -2.37** -2.26** -1.51* -2.72*** -2.96*** -3.01*** 
 (0.05) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.96) (0.20) (0.04) (0.01) (0.06) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
Prob>chi2 0.02** 0.77 0.02** 0.19 0.00*** 0.77 0.03** 0.08* 0.01** 0.64 0.03** 0.29 
Pseudo R2 0.1702 0.0763 0.1324 0.0750 0.1951 0.1016 0.1376 0.0902 0.1717 0.0851 0.1333 0.0772 
Obs 216 216 254 258 216 216 254 258 216 216 254 258 
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Essay 2 
 
The Location of New Anchor Stores within Metropolitan Areas  
 52 
 
1. Introduction 
The retail sector is a dynamic sector, with new construction and expansion occurring side-by-side 
with high vacancy, bankruptcy and liquidation of leading retail chains. Wal-Mart, Target and 
wholesale club chains have expanded aggressively over the past 25 years, introducing new technology 
such as sophisticated distribution centers and systems, tight cost control and related internet sales. 
Foster, Haltiwanger and Krizan (2006) use establishment level data from the Census of Retail Trade to 
explore substantial increases in productivity in the retail sector.
33
 These changes are associated 
largely with the entry and exit of retail establishments. They find that entry into local markets by large, 
multi-establishment retailers have displaced smaller retailers such as those with a single establishment 
over the 1987-97 decade. Moreover, they find that “the enormous restructuring of the retail trade 
sector towards large, national chains has been at the core of productivity gains in the retail sector (p. 
749).”34 
In this paper, we examine intra-metropolitan retail patterns by focusing on the opening of large, 
full-line department (“anchor”) stores in the United States. We identify and test factors that make a 
particular location more attractive to a particular chain among these large retailers. This is an 
important topic because the entry of a new multi-line, multi-store retail chain into a local market has 
the potential to change the retail landscape for smaller stores, causing some to thrive and others to go 
out of business. These changes may play out over a decade or more. 
We focus on anchors for two reasons. First, data collection, while still difficult, is manageable 
whereas any attempt to model the entire retail sector would have to deal with its enormous size and 
complexity. Second, as suggested by previous literature, these stores lead the retail sector. Any new 
shopping center requires a commitment from one or more anchors, and the economics of clusters of 
independent retail is changed by the opening of an anchor store.
35
 By understanding the changing 
                                                 
33
 An establishment is a single physical location where economic activity takes place. 
34
 In a recent study, Haltiwanger, Jarmin and Krizan (2010) examine the negative impact of Big-Box entry on 
small retail establishments within the DC metro area. Hausman and Leibtag (2007) find efficiency gains for 
consumers following the entry of a Wal-Mart. They ignore adjustments in the labor market.  
35
 Kramer (2008) defines the Wal-Mart shadow as open air strip shopping centers built in conjunction with a 
large Wal-Mart store. She says that “several chain stores, notably Dollar Tree, Cato and Shoe Show, make it 
their stated corporate objective to follow Wal-Mart’s path (p 46).” Kramer gives other examples of smaller 
stores that locate near Wal-Mart and compete directly with some of Wal-Mart’s lines. 
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location pattern of anchor stores, we gain insight into the dynamics of a large segment of the retail 
industry.
36
  
This paper tests the hypothesis that anchor locations can be largely explained by the location of 
population. The suburbanization of populations and income has been a dominant trend in the US. 
Only if we control adequately for access to population and income then we can isolate the role of 
retail clustering in location decisions. It is our goal to understand localization economies, the benefits 
associated with a cluster of retail stores. But clustering implies costs associated with traffic congestion 
and competition among stores selling close substitutes. We want to model localization economies and 
separate them from negative competitive effects. 
Our data are well-suited to the issues we address. Our sample includes 36 metropolitan statistical 
areas (MSAs) across East, Central, Midwest and Southwest regions in the US. By compiling data on 
all anchor stores each year from the beginning of 2005 to the end of 2011, we work with the universe 
of all anchors within these markets: there are 54 anchors in our data. We further classify all the chains 
into three categories, high-price, mid-price and low-price to control for price and quality variables. 
See Appendix 1B for details on our classification method based on Vitorino (2012) and Gould, 
Pashigian and Prendergast (2005). 
Wal-Mart is a particularly visible anchor store that has been the subject of some scholarly 
research (Pope and Pope, 2013; Ellickson and Grieco, 2013; Holmes, 2011; Neumark, Zhang and 
Ciccarella, 2008; Jia, 2008; Hausman and Leibtag, 2007; Basker, 2005). Our low-price category 
includes Wal-Mart Supercenters and its major competitors – Target, Costco, and Kmart – as well as 
Sears Grand, Sears Essentials, Meijer, Shopko, BJ’s Wholesale Club and Sam’s Club (a Wal-Mart 
subsidiary). We model Wal-Mart as just one among many competitors because, with about 20 percent 
of openings, it does not dominate the data.
37
 
                                                 
36
 Anchors generate traffic to a shopping center or retail cluster because customers can economize on 
transportation costs by making multipurpose shopping trips. Stahl (1982) and Schulz and Stahl (1996) develop 
the importance of nonconvex transportation costs. Additional theory is provided by Brueckner (1993), Pashigan 
and Gould (1998) and Salvo (2010). Konishi and Sandfort (2003) argue that stores with substantial advertising 
reduce uncertainty about product quality. Shopping centers and retail clusters attract customers because easy 
price and quality comparison implies low prices, good service and higher product variety.  
37
 We exclude three of Wal-Mart’s formats (Wal-Mart discount, Wal-Mart Market and Wal-Mart Express) 
because they do not satisfy our definition of a multiline department store. Target has about 15 percent of 
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Our analysis starts with a comparison of the location pattern of existing and new stores using a 
nonparametric approach proposed by Duranton and Overman (2005), and developed by Klier and 
McMillen (2008) and Billings and Johnson (2012). This K-density method estimates the density of 
distances separating each store location. We conclude that the location pattern of new stores is more 
dispersed than that of existing stores, i.e., there is less density at the short distances (e.g., three miles) 
of interest to decision makers. In all regions, the confidence intervals based on population-weighted 
probabilities poorly predict the location pattern of new stores, especially within three miles. We 
conclude the same results by investigating each of the three price types. As a result, the simple 
suburbanization hypothesis – that openings are simply following population – is rejected. This 
motivates a multivariate econometric model to explain the location pattern of openings as a function 
of localization and competitive effects.  
Next, we apply the conditional logit model (CLM) to anchor location decisions.
38
 We find that, 
consistent with the revenue hypothesis, new openings are affected by location proximity to Central 
Business District (CBD) and highway, potential revenue and growth. Most important, we find a strong 
negative cannibalization effect (i.e., competition from an existing store owned by the same chain) as 
well as a positive localization effect. There is also heterogeneity among different regions, where 
openings in Southwest are more influenced by population and hence least affected by localization. 
Zoning is taken into account with proxy variables such as the presence of existing retail 
establishments and proximity to a limited access highway. 
To test whether the CLM effectively explains the location pattern of openings, we use the 
predicted probabilities from the model to calculate K-density measures of concentration. We find that 
the CLM-based confidence intervals perform considerably better than do population-based confidence 
intervals, especially within the important threshold of three miles between anchors. We present 
evidence that the CLM successfully captures the possibility of zoning constraints with the proxy 
variables included. By separating into three price types, we find that the K-densities based on CLM 
perform better than the aggregate level, indicating that decision makers can accurately explain 
                                                                                                                                                        
openings, leaving about two-thirds spread out among many competitors. 
38
 The CLM is central to much of industrial location literature (see Arauzo-Carod, Liviano-Solis, and 
Manjón-Antolín, 2010). 
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location patterns if they disaggregate by price type. Most importantly, the model by matched type (i.e., 
when the price-type and chain of an opening are matched to existing stores to capture the mix of types 
and chains; hereafter, “matched type”) also has significant explanatory power. This means that the 
model has the potential to explain the location pattern of openings from the point-of-view of a 
particular retailer, a useful result for any decision maker.  
Our paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, it is the first location choice paper to 
focus on anchor store openings and to extend the concept of localization economies to include clusters 
of anchors of different types.
 39
 Second, our data are far more comprehensive than that used in other 
retail studies since we cover all anchors, existing and newly-opened, inside shopping centers and 
freestanding, in a broad range of MSA sizes over the period 2005-2011.
40
 We develop a new way of 
collecting data at the business establishment level, using CoStar and company web sites with 10K 
reports and a database of mergers and acquisitions. Third, this is the first paper we know of to apply 
CLM to a retail establishment database. Our application of the Duranton and Overman (2005) 
K-density method is also the first to a retail database. Most importantly, this paper develops a model 
suitable for adaptation by public policy officials, large retailers such as one of the anchors in our 
sample, and smaller retailers who might be displaced by anchor openings. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section develops our main 
hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data collection method and our unique data set, and presents 
descriptive statistics. Section 4 analyzes the spatial pattern of anchor stores and tests the hypothesis 
that retail follows population by using the nonparametric K-density method. Section 5 discusses the 
CLM results. Section 6 tests whether the CLM effectively explains the location pattern of openings. 
Section 7 concludes the discussion.   
 
                                                 
39
 In the context of industrial firm and plant location decisions, localization economies are usually defined as 
sharing of inputs such as specialized labor and technology (Arauzo-Carod, Liviano-Solis, and Manjón-Antolín, 
2010). Our extension to the retail sector includes the benefits from comparison shopping and multi-purpose 
shopping trips. For example, the clustering of stores selling high-value differentiated goods (e.g., jewelry and 
automobiles) is explained by this concept of localization economies. 
40
 For example, Hausman and Leibtag (2007) focus on supermarket competition only; Holmes (2011) studies 
Wal-Mart only; Jia (2008) evaluates Wal-Mart and Kmart competition in counties with small population; 
Vitorino (2012) works with nine anchor stores in regional shopping centers in 2006. By way of contrast, we 
have 54 anchors in 36 MSAs, and these MSAs represent all but the smallest and largest markets. 
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2. Do Anchor Locations Passively Follow Population and Income? 
The purpose of this section is to elaborate on the idea that retail is an uninteresting sector because 
it serves the needs of local population. The hypothesis that retail locations passively follow household 
locations (referred to as the suburbanization hypothesis) serves as a useful point of departure for our 
model, which introduces the possibility that retail locations are influenced by localization economies 
and by competitive conditions. A finding that suburbanization explains the location pattern of anchors 
would imply no need to add more variables.  
If customers are the major driver of retail productivity, the location pattern of retail 
establishments could be well-predicted by the location of households or population. We make this 
simple idea more plausible by introducing three types of anchor stores: low-price, mid-price and 
high-price. Incomes of the population may not be important if department stores can choose the 
format suitable to income in the local area. Therefore, the point of departure for our analysis is the 
hypothesis that location patterns of these three types will be indistinguishable from the location 
patterns of households and population modified by income. If so, then the potential of retail to lead 
local economic development, as suggested by Hausman and Liebtag (2007) and by Foster, 
Haltiwanger and Krizan (2006), is irrelevant to spatial patterns. 
We elaborate the suburbanization hypothesis with profit maximization, which predicts spatial 
clustering by adding variables such as potential revenue, revenue growth and urban transportation 
systems. For example, a location near limited-access roads expands the market catchment area. We 
refer to this group of variables as testing the revenue hypothesis. 
We add localization economies, the benefits associated with a cluster of retail stores of all 
types.
41
 Stahl (1982) assumes nonconvex transportation costs for consumers and declining marketing 
costs for retailers. A simple representation for consumers is a fixed cost of a shopping trip; this may be 
spread over multiple purchases. When differentiated products are introduced, then comparison 
shopping motivates clustering of retailers selling substitute products; localization economies may 
outweigh competitive effects. From the retailer’s perspective, a fixed setup cost allows costs to 
                                                 
41
 The concept of agglomeration (localization and urbanization) economies has been considered as the most 
studied determinant of industrial location (Arauzo-Carod, Liviano-Solis and Manjon-Antolin, 2010). 
 57 
 
decline with the volume of sales and the number of products sold; economies of scope are realized by 
larger retailers. 
Konishi and Sandfort (2003) extend Stahl’s (1982) framework to allow for brand names 
established by department stores. Advertising allows customers to develop a high degree of certainty 
about the items for sale and their pricing, as opposed to smaller “in-line” retailers that do not have as 
much advertising and selection or that have higher prices. The different brand identification, together 
with greater variety at the department store, generates benefits from co-location. We refer to these as a 
form of localization economies. As in the industrial location literature, localization economies would 
also derive from specialized labor pools and easier access to technology such as inventory control and 
supply-chain management systems. 
A strand of the economics literature views the location choices of anchor stores as a strategic 
game:  see Jia (2008), Holmes (2011), Fershtman and Pakes (2012) and Vitorino (2012).
42
 This 
approach emphasizes the negative effects of competition, suggesting that spatial patterns will be 
dispersed as anchors seek to avoid competition or enter in a way designed to preclude competition 
(Salvo, 2010). One form of competition is cannibalization: anchors have a strong aversion to locating 
too close to another of their own stores; empirical support for cannibalization has been found by 
Holmes (2011).  
We test competition and cannibalization hypotheses as one of several explanations of spatial 
patterns of retail. To summarize the most elaborate hypothesis, we test if spatial patterns of anchor 
store openings can be explained by competition (including cannibalization), localization economies, 
revenues (income and income growth) and by the location of population. The suburbanization 
hypothesis that households drive retail locations is nested within the revenue hypothesis since income 
and income growth will not have additional explanatory power if household location explains 
everything. Likewise, competition and localization economies elaborate the revenue hypothesis.  
The intra-metropolitan location of anchor stores is constrained by zoning, which commonly 
                                                 
42
 We find this line of reasoning problematical because it requires improbably complex calculations once the 
number of competitors increases from some small number. By adding constraints to optimization, Vitorino 
(2012) increases the number of competitors in her model to nine, whereas we consider all anchors of a given 
type as competitors. 
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provides for retail districts and accommodates shopping centers to serve the needs of the local 
population. Zoning might account for retail patterns that are more concentrated than that of 
households.
43
 
 
3. Data 
3.1. Sample Construction 
Anchor stores are defined by their functions and these differ across the central place hierarchy.
44
 
We develop a rigorous definition of anchors for large shopping centers: i.e., department stores where 
shoppers can find different categories of products including clothing, footwear, bedding, furniture, 
jewelry, beauty products, and housewares, as well as different brands within each category.
45
 We 
choose a sample of leading retail firms which operate department stores, discount stores, 
hypermarkets and wholesale clubs based on “Leading Retail Chains” listed in Directory of Major 
Malls (DMM).
46
 We also require the minimum store square footage be greater than 20,000 sq ft. 
Panel A of Appendix 1 contains the list of 54 department stores.
47
 Based on Vitorino (2012) and 
Gould, Pashigian and Prendergast (2005), we control for price and quality variables by classifying all 
the chains into three categories, high-price, mid-price and low-price. Panel B of Appendix 1 includes 
the classification methods.  
Since manual date collection is quite time-consuming, we start with a list of metropolitan 
statistical areas (MSAs) with population more than 750,000 in 2005. Based on the rationale of retail 
                                                 
43
 Similarly, the industrial location literature has sought to determine the influence of public policy: see, for 
example, Crozet, Mayer and Mucchielli (2004) and Arauzo-Carod, Liviano-Solis, and Manjón-Antolín  (2010). 
44
 The Directory of Major Malls (DMM) reports anchor stores for each shopping center. For regional and super 
regional shopping centers, anchor stores are normally department stores such as Macy’s, Sears and Nordstrom. 
For small-scale centers, anchor stores could be apparel chain stores such as Gap and Bob’s store. For power 
centers featured with big box retailers, anchor stores are normally discount stores (TJ Max and Marshalls), 
hypermarkets (Wal-Mart and Target) and wholesale clubs (BJ’s and Costco). Leading apparel chains such as the 
Gap are anchor stores for community centers but not for regional centers or larger. 
45
 This is essentially consistent with the hypothesis of Konishi and Sandfort (2003) that consumers with 
preference uncertainty can economize their travel costs. Following the same logic, discount stores, hypermarkets 
and wholesale clubs play a similar function and are normally anchor stores for large power centers and lifestyle 
centers. 
46
 The definition of department store in DMM is different from ours. A subject store is included in our sample 
based on the variety of products and brands. For example, TJ Maxx, Marshalls, Burlington Coat Factory and 
Ross Dress For Less are classified as apparel chains according to DMM. But we treat them as representatives of 
anchor stores because they provide a variety of products as well as different brands within each category. We do 
not include GAP and Abercrombie & Fitch because they offer only apparel of their own brands.    
47
 We initially include more than 60 retail chains but some of them are not within the 36 MSAs.  
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clustering and the function of anchor stores, customers economize their transportation costs through 
multipurpose shopping. In the US, shoppers often drive from store to store within a retail district. 
Downtown shopping, on the other hand, typically involves walking from store to store; it is more akin 
to shopping within a suburban shopping center, except that it is harder to identify the relevant cluster 
of stores. As a result, we delete all MSAs with heavy or light rail transportation systems. This leaves 
us with MSA’s that do not have mass transit systems in 2010.48 We end up with 36 MSAs defined in 
2010 Census. We further classify the MSAs into 4 regions: East, Central, Midwest and Southwest. 
There are 14 MSAs in East, 9 in Central, 6 in Midwest and 7 in Southwest.  
Panel A of Figure 1 shows that the 36 MSAs group logically into four regions, consistent with 
Census regions and divisions. Panel B of Figure 1 focuses on the 7 MSAs in the Southwest, showing 
that the anchors do follow population as suggested by the suburbanization hypothesis. In all MSAs 
except Las Vegas, the map shows that anchors, especially those opened since early 2005, often locate 
away from the CBD.  
For store openings, we search in Factiva to collect related news articles. Factiva applies 
Intelligent Indexing® in order to assign unique company codes to Dow Jones News Search (DJNS) 
articles that represent the companies that are the subject of the articles. Because of Intelligent 
Indexing, Factiva is considered effective in identifying articles relevant to specific companies. By 
conducting rigorous search in major news and business publication sources and press release wires, 
we gather 14,400 articles related to our universe of anchor store openings from 01/01/2005 to 
01/01/2012.
49
  
The objective of the search is to identify all articles related to anchor store openings driven by 
market demand as well as competition. By reading through the articles, we find the reasons behind 
those openings. We focus on new stores that require substantial sunk costs and thus may have large 
strategic impact on development within the MSA. As a result, we exclude rebranding, expansions and 
                                                 
48
 The source of transportation mode for each MSA is a listing by the American Public Transportation 
Association (APTA). As our sample period ends in December 2011 and transportation systems change over time, 
we use the 2011Q4 APTA report in order to guarantee the list of cities we selected do not have heavy and light 
rail transportation system during the whole sample period.  
49
 We search articles in headlines and leading paragraphs by using (store or stores or *center or center*) near10 
(move* or relocate* or relocation or expand* or expansion* or open or opens or opened or opening or unveil* 
or dispose* or disposal or cut* or shut* or close or closes or closing or closed or closure) 
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renovations. But we account for store relocations because relocation requires new construction that 
involves substantial sunk cost. We carefully investigate false announcements and censored 
observations because some announced openings did not actually take places. Our final sample 
includes 806 new stores opened from 2005 to 2011.  
The decision to open a new store is conditioned on the mix of pre-existing stores in the same 
local market. To identify existing anchors at any point in time, we manually collect all the existing 
stores as of September 2012 on retailers’ websites. We exert discretion to ensure that we select all 
stores within the list of MSAs.
50
 Our interest lies on the ownership of the store at both chain-level and 
company-level. Starting with stores existing in 2012, we then track backwards by identifying stores 
closed or those with an ownership change. Closings are tracked through news articles, CoStar, DMM 
and various website searches.
51
 Mergers and acquisitions are tracked from news articles, 10K reports, 
CoStar and Thompson One Banker database of mergers and acquisition at property level.  
For each chain, we start with September 2012 anchor locations and use the following equation to 
track existing stores backwards to the beginning of each year: 
# stores at the beginning of year t = # stores at the end of year t - # stores acquired during 
year t - # stores opened during year t + # stores closed during year t + # stores sold during year t 
As January is a big month for new store openings, an annual observation begins February 1 and 
ends January 31 (Holmes, 2011).
 52
 To avoid the bias that some companies might have higher 
incentive to announce openings, we cross check openings with CoStar and DMM.
53
 
Information on headquarters and distribution centers is collected from news articles, 10-K reports 
                                                 
50
 In store locator websites, we enter the names of the cities and collect the addresses for all stores that show up 
on the webpage. Some retailers such as Belk show all the stores by states. In that case we will collect stores 
locations based on states. Some retailers such as Bon Ton ask us to specify the radius on their store locator 
websites. We always choose the widest radius. However, in that way, we might over-select stores. So we match 
zip codes with MSAs in the next steps. 
51
 CoStar does not explicitly provide store closing information but might provide ownership information 
through tenancy and property transaction records. 
52
 Using Macy’s as an example, we collected all the current stores from Macy’s store locator website in 
September 2012. Based on the news articles on openings, closing, mergers and acquisitions from February 2011 
to September 2012, we use the above equation to track the number of Macy’s as of February 2011.The data 
collection period of the current existing store was from June to October 2012. In order to ensure the data 
accuracy, we collect news articles up to December 2012.    
53
 For example, CoStar Properties provides “Year Built” and CoStar Tenants provides “Move-in date”. If the 
property where the subject store located was built between 2005 and 2011, as indicated in CoStar Properties, or 
the earliest move-in date of the subject store is between 2005 and 2011, as indicated in CoStar Tenant, we treat it 
as a new opening. 
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and CoStar. We exclude e-commerce fulfillment centers from traditional distribution centers. We also 
consider the openings and closings of distribution centers, headquarter relocations and changes on 
distribution centers of multi-chain companies.
54
 
We manually search for detailed addresses of existing and new stores, in the form of “number, 
street, city, state, zip code” and categorize them into different MSAs based on “HUD USPS ZIP Code 
Crosswalk Files”. We only keep openings in our sample of 36 MSAs.55 Appendix 2 includes the 
distribution of openings by MSA. We obtain latitude and longitude of all the openings, existing stores, 
headquarters and distribution centers. Information is further verified based on various sources such as 
Google and GIS system. 
 
3.2. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 presents summary statistics at the MSA level. Panel A shows the socioeconomics 
characteristics of 36 MSAs by region based on Census 2010. The East MSAs have the fewest 
households but the highest median household income while the Central MSAs have the most 
households but the lowest income.
56
 Demand is defined as the total number of households multiplied 
by median household income. On average, the East MSAs have the highest demand density while the 
Southwest MSAs have the lowest demand density. Turning to demand growth, the Central MSAs 
exhibit the slowest demand growth while the Southwest MSAs exhibit the fastest growth in the recent 
20 years.
57
   
Panel B includes summary statistics of 2,380 existing stores as of 2005, the beginning of our 
sample period. By breaking down into three price types, we find evidence supporting the 
                                                 
54 
Some distribution centers serve more than one chain but some do not. For example, TJ Maxx and Marshalls 
under TJX do not share distribution centers while Sam’s club and Wal-Mart do.  
55 
We match zip code with counties/MSAs based on HUD 2010 definition. Correspondently, we should make 
two match files (MSA-CY and ZIP-CY) consistent. So we should use the 2010 MSA-CY definition as well. But 
the latest is the OMB 2009 definition. The 2010 definition has not been released. As a result, we use the OMB 
2009 definition. 
56
 We use households instead of population because it is a better unit of measurement for consumption. 
57
 Because MSA definition changes over time, we use the Census 2010 definitions: 12,346 census tracts in the 
36 MSAs. Demand in a local area (LA) around each tract is calculated for a three-mile radius from 2010 
centroids, effectively controlling for changes over time in tracts and in MSA definitions. Demand Growth 
1990-2000 is defined as annualized percentage growth of inflation-adjusted demand from 1990 to 2000. We use 
demand growth from 1990 to 2000, which is more than 10 years before the beginning of our sample period 
because a new opening normally takes more than five years to plan and construct. 
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suburbanization hypothesis that income may not be important because the anchors choose the format 
suitable to income in the area. For instance, the Central MSAs have the largest number of low-price 
existing stores due to the largest population and the lowest income. The East MSAs have the largest 
number of mid-price per capita and a high number of high-price per capita, corresponding to high 
income and demand density in the East. The number of high-price and mid-price anchors per capita in 
the Southwest MSAs corresponds well to the fact that it has median household income very close to 
the East. When we scale existing anchors by demand, much of the disparity across regions disappears. 
This suggests that the mix of stores varies systematically with local market conditions, a hypothesis 
we will explore further with CLM. 
Panel C presents statistics of 806 openings from 2005 through 2011. When we scale openings by 
households, the Midwest ranks the highest in all three price segments, suggesting that its high demand 
growth (Panel A) is balanced across demand segments. The Southwest, with demand growth of over 
4.5% per year, has a relatively large concentration of mid-price openings, suggesting that middle 
income groups are the fastest growing.  As with existing anchors, when we scale new anchors by 
demand, we get a much more even distribution across regions.  
Next, we analyze within-MSA location choices by using randomly chosen tract centroids as a 
counterfactual that allows us to evaluate existing and new locations. The reason of using this 
counterfactual is that a significant number of these areas have no new or existing stores; comparison 
shows how the chosen locations differ from the rejected ones.
58
  In addition, because there are more 
census tracts in more densely populated neighborhoods, randomly chosen centroids represent the 
suburbanization hypothesis that the anchors follow population.  
In Table 2, we bore down to demand and growth variables in local market areas (LAs) most 
relevant to the success of an anchor store, the three-mile radius around the store. The use of three-mile 
radius around each tracts centroid is justified by discussions with real estate professionals
59
 and by 
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 In unreported results, at least 25% of counties have neither new nor existing stores. Our counterfactual 
methodology is similar to those used by Duranton and Overman (2005) and Billings and Johnson (2012). 
59
 Fanning (2005, page 192) uses three to five miles or a 5-10 minute drive on local roads as the boundary 
between shopping centers anchored by supermarkets and junior department stores and those anchored by the 
multiline department stores we study. Moreover, a three-mile radius is consistent with the sizes of submarkets 
defined by CoStar and other vendors. 
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the fact that larger areas would potentially comprise too much of a typical metropolitan area, 
depriving location choices of sufficient intra-metropolitan variation. Moreover, three mile areas have 
the advantage of encompassing enough area to obviate the need for distance weighted variables such 
as those used by Crozet, Mayer and Mucchielli (2004) and by Woodward Figueiredo and Guimarães 
(2006).
60
  
In all regions, demand is much higher in LAs of existing stores, in comparison with random LAs 
as well as LAs of openings. However, demand growth is much higher in LAs of openings, in 
comparison with random LAs and LAs of existing stores. This suggests that new stores are accepting 
lower immediate revenues than existing in exchange for higher demand in the future. New stores are 
likely less profitable on a current basis. This is also consistent with the revenue hypothesis in which 
potential revenue and growth help explain the opening decisions of new anchor stores.  
 
4. The Spatial Pattern of Anchor Stores 
4.1. An Example of Spatial Pattern within MSAs 
Since our analysis is based on choices within MSAs, we are interested in a general spatial pattern 
across a typical MSA. To illustrate a general pattern, Figure 2 compares Albany-Schenectady-Troy, 
NY (Panel A) with Oklahoma City and Tulsa, OK (Panel B). Both maps demonstrate a strong spatial 
clustering observed in all our MSAs. The anchors tend to locate in the most densely populated parts of 
the MSAs, where census tracts have smaller areas.
61
 Existing anchors as of January 2005 tend to 
cluster around limited access roads (not shown). On the other hand, openings are somewhat more 
disbursed, avoiding the CBD. The generality of this conclusion is demonstrated previously by Table 2, 
which shows a random (i.e., population weighted) choice of location compared to actual locations. 
The three MSAs have similar total populations (about 350,000 households in Tulsa and Albany, 
471,000 in Oklahoma City), but Albany has over twice the density of Tulsa and 1.5 times that of 
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 Spatial autoregressive techniques are not well developed in the CLM context. Despite the advantages of 
using three-mile LAs, we are aware of the Modifiable Areal Unit Problem (MAUP) and so we provide 
sensitivity tests of the three mile assumption. 
61
 In the US, census tracts are designed to contain residential locations of about 4,000 people on average. 
Therefore, the area will be smaller and the centers of the tracts (“centroids”) will be closer together in more 
densely populated areas. 
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Oklahoma City.
62
 The different scales on the two maps provide a visual representation of the 
relatively spread-out pattern in Tulsa and Oklahoma City. As a result, separate analysis of each of the 
four regions is motivated by Figure 2. 
 
4.2. Duranton and Overman (2005) Method for Evaluating Spatial Patterns 
Next, we use the Duranton and Overman (2005) K-density method to test the suburbanization 
hypothesis and examine spatial patterns of existing and new stores. Appendix 3 includes computation 
details. Our application of the K-density method is motivated by the question “can the CLM model 
explain the spatial clustering of new anchors better than the suburbanization hypothesis?” To build on 
the previous findings that existing stores exhibit more spatial clustering than openings, we plot the 
densities of distances between existing anchors (E2E) compared to the density between opening of 
new stores and existing stores (O2E).  
By using existing locations as counterfactuals, we deal with the dartboard problem discussed by 
Ellison and Glaeser (1997) and Billings and Johnson (2012). The problem is that random locations 
will exhibit patterns that might be mistaken for intentional clustering. Our comparison of O2E to E2E 
simply describes the way openings compare to existing locations.
63
 
Figure 3 plots the spatial pattern of E2E and O2E by region. The solid line without cross shows 
the pattern of E2E. The solid line with cross marks shows the pattern of O2E. The horizontal axis is 
target distance from zero to 50 miles; 51 target points. We use 50 miles as threshold because the 90
th
 
percentile of E2E distances is about 50 miles.
64
 The East region has a sharp peak because older cities 
typically have dense CBDs and there are stronger controls on new constructions.  
The two dashed lines plot the global confidence interval for a random choice of tract centroid 
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 The Albany MSA had about 123 households per square mile in 2010, whereas the Tulsa MSA had about 58 
and Oklahoma City about 85. 
63
 There are other reasons for using E2E and O2E. Duranton and Overman (2005) use existing locations as 
counterfactuals because it is known that existing establishments have zoning permissions, and existing 
establishments likely found locations attractive from a profit maximizing point-of-view after considering many 
factors unobserved by the econometrician. In addition, comparing E2E with O2O would lack a reliable 
benchmark. For example, if new stores opened in a recently emerged shopping district located far away from 
traditional central business district (CBD), one might falsely conclude that openings exhibit clustering compared 
with existing anchors.   
64
 Duranton and Overman (2005) use the median distance between all pairs of manufacturing establishments in 
the whole UK. We focus on individual MSAs, which are much smaller but relatively densely populated 
geographical areas. As a result, we use the 90
th
 percentile instead of median. 
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(i.e., a population weighted location choice). The first (second) numbers in parentheses is the number 
of O2E densities at 51 target distances (four target distances within three miles) outside the 95% 
global confidence intervals. This approach is similar to Duranton and Overman (2006), Klier and 
McMillen (2008) and Billings and Johnson (2012) who suggest global intervals to test for choices 
across multiple locations. We use the centroids of census tracts as counterfactuals and assume that the 
probability that a census tract is chosen as a new store location is equal within a MSA.  Graphically, 
a cluster pattern (i.e., more spatially concentrated than population) is detected when the actual 
K-density lies above the upper confidence band and a dispersed pattern is detected when the actual 
K-density lies below the lower confidence band. We find that, except in the Midwest, O2E is 
well-above the 95 percent global confidence interval from distance of zero to three miles. The 
numbers in parentheses show that, except in the Southwest, most of actual O2E densities are outside 
the population-weighted global confidence intervals, especially at the four target distances within 
three miles. In unreported figures, we plot O2E densities by price type. Again, the global confidence 
intervals based on population weighting do not predict any of the three types of openings.  
The clustered pattern of openings relative to a population weighted pattern could be explained by 
zoning, but the differences between E2E and O2E suggest that there is more to the story: i.e. O2E is 
more dispersed than E2E for all regions, consistent with findings reported in Tables 1 and 2.
65
 The 
comparison of O2E with E2E suggests that anchors have had some success in finding locations closer 
to population, and perhaps farther from competition, than existing anchors. 
 Localization and competition hypotheses suggest that anchors have higher incentive to locate 
near existing stores of different price categories. For example, Target might prefer a location near 
Macy’s rather than Wal-Mart, subject to zoning constraints. To directly test competition and 
localization hypotheses, we aggregate existing stores into four categories defined from the perspective 
of an opening of a given price type and chain. The matched type variables are defined as the locations 
of existing anchors that are: same-chain-same-company (SCS), different-chain-same-company (DCS), 
same-type-different-company (SD) and different-type-different-company (DD) relative to a given 
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 The endogeneity of zoning (see Glaeser, Gyourko and Saiz, 2008) suggests that local governments often 
comply with profit maximizing imperatives. This assumption is particularly plausible for the retail sector. 
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opening. We hypothesize that cannibalization is measured by SCS stores and localization is measured 
by DD stores. Figure 4 plots K-densities of O2SCS, O2SD and O2DD defined analogously to O2E 
with the existings broken down into the SCS, SD and DD categories. We omit O2DCS because of 
insufficient observations.  
In Figure 4, O2SCS lies well below O2SD and O2DD, consistent with cannibalization.
66
 As 
shown by the numbers in parentheses, most of densities are outside the population-weighted global 
confidence intervals. More importantly, O2SCS is more dispersed than the lower band, supporting the 
fact that zoning does not dictate location choices. Likewise, in a recent study of Big Box stores, 
Schuetz (2013) concludes that zoning does not appear to drive store clustering. 
The major conclusions of Figure 3 and 4 are that, consistent with descriptive statistics, the 
location pattern of openings cannot be fully explained by either existing locations or by population. 
This motivates a multivariate econometric model to explain the location pattern of openings. 
 
5. A Conditional Logit Model (CLM) of Anchor Store Openings 
5.1. Conditional Logit Model 
The CLM has been one of the most popular methods for industrial location literature, so it is a 
reasonable point of departure for a study of retail locations.
67
 The CLM we develop models the 
intra-metropolitan location of anchor store openings as a function of measurable supply and demand. 
A significant contribution of applying CLM is to use existing store locations, and choices near 
limited-access highways, to control for omitted variables. Appendix 4 gives details of the CLM 
method, which is based on profit maximizing location choices. 
For an opening in a particular MSA, we assume that the decision maker faces a set of finite 
potential location choices (tract centroids) within the same MSA. We follow the methods used by 
Ben-Akiva and Lerman (1985) and by Klier and McMillen (2008) to deal with the problem of a large 
choice set and to obtain consistent estimators that are more efficient than a multinomial logit (MNL) 
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 In unreported figures, we plots K-densities of O2SCS, O2SD and O2DD by region and conclude the same 
results. 
67
 Table 1 in Arauzo-Carod, Liviano-Solis, and Manjón-Antolín (2010) lists nineteen studies using CLM and 
they compare discrete choice to count data models. 
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model. To ensure the choices are finite, we replace the locations of actual openings by the closest 
census tract centroid. Each opening is paired with five non-overlapping LAs randomly select without 
replacement in order to ensure that the choices are independent and mutually exclusive.
68
 The 
resulting dataset has N openings and 6N observations; the dependent variable equals 1 for the selected 
market and 0 for the rejected markets. Time is not a factor in our CLM model because we evaluate 
each decision relative to initial characteristics at the beginning of each year. Hence, CLM allows us to 
control all time-invariant unobservable characteristics of decision makers. 
Our CLM model is a reduced form, cross sectional solution designed to explain the spatial 
pattern better than a model that omits our supply and demand variables. The explanatory power of 
CLM should be better than either the population weighted K-density of tracts or the K-density for 
E2E. Controlling for factors such as distance to highways and CBD, significant coefficients for SCS 
and DD variables indicate that they can explain spatial patterns. 
 
5.2. Explanatory variables 
Our explanatory variables include location specific variables (X variables) and location-decision 
specific variables (Z variables). A set of X variables to test the suburbanization hypotheses includes a 
CBD dummy for any location within three miles of the CBD (CBD_3mile), distance of the location 
from the CBD (dis2CBD) and distance squared. Movements of population and income over the 
sample period have typically been away from the CBD and towards more outlying suburbs. 
Consequently, we expect a negative sign on CBD_3mile, a positive sign on dis2CBD and an 
indeterminate sign on the squared term. 
To test the revenue hypothesis, we make the LA’s more flexible by including dummies for 
locations within half a mile of a limited-access road (hwy_half_mile).
69
 Then we add another dummy 
for locations more than half a mile but less than two miles from highways (hwy_half2two_mile). The 
omitted category is all other tract centroids. If these variables do, in fact, measure access to demand, 
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 Guimarães, Figueirdo, Woodward et al (2003) suggest Poisson regressions as an alternative to CLM. Since 
our IIA tests cannot reject the null hypothesis, we do not pursue the Poisson method here. 
69
 All anchors will locate on a major road, suggesting that the limited access designation is a reasonable first 
approximation to better access to demand. We use the terms “highway” and “limited-access roads” 
interchangeably. 
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then we expect a positive coefficient on hwy_half_mile and a smaller positive coefficient on 
hwy_half2three_mile. The hwy_half_mile variable also captures a positive effect of zoning, which 
typically encourages retail locations near limited access highways. 
The most important variable for testing the revenue hypothesis is expected demand (demand in 
2000 multiplied by demand growth from 1990 to 2000 within a three-mile LA).
70
  However, anchors 
may position themselves in growth markets even when current demand is low. In this case, our 
expected demand variable may not give sufficient weight to growth. We also test models separating 
demand (2000) and growth (1990-2000). In order to make a direct comparison, we standardize 
demand variables with mean of zero and standard deviation of one. 
To test cannibalization and localization hypothesis, the Z vector contains three location-decision 
specific variables. existing_scs captures the cannibalization effect and takes on a value of one if the 
number of same chain, same company stores within the local area is above the median for the MSA, 
otherwise zero.
71
 For localization economies, existing_sd (same type, different company) and 
existing_dd (different type, different company) is constructed in the same way as existing_scs. It is 
important to note that existing_sd not only captures localization effects but also competition effects.  
For completeness, we add existing_dcs (different chain, same company).
72
 We also add 
additional Z variables to control for distance to headquarters and distance to the closest distribution 
centers. Because these variables are highly right skewed, we use dummy variables to control the 
non-normality. All the Z variables are calculated based on the median values within the same MSA.
73
   
We can interpret coefficients as the change in probability relative to a base case, as suggested by 
Ben-Akiva (see Chapter 9). The base is a given amount of demand in the area around a tract. Then the 
shift in probability of opening given by the coefficients on the competition and localization variables 
is relative to the base that demand is the only driver of location. i.e., high values of SCS, SD and DD 
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 Census tract centroids within the three-mile LA radius are used to obtain 1990 and 2000 numbers. This 
adjusts for tract splits and mergers. 
71
 Note that this variable is based on the number of matched type anchors within an LA. The number of stores is 
calculated at the beginning of the year before opening. We choose the dichotomous variable because the 
distribution of number of stores in an LA is highly skewed left. 
72
 Because of few observations, we present the different-chain-same-company variable just for completeness.  
73
 We only present results by using dummies for median. In unreported estimates, we use dummies for upper 
quartile. The results are similar. 
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indicate conditions (including omitted variables) that change the probability of opening. Significant 
values explain spatial clustering patterns. The efficacy of the CLM location model can be tested with 
K-density confidence bands for the probability of an opening.  
 
6. Results 
6.1. CLM Results 
Table 3 presents three CLM models for all MSAs and by region. Panel A presents the base model 
with expected demand. Consistent with the  suburbanization hypothesis, negative and significant 
coefficients on CBD_3mile indicate that new openings are less likely to locate in CBD areas, which 
have negative or slow population growth. The Southwest is an exception, but only in that the 
coefficient is not different from zero. Capturing population movements away from the inner suburbs, 
dis2CBD is positive and the squared term is negative except that the Southwest has insignificant signs 
on both variables.  
Consistent with the revenue hypothesis, positive coefficients of dummies for proximity to 
highways suggest that new openings prefer locations with better access to demand and available 
locations. Again, this pattern is less significant in the Southwest. In addition, large positive 
coefficients of expected demand are consistent with the revenue hypothesis. In Panel B, both demand 
and growth have positive impact but demand has a larger impact than growth. Immediate revenues are 
preferred to deferred revenues. In unreported results, we interact expected demand with dummies for 
proximity to highways. Interaction coefficients are negative and significant in all MSAs, East and 
Central regions, indicating that trade areas are expanded by highway access. New stores near limited 
access highways require less demand within three miles. These findings suggest that the demand can 
come from much larger areas if the store has good highway access.  
Our Z variables measure how decision makers respond to competition and localization. We 
observe a strong cannibalization effect as indicated by large negative coefficients of existing_scs. The 
East MSAs have the largest coefficient. This is consistent with descriptive statistics that the East 
region has the largest number of existing stores per households and per demand. The coefficients of 
existing_sd are positive but only significant in all MSAs and East while the coefficients of existing_dd 
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are positive and highly significant in all MSAs. In comparison with existing_sd, existing_dd has a 
larger magnitude as well as a higher statistical significance. This is consistent with localization 
economies because existing_dd captures the localization effect while existing_sd captures both 
competition as well as localization. Separating by region, the localization effect is the highest in 
Midwest. As we concluded in Table 1, the Midwest has the smallest number of existing stores per 
household and per demand. This suggests that localization plays a more important role when demand 
is less densely distributed.  
For other control variables, existing_dcs is insignificant. This might be affected by limited 
observations because most of companies in our sample do not operate multi-chains.
74
 Because we 
construct Z variables based on median value within an MSA, it is difficult to get enough variation on 
variables of distance to headquarters and distance to distribution centers. Coefficients of these two 
variables are not significant, except distance to headquarters in Central.  
We have omitted variables, notably precise measures of zoning and of competition among local 
jurisdictions for new anchor stores. We have noted that SD and DD variables should be positively 
associated with prior local public policies and including them should partially control for public 
policy.
75
 Coefficients on these variables cannot be interpreted as causal relationships, but we can 
exploit the plausible assumption that both DD and SD respond in the same way to omitted factors. 
To interpret the SD minus DD coefficient we have the following: the SD coefficient includes the 
sum of competitive effects, localization economies and omitted variables whereas the DD coefficient 
includes the sum of the last two only. Moreover, we expect greater localization benefits from DD 
since it represents greater variety in the choices of anchors available to shoppers. It follows that the 
SD – DD coefficient is the sum of the negative competitive effect and the extra localization benefits 
associated with DD: i.e., the difference can be interpreted as a lower bound on the absolute value of 
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 For some companies that operate multi-chains, there might be no opening that took place within our sample 
areas and sample period. 
75
 Duranton and Overman (2005) recognize this, which is why they (and we) use existing locations to measure 
spatial clustering. An additional proxy for zoning in our study includes distance to limited access highways. 
Moreover, zoning may not be binding, or may be endogenous, because local governments need revenue from 
anchors and prefer to serve the needs of their local populations. 
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competitive effects assuming that omitted variables have identical effects on DD and SD.
76
 
The difference between SD and DD for all MSAs implies a lower bound estimate of -30% 
(=exp(.36-.71) – 1) on the probability of opening for a one unit change in the SD variable; this 
difference is statistically significant at the 5% level. The difference is negative in each region taken 
separately, providing evidence that the negative competition effect is always of larger magnitude than 
the extra localization effect associated with DD. The difference is large and significant in the Midwest 
(a 76% reduction in probability) and Southwest (a 29% reduction). The difference is much smaller in 
magnitude and statistically insignificant in East and Central regions. A likely cause is more restrictive 
public policies in these regions, but full investigation of this would require more study. 
 
6.2. Robustness tests 
In a robustness test, we investigate the possibility that a high correlation between SD and DD is 
driving our results: i.e., the collinearity issue. We calculate correlation coefficients in all MSAs and by 
region. The correlation varies from 0.38 (East and Central) to 0.41 (Southwest). We also run separate 
models by including only existing_sd and only existing_dd.  In SD-only results, we find that the 
estimated coefficients are positive in all regions. They are significant in all MSAs, East and Central. 
In DD-only results, we find that the estimated coefficients are positive and significant in all MSAs 
and in all four regions. Comparing the magnitude to coefficients when both of the variables are in the 
regression, SD coefficients are bigger and DD about unchanged when they are alone in the regression. 
This supports our interpretation of the SD – DD coefficients. 
We perform several addition tests for robustness. We replace the Z variables based on median 
values with alternatives based on upper quartiles and conclude similar results. We also apply a 
different classification of competition based on Company reports by Gale Business Insights (GBI). 
The classification is shown in Appendix 1 Panel C. Instead of classifying into different price 
categories, GBI reports major competitors of each firm. Hence, we revise our competition variables 
accordingly. existing_sd (existing_dd) equals one if number of existing competing (non-competing) 
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 It may be objected that the competitive effect differs for a low-priced anchor when compared to another type. 
But, our SD and DD variables include competition as viewed by each type. Our lower bound for the absolute 
value of the competitive coefficient may be interpreted as an average over all anchor types. 
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stores is greater than the median for the MSA and zero otherwise. We conclude that our results are 
robust by using variables constructed based on the GBI classification. Because we have omitted 
variables which might vary across decision makers, we apply a random effect model to the 
specifications in Table 3. The results are similar in terms of sign and significant level.
77
 To deal with 
MAUP, we also try five-mile radius around tract centroids; we find very similar CLM coefficients.  
 
6.3. Is the CLM Model Effective in Estimating the Location Pattern of Openings? 
In Figure 5, we apply the estimated probabilities from CLM as the basis for K-density 
confidence intervals.
78
 The difference between the CLM-based intervals and the population-based 
intervals plotted in Figure 3 is that the former uses model results to estimate the probability that any 
tract centroid is chosen, whereas the later selects each centroid with probability 1/n. If the CLM 
model accurately estimates the location pattern of openings, then the actual O2E K-densities should 
lie within the 95% confidence interval implied by the estimated probabilities. 
Shown by the numbers in parentheses, we find that the CLM-based confidence bands 
successfully capture the cluster pattern within three miles; none of the actuals fall outside the 
confidence bands. The three-mile distance is more important to decision makers than long distances. 
From a practitioner’s perspective, distances of 10 to 12 miles, the peak of the actual distribution, are 
too long to be within the same submarket. Comparing with the numbers in parentheses in Figure 3 
(three of the four points within three miles are outside the bands), we conclude that the CLM model 
explains the actual location pattern much better than population weighted distances. For example, for 
all MSAs, the CLM confidence bands include 44 of the 51 actuals, whereas the population weighted 
confidence bands include only 22 out of 51.  
The actual O2E is still below the five percent lower band from four miles to the peak. This says 
that the actual is somewhat more dispersed than predicted by the model, but only at distances beyond 
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 One cannot compare the magnitude because the random effect model contains an intercept term.  
78
 Our approach is similar to Klier and McMillen (2008), except that they use probability estimates from a 
simple logit model. We randomly draw without replacement from the set of n census tracts in the same MSA. 
The calculation of global confidence interval is shown in Appendix 3. With n existing stores and n census tract 
centroids, there are n
2
 distance pairs. For each location choice to a particular decision maker, we calculate the 
probabilities based on CLM estimates. The predicted probability is given by Appendix Equation (A4).  
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those of most interest to decision makers. 
In Figure 6, we find that the CLM-based confidence bands perform better by different price 
types than at the aggregate level (Figure 5, panel A), indicating that decision makers can accurately 
explain location patterns if they disaggregate by price type using our model. In Panel A, high-price 
densities at all the target distances fall within the confidence bands estimated by CLM. Low- and 
mid-priced anchor openings are well-explained within three mile distances. In Panel B, although 
results by matched type are not as good as in Panel A, the model still explain most of the 51 target 
distances for SD and DD, and all four target distances within three miles for SCS. Again, we 
conclude that, from a particular retailer chain’s point of view, the model offers a better explanation of 
a general location pattern than the population-weighted method. Plots by region (not shown) reveal 
similar results.  
In conclusion, the CLM model effectively explains location patterns of new anchor stores. Even 
in the Southwest, where the hypothesis that retail follows population did the best (42 out of 51 target 
points were explained) the CLM produced better explanations (all 51 points were within a 95% 
global confidence band). The model offers a better explanation of location patterns by different price 
types (Figure 6A), in comparison with the aggregate level (Figure 5A). Most importantly, the 
explanatory power of the model by matched type (Figure 6B) suggests that, even from the 
point-of-view of a particular retailer, our model explains spatial patterns as well as the aggregate 
(Figure 5A).
79
  
 
7. Conclusion 
This paper examines the intra-metropolitan location decisions of retail stores by focusing on the 
opening of a comprehensive list of anchor stores in the United States. We develop a method for using 
CoStar, Factiva, 10K reports and other sources to track retail establishments and their ownership over 
time. The nonparametric K-density procedure shows that new stores are more dispersed than existing 
stores. It shows substantial differences in retail location patterns across regions. Anchors classified by 
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 For same-chain-same-company, the model does not do a good job of predicting the tendency to widely 
separate these stores. Future research might refine the model to better account for cannibalization.  
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price type and by relationship to competition have different location patterns. K-density analysis 
rejects the suburbanization hypothesis that anchors passively follow population, motivating the 
introduction of variables designed to account for zoning, revenue potential, competition and 
localization economies.  
By applying the CLM approach, we can account for the effects of several explanatory variables. 
The probability of opening is negatively related to CBD location but positively related to distance to 
CBD as suggested by the suburbanization trend occurring during our sample period. Highway 
proximity has a strong positive impact on probability of opening. Openings are more likely to locate 
in areas with higher potential revenue as well as revenue growth. The model is particularly effective 
in explaining openings within three miles of existing anchors, an approximation to the spatial scale of 
most relevance to decision makers such as anchor stores, government officials and smaller retailers. 
Consistent with cannibalization, openings are much less likely to locate near an existing store 
owned by the same chain. Most importantly, localization economies play a significant positive role in 
the opening decisions by anchor stores. Localization economies appear to be more important than the 
competitive effects associated with the existence of a concentration of the same type of store owned 
by a different chain. Using the difference between two coefficients (same type, different chain minus 
different type, different chain), we estimate a lower bound on the effect of competition on the 
probability of opening, assuming that omitted factors have the same effect on the two variables. The 
lower bound is negative in all regions and significantly negative for all MSAs, the Midwest and 
Southwest. 
Further research might explore reasons for small competitive effects in the East and Central 
regions, and apply our method to alternative MSA classification schemes. We present evidence that 
zoning is not strongly binding, but further research might reveal a bigger effect in the East and Central 
than other regions we study. 
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Appendix 1  
 
Panel A: List of 54 Department Stores (Anchors) 
 
List of Retail Chains Company 
Public / 
Private 
Note 
Barneys New York Barneys New York Private  
Boscov's 
Boscov's Private 
Filed for bankruptcy in 
2008. Exited bankruptcy 
in 2009. 
Lord & Taylor 
Hudson's Bay 
Company 
Public 
Belongs to Federated 
Department Store before 
2006 
Von Maur Von Maur Private  
Bealls (Florida) Bealls Private  
Bealls Outlet Bealls 
Private 
Outlet format store of 
Bealls (Florida) 
Belk Belk Public  
Bloomingdale's Macy’s Public  
Bloomingdale's outlet Macy’s 
Public 
Outlet format store of 
Macy’s 
Macy's Macy’s 
Public 
Former name is 
Federated Department 
Store 
Filene's Macy’s 
Public 
Converted to Macy’s in 
2006 
Strawbridge's Macy’s 
Public 
Converted to Macy’s in 
2006 
Robinsons-May Macy’s 
Public 
Converted to Macy’s in 
2006 
Bon-Ton Bon-ton Stores Public  
Elder-Beerman Bon-ton Stores Public  
Bergner’s Bon-ton Stores 
Public 
Sold by Saks to Bon-ton 
Stores in 2005 
Boston Store Bon-ton Stores 
Public 
Sold by Saks to Bon-ton 
Stores in 2005 
Carson Pirie Scott Bon-ton Stores 
Public 
Sold by Saks to Bon-ton 
Stores in 2005 
Herberger's Bon-ton Stores 
Public 
Sold by Saks to Bon-ton 
Stores in 2005 
Parisian Bon-ton Stores 
Public 
Sold by Belk to Bon-ton 
in 2006 
Younkers Bon-ton Stores 
Public 
Sold by Saks to Bon-ton 
Stores in 2005 
Dillard's Dillard's Public  
Gottschalks Gottschalks 
Public 
Filed for bankruptcy and 
liquidated in 2009. All 
stores were closed. 
Kohl's Kohl’s Public  
May Department Store May Department Stores Public  
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Appendix 1 (continued) 
 
Mervyn’s Sun Capital Partners 
Private 
Filed for bankruptcy and 
liquidated in 2008. All 
stores were closed. 
Peebles Stage Stores Public  
Bealls Stage Stores Public  
Stage Stage Stores Public  
JCPenney JCPenney Public  
Saks Fifth Avenue Saks Public  
Off 5th Saks Fifth Avenue 
Outlet 
Saks 
Public 
Outlet format store of 
Saks Fifth Avenue 
Nordstrom Nordstrom Public  
Nordstrom Rack Nordstrom 
Public 
Outlet format store of 
Nordstrom 
Neiman Marcus Neiman Marcus Public  
Bergdorf Goodman Neiman Marcus Public  
Neiman Marcus last call Neiman Marcus 
Public 
Outlet format store of 
Neiman Marcus 
Sears  Sears Public  
Meijer, Inc. Meijer Private  
Burlington Coat Factory Burlington Coat 
Factory 
Private  
Pamida 
Shopko Private 
Operated by Shopko 
from 1999 to 2007. 
Merged with Shopko in 
2012. 
Shopko Shopko Private  
Kmart Sears Public  
Target Target Public  
TJ Max TJX Public  
Marshalls TJX Public  
AJ Wright 
TJX Public 
Defunct in 2011. All 
stores were closed by 
TJX. 
Ross Ross Stores Public  
Stein Mart Stein Mart Public  
BJ's BJ’s Public  
Costco Costco Public  
Sam's club Wal-Mart Public  
Walmart Supercenters Wal-Mart Public  
 
Note: this is the universe of all multiline department stores operating in the 36 MSAs during the years 
2005-2012. See text for full definition. 
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Panel B: Classifications of Retail Chains (Anchors) 
 
Classification in Gould, Pashigian and Prendergast (2005) pp.414 
“Type 1: Prestige/fashion department stores. These stores usually operated in only one or a few 
markets until recently, when they expanded into more regional and national markets, often by entering 
into existing malls.  
Type 2: High- to moderate-quality department stores with national reputations since the 1950s and 
1960s. These stores were usually in the mall right from the beginning and were eagerly recruited by 
developers to establish the mall. 
Type 3: Lower-quality department stores with mostly local or regional reputations. (30% of anchor 
stores.)  
Type 4: Department stores that are members of very well-known national chains that have long 
operated in many markets. These stores were also usually in the mall right from the beginning and 
were eagerly recruited by developers to establish the mall.8 (41% of anchor stores.)” 
 
Classification in Vitorino (2012) pp.177 
“Upscale department stores: These stores generally sell designer merchandise above an average price 
level. When their items are on sale, their prices resemble those of averagepriced items at a 
lower-scale department store. Upscale department stores typically provide checkout service and 
customer assistance in each department. Examples include Dillard’s, Macy’s, and Nordstrom. 
Midscale department stores: These stores sell brand names and non–brand names but do not sell 
upscale brand names. Compared with upscale department stores, midscale stores usually do not have 
perfumes and beauty supplies at the main entrance and do not have cosmetic specialists. Examples 
include JCPenney, Mervyn’s, and Kohl’s. 
Discount department stores: These stores encompass retail establishments selling a variety of 
merchandise for less than conventional prices. Target, Sears, Wal-Mart, and Kmart are examples. 
Most discount department stores offer wide assortments of goods; others specialize in merchandise 
such as jewelry, electronic equipment, or electrical appliances. Discount stores are not dollar stores, 
which sell goods at a dollar or less. Discount stores differ because they sell branded goods, and 
prices vary widely among products. Compared with midscale department stores, discounters sell 
fewer major brand names and offer a wider variety of products. Stores in the discount department 
store category typically have fewer sales workers, relying more on self-service features, and have 
centrally located cashiers.” 
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Classification of Direct Competitors to Department Stores by Gale Business Insights 
Chain Direct Competitors 
Macy's Saks Fifth Avenue, Nordstrom, Dillard’s, JCPenney  
Nordstrom 
Saks Fifth Avenue, Neiman Marcus, Dillard’s, Macy’s, JCPenney, 
Sears  
Neiman Marcus 
Barneys New York, Macy’s, Bon-Ton Stores, Dillard’s, 
Nordstrom, Saks Fifth Avenue, Von Maur 
Saks Fifth Avenue  
Barneys New York, Bloomingdale’s, Neiman Marcus, Macy’s, 
Dillard’s, Nordstrom 
Bealls Kohl’s, Target, Wal-Mart 
Belk Saks Fifth Avenue, Dillard’s, JCPenney, Macy’s 
Von Maur Macy’s, Nordstrom 
Bergdorf Goodman 
Barneys New York, Saks Fifth Avenue, Nordstrom, 
Bloomingdales 
Dillard's 
Burlington Coat Factory, Kohl’s, Macy’s, Neiman Marcus, 
Nordstrom, Saks Fifth Avenue 
Elder-Beerman Boscov’s, Macy’s, Kohl’s, Sears 
Gottschalks  JCPenney, Mervyns, Dillard’s, TJ Maxx, Marshalls, AJ Wright 
Parisian  Boscov’s, Macy’s, Kohl’s, Sears 
Bealls outlet Sears, Wal-Mart 
Neiman Marcus last call Nordstrom Rack, Saks Fifth Off 
Nordstrom Rack Neiman Marcus last call, Saks Fifth Off 
Saks Off 5th  Nordstrom Rack, Neiman Marcus last call 
JCPenney  
Kohl’s, Sears, Target, Wal-Mart, Dillard’s, Nordstrom, Bon-Ton 
Stores 
Kohl's 
Wal-Mart, Target, JCPenney, Sears, Mervyn’s, TJ Maxx, 
Marshalls, AJWright, Ross Stores, Macy’s 
Burlington Coat Factory Ross Stores, TJ Maxx, Marshalls, AJ Wright, Target 
Marshalls Kohl’s, JCPenney, Target, Macys 
Ross Dress for Less 
TJ Maxx, Marshalls, AJ Wright, Kohl’s, Target, Burlington Coat 
Factory, JC Penney, Stein Mart, Goody’s 
Stein Mart JC Penney, TJ Maxx, Marshalls, AJ Wright, Macy’s 
T.J. Maxx Kohl’s, JCPenney, Target, Macys 
BJ's Sam’s club, Costco 
Costco  Sam’s club, BJ’s 
Meijer Wal-Mart, Target 
Sam's club BJ’s, Costco 
Shopko  Wal-Mart, Target, Kmart 
Target Costco, Macy’s, JCPenney, Kohl’s, Sears, Wal-Mart 
Wal-Mart Supercenter Costco, Target, Kmart 
Sears Essentials Wal-Mart, Target, JCPenney, Kohl’s 
Sears Grand Wal-Mart, Target, JCPenney, Kohl’s 
Source: http://www.cengagesites.com/literature/782/gale-business-insights-global-essentials/ 
Note: Based on GBI reports, existing_sd (existing_dd) equals to 1 if number of existing competing 
(non-competing) stores is above the median for the MSA, otherwise zero. The number of existing 
competing (non-competing) stores is calculated at the beginning of the year before opening.   
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Appendix 2: Openings by MSA 
 
MSA Region Number of Openings 
Albany-Schenectady-Troy, NY East 7 
Albuquerque, NM Southwest 13 
Allentown-Bethlehem-Easton, PA-NJ East 16 
Austin-Round Rock, TX Midwest 46 
Bakersfield, CA Southwest 6 
Birmingham-Hoover, AL Central 23 
Bridgeport-Stamford-Norwalk, CT East 4 
Cincinnati-Middletown, OH-KY-IN Central 29 
Columbus, OH Central 24 
Dayton, OH Central 8 
Detroit-Warren-Livonia, MI Central 64 
Fresno, CA Southwest 10 
Grand Rapids-Wyoming, MI Central 11 
Hartford-West Hartford-East Hartford, CT East 6 
Indianapolis-Carmel, IN Central 21 
Jacksonville, FL East 35 
Kansas City, MO-KS Midwest 37 
Las Vegas-Paradise, NV Southwest 38 
Louisville-Jefferson County, KY-IN Central 15 
Milwaukee-Waukesha-West Allis, WI Central 24 
Nashville-Davidson--Murfreesboro, TN East 28 
New Haven-Milford, CT East 11 
Oklahoma City, OK Midwest 20 
Omaha-Council Bluffs, NE-IA Midwest 17 
Orlando-Kissimmee, FL East 48 
Oxnard-Thousand Oaks-Ventura, CA Southwest 9 
Providence-New Bedford-Fall River, RI-MA East 15 
Raleigh-Cary, NC East 28 
Richmond, VA East 19 
Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario, CA Southwest 53 
Rochester, NY East 15 
San Antonio, TX Midwest 35 
Tucson, AZ Southwest 16 
Tulsa, OK Midwest 18 
Virginia Beach-Norfolk-Newport News, VA-NC East 27 
Worcester, MA East 10 
 
Note: We do not include Honolulu, HI because it is not in the continental US, so it does not fit into 
our regional classification of MSAs. 
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Appendix 3: Non-parametric Based Measure of Localization by Duranton and Overman (2005) 
K-densities of Actual Locations 
The K-density method proposed by Duranton and Overman (2005) takes all pairs of anchor 
locations within the same MSA and calculates the distances between them. The existing to existing 
(E2E) density of bilateral distances at any target distance d is calculated by using Silverman’s (1986) 
reflection method as: 
(A1)   for d > 0 
 for d < 0 
where di,j is the straight line distance between existing store i and existing store j in the same 
MSA, h is the bandwidth, and f is the kernel function. With n existing stores, there are n(n-1) distance 
pairs. We use a standard Guassian kernel with an optimal bandwidth proposed by Silverman (1986). 
The opening to existing (O2E) density of bilateral distances at any target distance d is calculated 
similar to (A1) except that di,j is the straight line distance between opening i and existing store j in the 
same MSA.  
Local and Global Confidence Intervals  
To calculate local and global confidence intervals for population-weighted choices of locations, 
we use a bootstrap re-sampling procedure by following Duranton and Overman (2005) and Klier and 
McMillen (2008). We make m draws without replacement from the set of census tract centroids to 
construct a set of n locations. The distance between every existing store and the randomly chosen set 
of locations is calculated. The K-density is:  
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where di,j is the distance between existing store i and random chosen location j in the same MSA. 
With n existing stores and n census tract centroids, there are n
2
 distance pairs. We apply this bootstrap 
re-sampling procedure 1,000 times and generate 1,000 estimates of the K-density functions. Because 
our target distance is from 0 mile to 50 miles, we estimate K-density at each of the 51 target distances. 
At each target distance, we rank K-density and take the 2.5 percentile (lower band) and 97.5 
percentile (upper bound) as local confidence interval. The global confidence interval, constructed to 
ensure that no more than 95 percent of the estimated density functions have even a single value that 
lies outside at any of the target distances, controls for the multiple alternative hypotheses being tested. 
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Appendix 4: Conditional Logit Model (CLM) 
Opening decisions can be based on either chooser-specific or choice-specific explanatory 
variables. In our research setting, chooser-specific factors such as financing condition, investment 
plan and business strategy are largely unobservable. CLM allows us to control all time-invariant 
unobservable characteristics of decision makers (department store chain): the likelihood function is 
constructed as a ratio for each chooser, so these variables drop out. 
Our explanatory variables include location specific variables (X variables) and location-chain 
specific variables (Z variables). The profit derived from an opening decision i in market j is 
(A3)  
where i = 1, … N represents opening decisions and j =1, … J represents markets or trade areas. xij 
is a vector of location-specific variables which does not depend on decision makers. βx is a vector of 
unknown parameters of xij. zij is a vector of location-specific variables which depends on decision 
makers. βz is a vector of unknown parameters of zij. εij is a random term. The profit from decision i of 
locating at j is composed of a deterministic and a random component. Given an opening decision, the 
investor will choose a market that will yield the highest expected profit. If the εij is the usual (i.i.d.) 
stochastic term assumed to have an extreme type value I distribution. Then, following McFadden, the 
probability of that opening i locates at j is 
(A4)  
If we let dij = 1 if opening i locates in area j and dij = 0 otherwise, the log likelihood of the 
conditional logit model is 
(A5)  
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel A – MSA Composition and Characteristics 
 All  East Central Midwest Southwest 
Number of MSAs 36 14 9 6 7 
Number of Households per MSA 548,172 474,335 681,009 567,374 508,599 
Demand per MSA (mil $2010) 31,307 28,600 37,467 31,129 28,954 
Number of Households per sq. miles 114.35 183.96 194.96 95.92 51.18 
Median Household Income ($2010)  52,211 55,963 49,248 50,171 53,214 
Demand Growth 1990-2010 (annualized %) 2.13% 2.02% 0.35% 3.20% 4.53% 
Notes: Mean values are presented. Demand is defined as the total number of households multiplied by 
median household income. 
 
Panel B – Descriptive Statistics on Existing Stores as of the beginning of 2005 
  All East Central Midwest Southwest 
Number of Existing Stores Total 2380 876 721 364 419 
Low-price 1026 343 355 154 174 
Mid-price 877 359 234 135 149 
High-price 477 174 132 75 96 
Number of Existing Stores  
per 100,000 Households 
Total 12.06 13.19 11.76 10.69 11.77 
Low-price 5.20 5.17 5.79 4.52 4.89 
Mid-price 4.44 5.41 3.82 3.97 4.19 
High-price 2.42 2.62 2.15 2.20 2.70 
Number of Existing Stores  
Per $mil Demand 
Total 2.11 2.19 2.14 1.95 2.07 
Low-price 0.91 0.86 1.05 0.82 0.86 
Mid-price 0.78 0.90 0.69 0.72 0.74 
High-price 0.42 0.43 0.39 0.40 0.47 
 
 
Panel C – Descriptive Statistics on Opening of New Stores from 2005 to 2011 
  All East Central Midwest Southwest 
Number of Openings Total 806 219 269 173 145 
 Low-price 382 125 126 73 58 
 Mid-price 380 85 131 83 81 
 High-price 44 9 12 17 6 
Number of Openings  
per 100,000 Households 
Total 4.08 3.30 4.39 5.08 4.07 
Low-price 1.94 1.88 2.06 2.14 1.63 
 Mid-price 1.93 1.28 2.14 2.44 2.28 
 High-price 0.22 0.14 0.20 0.50 0.17 
Number of Openings  
per $mil Demand 
Total 1.45 1.40 1.25 2.06 1.45 
Low-price 0.69 0.80 0.59 0.87 0.58 
 Mid-price 0.68 0.54 0.61 0.99 0.81 
 High-price 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.20 0.06 
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Table 2: Demographic Characteristics and Market Conditions of Openings, Existing Stores and Randomized Local Market Areas 
 
  All MSAs East Central Midwest Southwest 
  Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Demand 2000 (mil $2005) Opening 25.14 30.79 23.27 29.86 27.45 35.95 20.64 26.76 31.91 36.53 
 Existing 38.22 47.16 33.27 39.88 40.53 49.09 41.17 57.85 43.09 52.51 
 Random 25.93 40.99 23.24 36.32 33.27 42.77 21.89 35.08 26.48 39.96 
Opening minus Existing  <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Random minus Existing   <.0001  <.0001  <.0001 0.0004 0.0002 <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  <.0001 
Random minus Opening  0.4742  <.0001 0.986 0.011 0.0194  <.0001 0.5681 0.0186 0.0611 0.7837 
Growth 1990-2000 Opening 3.71% 2.78% 3.79% 3.15% 2.51% 2.19% 5.07% 3.70% 3.85% 1.94% 
 Existing 2.51% 1.60% 2.27% 1.50% 2.20% 1.53% 3.30% 2.31% 2.84% 1.38% 
 Random 2.56% 1.63% 2.12% 1.55% 1.60% 0.97% 3.64% 2.50% 3.61% 2.07% 
Opening minus Existing  <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Random minus Existing  0.6918 0.403 0.5204 0.8394 0.0018  <.0001 0.2141 0.1621 0.0363 0.0104 
Random minus Opening   <.0001  <.0001  <.0001  <.0001 0.0008  <.0001 0.0026 0.0018 0.693 0.9577 
Number of Low-price Existing Opening 1.40 1.00 1.49 1.00 1.31 1.00 1.12 0.00 1.70 1.00 
 Existing 2.46 2.00 2.41 2.00 2.38 2.00 2.27 2.00 2.89 3.00 
 Random 1.17 0.00 1.06 0.00 1.17 0.00 1.12 0.00 1.43 1.00 
Opening minus Existing  < .0001 < .0001 < .0001 < .0001 < .0001 < .0001 < .0001 < .0001 < .0001 < .0001 
Random minus Existing  < .0001 < .0001 < .0001 < .0001 < .0001 < .0001 < .0001 < .0001 < .0001 < .0001 
Random minus Opening  0.0004 0.0004 < .0001 < .0001 0.2402 0.2433 0.9856 0.8252 0.1155 0.1239 
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Table 2 (con’t) 
 
Number of Mid-price Existing Opening 0.79 0.00 0.70 0.00 0.72 0.00 0.77 0.00 1.08 0.00 
 Existing 1.74 1.00 1.66 1.00 1.50 1.00 1.79 1.00 2.26 2.00 
 Random 0.72 0.00 0.66 0.00 0.59 0.00 0.82 0.00 0.91 0.00 
Opening minus Existing  < .0001 < .0001 < .0001 < .0001 < .0001 < .0001 < .0001 < .0001 < .0001 < .0001 
Random minus Existing  < .0001 < .0001 < .0001 < .0001 < .0001 < .0001 < .0001 < .0001 < .0001 < .0001 
Random minus Opening  0.0633 0.0041 0.6213 0.0196 0.2053 0.1963 0.7239 0.9879 0.229 0.0416 
Number of High-price Existing Opening 1.43 1.00 1.26 1.00 1.47 1.00 1.29 1.00 1.83 1.00 
 Existing 2.09 2.00 1.81 2.00 2.01 2.00 2.27 2.00 2.65 2.00 
 Random 1.20 1.00 1.04 1.00 1.23 1.00 1.17 1.00 1.50 1.00 
Opening minus Existing  < .0001 < .0001 < .0001 < .0001 < .0001 < .0001 < .0001 < .0001 < .0001 < .0001 
Random minus Existing  < .0001 < .0001 < .0001 < .0001 < .0001 < .0001 < .0001 < .0001 < .0001 < .0001 
Random minus Opening  < .0001 < .0001 0.0021 0.0011 0.0058 0.0022 0.1919 0.0193 0.0278 0.0015 
 
Notes: Demand 2000 (in million constant 2005 dollars) is defined as the number of households in 2000 multiplied by median household income in 2000. 
Demand Growth 1990-2000 is defined as annualized percentage growth of inflation-adjusted demand from 1990 to 2000. Opening minus Existing, 
Random minus Existing and Random minus Opening show p-value of two-sample t-test for mean and Wilcoxon Rank-Sum test for median.   
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Table 3: Conditional Logit Model  
 
Panel A - Model with Expected Demand 
 
Variable All MSAs East Central Midwest Southwest 
CBD_3mile -1.2398*** -1.4381*** -1.627*** -2.6805*** 0.1025 
 (0.2318) (0.4173) (0.629) (1.0477) (0.3847) 
hwy_half_mile 0.7526*** 0.6375*** 0.7871*** 1.2896*** 0.632** 
 (0.1272) (0.2333) (0.2696) (0.281) (0.2766) 
hwy_half2two_mile 0.4825*** 0.6509*** 0.7835*** 0.8514*** -0.0581 
 (0.1007) (0.1793) (0.2031) (0.2195) (0.2482) 
dis2CBD 0.0653*** 0.0536** 0.1305*** 0.1326*** 0.0241 
 (0.0122) (0.0244) (0.0264) (0.0419) (0.018) 
dis2CBD*dis2CBD -0.0007*** -0.0004 -0.0014*** -0.0028*** -0.0002 
 (0.0002) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0011) (0.0002) 
exp_demand 0.3926*** 0.5398*** 0.5361*** 0.3236*** 0.5731*** 
 (0.0637) (0.1145) (0.1433) (0.1379) (0.1679) 
distance to HQ 0.0306 0.1549 -0.3442** 0.0952 0.1485 
 (0.0895) (0.1631) (0.1755) (0.21) (0.2148) 
distance to DC 0.0318 0.0264 0.0485 0.0227 0.00797 
 (0.0958) (0.1703) (0.1841) (0.2188) (0.226) 
existing_scs -1.9121*** -2.5567*** -2.2509*** -2.2517*** -1.1741*** 
 (0.168) (0.3648) (0.3513) (0.4062) (0.2981) 
existing_dcs -0.3132 -0.5192 -0.4996 -1.1115* -0.2481 
 (0.2186) (0.3575) (0.3709) (0.5391) (0.5639) 
existing_sd 0.3621** 0.4230 0.5108 -0.2775 0.1505 
 (0.161) (0.2712) (0.3369) (0.4022) (0.3497) 
existing_dd 0.7099*** 0.5429*** 0.5694*** 0.8381*** 0.4939* 
 (0.1189) (0.1962) (0.2293) (0.3083) (0.2701) 
Pseudo-R2 0.1665 0.2158 0.223 0.2468 0.1289 
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Panel B – Model with Growth and Demand 
 
Variable All MSAs East Central Midwest Southwest 
CBD_3mile -1.238*** -1.3939*** -1.5958*** -2.764*** 0.0684 
 (0.2318) (0.4032) (0.6301) (1.0502) (0.3898) 
hwy_half_mile 0.7742*** 0.7175*** 0.7747*** 1.3224*** 0.5956** 
 (0.128) (0.236) (0.2701) (0.283) (0.2843) 
hwy_half2two_mile 0.4972*** 0.7564*** 0.7684*** 0.8203*** -0.0953 
 (0.1013) (0.1836) (0.2042) (0.221) (0.257) 
dis2CBD 0.0574*** 0.0354*** 0.1404*** 0.0903** 0.0263 
 (0.0132) (0.0161) (0.0295) (0.0455) (0.019) 
dis2CBD*dis2CBD -0.0006*** -0.0003 -0.0016*** -0.0022** -0.0002 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0005) (0.0011) (0.0002) 
growth 0.2202*** 0.3974*** 0.0896 0.3286*** 0.1452 
 (0.0557) (0.0835) (0.1106) (0.1095) (0.1401) 
demand 0.3259*** 0.3872*** 0.6128*** 0.1232 0.5723*** 
 (0.072) (0.1257) (0.1655) (0.1604) (0.184) 
distance to HQ 0.0256 0.1295 -0.3452** 0.0689 0.1585 
 (0.0895) (0.1632) (0.1755) (0.2117) (0.2157) 
distance to DC 0.0289 0.018 0.0383 -0.0251 0.00444 
 (0.0958) (0.17) (0.1845) (0.2202) (0.2263) 
existing_scs -1.9031*** -2.5785*** -2.2575*** -2.2338*** -1.1865*** 
 (0.1683) (0.3653) (0.3515) (0.41) (0.2992) 
existing_dcs -0.305 -0.4765 -0.4981 -1.0253** -0.2497 
 (0.2187) (0.3618) (0.3703) (0.539) (0.5642) 
existing_sd 0.3814** 0.4295 0.5018 -0.1823 0.1343 
 (0.1615) (0.275) (0.3372) (0.4069) (0.3506) 
existing_dd 0.7277*** 0.6494*** 0.5594*** 0.9325*** 0.4766* 
 (0.1195) (0.2013) (0.2299) (0.3141) (0.2722) 
Pseudo-R2 0.1672 0.2276 0.2239 0.2577 0.1297 
 
Notes: The dependent is one if a new anchor opened in the tract, otherwise zero. The omitted category 
is locations beyond 2 miles from the highway. Standard errors are in parentheses. *Significant at 10%. 
**Significant at 5%. ***Significant at 1%. 
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Figure 1: Distribution of Anchor Stores in 36 MSAs and A Close-Up in Southwest 
 
Panel A: Regional Classifications of 36 MSAs. 
 
 
Panel B: A Close-Up in Southwest.  
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Figure 2: Examples of the Sample MSAs – Similar Population but Divergent Location 
Pattern. 
 
Panel A: Albany-Schenectady-Troy, NY. 
 
 
Panel B: Oklahoma City and Tulsa, OK. 
 
 
 
Note: There are different mileage scales for Oklahoma City and Tulsa, OK compared to 
Albany-Schenectady-Troy, NY  
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Figure 3: Densities for Distance from Existing to Existing Stores (E2E) and Distance from New to Existing Stores (O2E), and 
Population-weighted Confidence Interval  
 
  Panel A: All MSAs 
(22, 1) 
 
 
 
 
Panel B: East 
(26, 1) 
 
Panel C: Central 
(18, 1)  
 
Panel D: Midwest 
(15, 0) 
 
Panel E: Southwest 
(42, 2) 
 
Notes: The solid line without cross shows the pattern of K-densities of existing stores to existing stores (E2E). The solid line with cross marks 
shows the pattern of K-densities of openings to existing stores (O2E). The two dashed lines plot the global confidence interval for a random 
choice of tract centroid (i.e., a population-weighted location choice). The horizontal axis is target distance from zero to 50 miles; 51 target 
points. The first (second) numbers in parentheses is the number of O2E densities at 51 target distances (4 target distances within 3 miles) inside 
the 95% global confidence intervals.  
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Figure 4: Densities for Distance from New to Existing Stores (O2E) by Matched Type, and 
Population-weighted Confidence Interval – All MSAs 
 
 
 
SCS: (4, 0); SD: (15, 1); DD: (24, 0) 
Notes: The solid line with cross marks shows the pattern of K-densities of 
same-chain-same-company openings to existing stores (scs). The solid line without mark shows 
the pattern of K-densities of same-type-different-company openings to existing stores (sd). The 
solid line with vertical marks shows the pattern of K-density of 
different-type-different-company openings to existing stores (dd). The two dashed lines plot the 
global confidence interval for a random choice of tract centroid (i.e., a population weighted 
location choice). The horizontal axis is target distance from zero to 50 miles; 51 target points. 
The first (second) numbers in parentheses is the number of O2E densities at 51 target distances 
(4 target distances within 3 miles) inside the 95% global confidence intervals.  
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Figure 5: Densities for Distance from New to Existing Stores (O2E), and Confidence Interval Based on CLM. 
Panel A: All MSAs 
(44, 4) 
 
Panel B: East 
(39, 4) 
 
Panel C: Central 
(47, 4)  
 
Panel D: Midwest 
(35, 4) 
 
Panel E: Southwest 
(51, 4) 
 
Notes: The solid line shows the pattern of K-densities of openings to existing stores (O2E). The two dashed lines plot the global confidence 
interval based on predicted probability from CLM estimates. The horizontal axis is target distance from zero to 50 miles; 51 target points. The 
first (second) numbers in parentheses is the number of O2E densities at 51 target distances (4 target distances within 3 miles) inside the 95% 
global confidence intervals.  
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Figure 6: Densities for Distance from New to Existing Stores (O2E) for all MSAs by Price Type and Matched Type, and Confidence 
Interval Based on CLM 
 
 
 
           (11, 1)             
 
 
Notes: In Panel A, the solid line shows the pattern of K-densities of openings to existing stores by low-price, mid-price and high-price. In Panel B, 
the solid line shows the pattern of K-densities of openings by same-chain-same-company (SCS), same-type-different company (SD) and 
different-chain-different-company (DD). The two dashed lines plot the global confidence interval based on predicted probability from CLM 
estimates. The horizontal axis is target distance from zero to 50 miles; 51 target points. The first (second) numbers in parentheses is the number of 
O2E densities at 51 target distances (4 target distances within 3 miles) inside the 95% global confidence intervals.  
Panel A: By Price Type 
(45, 4) 
 
 
(47, 4) 
 
 
(51, 4)  
 
Panel B: By Matched Type 
(35, 4) 
 
 
(45, 4) 
 
 
(45, 4)  
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Essay 3 
 
Accounting Expertise of Directors and Accounting Irregularities  
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1. Introduction 
Although there exists a fairly large literature on the causes and consequences of accounting 
misconduct, we still donot have a good understanding of what factors affect a firm’s incentives to 
misreport accounting performance, why accounting scandals vary across industries and over time, and 
what factors are effective in regulating fraudulent behavior. Povel, Singh and Winton (2007; PSW, 
hereafter) indicate that incentives to commit fraud are affected by two major mechanisms, investors’ 
prior beliefs about business conditions and their monitoring costs. Drawing on these insights, we test 
the effect of investor beliefs and the monitoring effectiveness of independent directors with 
accounting expertise (AE) on the incidence of intentional accounting misstatements (irregularities). In 
addition, we investigate whether investor optimism decreases the proportion of independent directors 
with accounting expertise serving on the board. We focus on irregularities instead of accounting fraud 
because intentional misrepresentations are necessary but not sufficient conditions for classifying 
misconduct as accounting fraud. That is, an accounting fraud is an irregularity, but an irregularity is 
not necessarily a fraud. Hence, an analysis of irregularities allows us to study a broader class of 
accounting misconduct.
1
  
We use a sample of U.S. firms that committed irregularities as well as unintentional accounting 
misstatements (which are labelled as errors henceforth) from 1996 to 2010. Our first finding is that the 
probability of committing irregularities is hump-shaped in investor beliefs about industry business 
conditions, first increasing as beliefs improve and decreasing when beliefs are sufficiently high. 
However, investor beliefs do not affect the likelihood of errors, consistent with our expectation.  
PSW also predict that investors do not monitor a firm with positive public information carefully 
when their priors are fairly optimistic, suggesting a negative link between investor beliefs about 
business conditions and their monitoring intensity. More optimistic beliefs about business conditions 
                                                             
1
 The legal definition of fraud is “an intentional misrepresentation of material existing fact made by one person to another 
with knowledge of its falsity and for the purpose of inducing the other person to act, and upon which the other person relies 
with resulting injury or damage.” (http://definitions.uslegal.com/f/fraud/)  For a detailed discussion of differences in fraud 
terminology in law, finance, and accounting, see Karpoff, Koester, Lee, and Martin (2012), Appendix E. Hennes, Leone and 
Miller (2008) are among the first in distinguish errors from irregularities. Most studies on irregularities focus on financial 
restatements instead of accounting fraud. An accounting fraud is an irregularity. But an irregularity is not necessarily a fraud. 
We focus on “intentional” misinterpretations, so we include both irregularities and accounting fraud. Data on irregularities 
are obtained from General Accounting Office (GAO) and Audit Analytics (AA), while accounting frauds are collected from 
US SEC Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAER) and Securities Class Action Clearinghouse (SCAC). 
Karpoff, Koester, Lee, and Martin (2012) note that the Federal Securities Regulation (FSR) database is considered more 
comprehensive compared with AAER and SCAC.  
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lead to lower monitoring, encouraging financial misconduct.
2
 Whereas many monitoring mechanisms 
would influence fraudulent behavior of firms, we focus on the AE of independent members of the 
board of directors, which should play a salient role in mitigating accounting misstatements. We 
investigate whether optimistic investor beliefs about business conditions lower the proportion of 
independent directors with AE and find that the latter is decreasing in investor beliefs. Next, we 
analyze the effect of AE of independent directors on the board on the incidence of accounting 
misstatements (which covers both irregularities and errors). PSW suggest that decreasing monitoring 
costs shift the incidence of corporate fraud toward higher investor beliefs. An alternative explanation 
proposed by Sherman (1990) suggests that a decrease in monitoring costs reduces the likelihood of 
fraud regardless of investor beliefs because of legal liability and reputational concerns. We expect that 
accounting expertise lowers monitoring costs faced by independent directors over accounting reports 
issued by firms, thus enhancing the directors’ monitoring effectiveness. Consistent with Sherman 
(1990), we find that stronger AE of independent directors is associated with less irregularities overall. 
In addition, this pattern also appears in accounting errors. In addition, the level of investor beliefs on 
irregularity continues to have a hump-shaped impact on the incidence of irregularity, suggesting that 
the monitoring mechanism is not the full explanation. In contrast, the predicted monitoring does not 
explain the incidence of errors. 
To provide further insight on the monitoring mechanism of independent directors’ AE on 
fraudulent behavior, we also investigate whether stock market reaction to financial restatements varies 
with AE. Consistent with previous literature, we find that investor reactions to irregularities are more 
negative, compared with their reactions to errors. More importantly, market reactions to the 
announcement of irregularities are positively related to the proportion of independent directors who 
are accounting experts. In addition, we find that investors react positively to the independent directors’ 
AE measured when misstatements are committed, not only when misstatements are detected. Finally, 
we find that an improvement in AE from the time of commission of misstatements to their detection 
has a positive impact on market reactions.  
                                                             
2
 A large volume of literature addresses the link between investors’ optimism and monitoring, see Shleifer and Vishny (1997) 
for a survey on this topic. 
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This study makes three important contributions. First, although there is considerable research on 
the various factors underlying fraudulent accounting behavior, this is the first study to focus on the 
impact of investor prior beliefs about business conditions on the incidence of financial misstatements. 
Wang, Winton and Yu (2010; WWY, hereafter) test PSW’s model by using a sample of IPO firms. A 
few papers, such as Harris and Bromiley (2006), Kedia and Philippon (2007) and Davidson (2011), 
show that the incidence of accounting scandals varies with macroeconomic conditions. However, 
most papers focus on realized (ex post) economic conditions, instead of investors’ ex ante beliefs 
about business prospects. Furthermore, previous studies investigate a linear relation between fraud 
and business cycle, while our study shows that consistent with recent models of corporate fraud there 
is a non-linear relation between fraud and investor beliefs.  
Second, although there is a large body of literature on the relation between accounting or financial 
expertise and quality of financial reporting (for example, Abbott, Parker, and Peters, 2004; Agrawal 
and Chadha, 2005; Keune and Johnstone, 2012; Erkens and Bonner, 2013), none of these studies 
investigate whether investors’ prior beliefs about business conditions influence how many 
independent directors with AE are appointed to board.
3
 WWY analyze the role of venture capitalists 
in IPO fraud and conclude that, in the presence of venture capitalists, fraud is less likely in bad times 
but more likely in good times. In contrast to venture capitalists, underwriters care about their 
reputation and try to detect fraud regardless of the level of investor beliefs. Given that the interaction 
between monitoring costs and investor prior beliefs explains the fraudulent behavior, it is important to 
investigate more deeply the monitoring mechanisms linking investor prior beliefs to the incidence of 
irregularities. Our results suggest that a) investor optimism lowers the proportion of independent 
directors with accounting expertise, and b) monitoring by independent directors with AE is effective 
regardless of the level of investor beliefs in reducing the likelihood of accounting irregularities.  
Third, there is considerable research on market reactions to accounting restatements, with many 
papers examining restatement features and firm characteristics that explain the magnitude of the stock 
                                                             
3
 Most of existing studies focus on the AE of audit committees. Bedard, Chtourou and Courteau (2004) find that audit 
committee AE is associated with less earnings management. Anderson, Mansi and Reeb (2004) conclude that audit 
committee AE lowers cost of debt. DeFond, Hann, and Hu (2005) find a positive abnormal stock price reaction upon 
appointment to the audit committee. Erkens and Bonner (2013) investigate the effect of firm status on the appointment of 
accounting experts to audit committees. They find that higher status firms (larger, better connected and more admired firms) 
are less likely to appoint accounting experts.  
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price reaction (Palmrose, Richardson and Scholz, 2004; Files, Swanson, and Tse, 2009). However, 
there exist few studies on the impact of accounting or financial expertise on the market reaction to 
restatement announcements. An exception is Carcello, Neal, Palmrose and Scholz (2011) who find no 
relation between the financial expertise of audit committee (measured as of the first year of 
misstatements) and market reaction to a restatement announcements.
4
  Yet none of the studies 
differentiate the impact of accounting expertise measured when misstatements are committed from 
that measured when misstatements are detected. We expect that investors pay attention to the level of 
monitoring by the board of directors measured when the managerial misconduct begins (i.e., the date 
of commission) and when the misconduct is announced (i.e., date of disclosure or detection). 
Furthermore, Carcello, Neal, Palmrose and Scholz (2011) only examine the financial expertise of 
audit committee, which is typically but a subset of independent members of the broad of directors. In 
contrast, we measure accounting expertise of all independent directors on the broad, which is arguably 
a more comprehensive measure of the effectiveness of board monitoring. As expected, our results 
suggest that both the measurements of directors’ AE (i.e., at the time of commission and at detection) 
are associated with less negative market reactions to restatements. In addition, the improvement in the 
accounting expertise of independent directors from the time of commission of misstatements to their 
detection helps mitigate negative stock price reaction to irregularities. 
 
2. Development of Hypotheses  
2.1 Investor Beliefs and Propensity for Irregularities 
In PSW, a manager controls a firm and seeks funding. A firm can be either good or bad. A funded 
firm generates control benefits for the manager, regardless of firm type. The firm type is private 
information to the investors, who incur monitoring costs to discover it. Investors have prior beliefs 
about business conditions and take actions of no investment (A1), investment with monitoring (A2), 
and investment without monitoring (A3). They consider three threshold points about investor beliefs 
                                                             
4
 In Carcello, Neal, Palmrose and Scholz (2011), the definition of financial expertise is the same as our definition of 
accounting expertise. In a related study, Kouwenberg and Phunnarungsi (2013) conclude that there is no significant 
difference in market reaction to violations of rules and regulations between firms with high and low corporate governance 
scores in Thai listed firms. 
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about business conditions and five regimes: fund-everything regime, optimistic regime, trust-signal 
regime, skeptical regime and no-trust regime. In fund-everything regime and no-trust regime, there is 
no incentive to commit fraud because investors would take actions of either A1 or A3. In PSW 
proposition 4, the probability of fraud increases in prior beliefs about business conditions in the 
skeptical regime and decreases in prior beliefs in optimistic regime and trust-signal regime. Thus, the 
probability of fraud is hump-shaped in the prior beliefs of investors about macroeconomic conditions.  
In this study, we focus on accounting irregularities instead of fraud. Irregularities are similar to 
fraud in terms of a firm’s incentives to engage in accounting misconduct. However, irregularities are 
not necessarily fraud. Fraud signifies stronger perverse incentives whereas irregularities denote 
generally milder incentives to misreport. Fraud implies that the perpetrator intended to deceive 
stakeholders, and intent to deceive requires a higher burden of proof than is necessary to bring charges 
of financial misrepresentation. Accounting fraud is defined as a case as involving fraud if the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) or Department of Justice (DOJ) file charges alleging the 
violation of: (i) Section 17(a) of the 1933 Securities Act for fraudulent interstate transactions related 
to the issuance of a security; or (ii) Section 10(b) of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act for 
manipulative and deceptive devices related to the trading of an already issued security (Karpoff, 
Koester, Lee and Martin, 2012; Young and Peng, 2013). Further, Hennes, Leone and Miller (2008) 
highlight the importance of distinguishing between (unintentional) accounting errors and (intentional) 
irregularities. Since we are interested in studying a firm’s incentives to engage in a broader class of 
accounting misconduct, we examine not only accounting fraud but also intentional misstatements that 
are not regarded as fraud as well as accounting errors. We formulate the following hypothesis based 
on PSW’s prediction.  
 
Hypothesis 1: The likelihood of irregularities should be a hump-shaped function of investor 
beliefs about business conditions. But the likelihood of errors should be unrelated to investor beliefs 
about business conditions. 
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2.2 Monitoring Costs and Propensity for Irregularities 
In PSW, investor monitoring of the firms is affected by their beliefs about the state of the 
economy. When investor beliefs are high (i.e., optimistic), firms are funded without monitoring. This 
is consistent with prior studies on the relation between monitoring and financing.
5
 These studies 
indicate that more optimistic beliefs about business conditions lead to lower investor monitoring of 
managers. Independent directors with AE are one of the most direct and important (delegated) 
monitoring mechanisms that can affect intentional misstatements. An independent director with AE is 
defined as an independent director with CPA and/or experience as a public accountant, auditor, 
principal or chief financial officer, controller, or principal or chief accounting officer. Our definition 
of AE is the same as that of accounting financial experts defined by SEC 2002, which is considered as 
more effective compared with the SEC 2003 definition.
6
 Recent literature suggests that the broader 
definition of SEC 2003 does not capture the essential monitoring power (Carcello, Hollingsworth, 
Klein, and Neal 2009; Zhang, Zhou, and Zhou 2007; Krishnan and Visvanathan 2008).
7
 Defond, 
Hann and Hu (2005) find a positive market reaction to the appointment of accounting financial 
experts but no reaction to nonaccounting financial experts assigned to audit committees. Krishnan and 
Visvanathan (2008) find that accounting conservatism is positively related to accounting financial 
expertise but not related to non-accounting financial expertise and nonfinancial expertise. 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 mandates that a firm must disclose whether at least one 
member of the audit committee is a financial expert. If not, the firm has to explain why. Further, the 
listing stock exchanges, such as NYSE and MASDAQ, require that at least one member of the audit 
committee have accounting or related financial management expertise and/or experience (Krishnan 
and Visvanathan (2008)). These rules suggest that investors can influence how many additional 
                                                             
5
 Shleifer and Vishny (1997) summarize previous literature on the relation among external financing, investors’ optimism 
and monitoring. 
6
 SEC 2002 originally proposed that accounting financial experts are individuals who have knowledge of GAAP that has 
been obtained through direct experience in accounting and/or auditing positions, which would have only included 
individuals with experience as a public accountant, auditor, principal or chief financial officer, controller, or principal or 
chief accounting office. In SEC 2003, it relaxed the range and allowed for individuals who have obtained knowledge of 
GAAP by supervising or otherwise monitoring the performance of others who are directly engaged in accounting and/or 
auditing functions to qualify. 
7
 The majority of accounting literature focuses on the accounting financial expertise of audit committee while our focus is 
on the AE of independent members of the board of directors. Audit committee is part of the board of directors. Committee 
members are drawn from members of the company's board of directors. The independent directors are expected to serve as 
the overall monitors of management activities while the audit committee is specifically charged with the oversight of 
financial reporting. 
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independent directors with accounting expertise, over and above the minimum set by the regulatory 
and listing provisions, are appointed to the board depending on their beliefs about business conditions. 
Specifically, we would expect that investors would appoint fewer (subject to the minimum of one) 
independent directors with AE when they feel more optimistic. This intuition leads us to advance the 
following hypothesis:  
         
Hypothesis 2A: The proportion of independent directors with accounting expertise decreases 
when investor beliefs about business conditions are relatively optimistic. 
 
In PSW, investor prior beliefs about business conditions and the cost of monitoring are the two 
key determinants of a firm’s incentives to commit fraud. Prior beliefs affect fraud propensities as 
monitoring costs decrease. Investors do not monitor fraud per se; instead, they use monitoring to make 
investment decisions. In bad times, investor monitoring focuses on firms reporting strong 
performance to weed out bad firms. The presence of (some) investors with lower monitoring costs 
decreases the likelihood of fraud. In good times, monitoring focuses on firms reporting weak 
performance to pick out undervalued investment opportunities. The presence of investors with lower 
monitoring costs increases the likelihood of fraud. Consistent with PSW’s prediction, WWY find that 
the presence of venture capitalists increases the probability of IPO fraud when investor beliefs are 
optimistic but decreases the probability of fraud when investor beliefs are pessimistic. In our study, 
The fiduciary duties of independent directors require them to act on behalf of investors and monitor 
managerial behavior. Therefore, we expect to find the monitoring role of independent directors with 
AE to differ from that of venture capitalists in WWY. 
WWY also test an alternative model proposed by Sherman (1999) and analyze underwriters’ 
incentives in IPOs. Because of legal liability and concerns over loss of reputation, underwriters certify 
whether an issuing firm has good prospects as accurately as they can, regardless of investor beliefs. 
Consistent with Sherman (1999), WWY find that underwriters’ industry specialty is negatively and 
significantly associated with the probability of fraud regardless of the level of investor beliefs. In our 
study, an independent director is subject to fiduciary duties and obligated to act in the reasonable 
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belief that her actions are in the best interests of shareholders. We argue that accounting expertise 
lowers monitoring costs faced by independent directors over accounting reports issued by firms, thus 
enhancing the directors’ monitoring effectiveness. In addition, the board of directors would face 
substantial costs if the firm engages in fraudulent behavior (Srinivasan, 2005; Helland, 2006; Fich and 
Shivdasani, 2007). Therefore, we expect that independent directors would act in a similar fashion as 
underwriters in Sherman (1999) and WWY. These arguments lead us to the following hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 2B: The likelihood of accounting irregularities decreases as the proportion of 
independent directors (on the board) with accounting expertise increases, regardless of investor 
beliefs about business conditions. 
 
2.3 Market Reactions 
Numerous studies document an economically and statistically significant negative market reaction 
to restatement announcements and an even more negative market reaction to irregularities or fraud 
(see, for example, Palmrose, Richardson and Scholz, 2004; Hribar and Jenkins, 2004). However, only 
a couple of studies examine the relation between financial or accounting expertise of directors and 
market reactions. Carcello, Neal, Palmrose and Scholz (2011) predict that an audit committee with 
financial experts might mitigate negative stock price reaction to restatement announcements. 
Kouwenberg and Phunnarungsi (2013) suggest that if governance is fully discounted in stock prices, 
the market reacts more negatively when firms with better governance violate the exchange listing 
rules. Moreover, both of these studies do not find any significant impact of monitoring by the broad of 
directors on market reactions to the announcement of financial misstatements and misconduct.   
Carcello, Neal, Palmrose and Scholz (2011) posit a positive relation between market reaction and 
audit committee expertise, measured as of the first year of misstatement, because a firm with good 
corporate governance is viewed as less prone to systematic failure. In our second hypothesis, we 
consider the accounting expertise of independent directors when misstatements are committed rather 
than detected. However, when a firm announces a restatement investors learn about the directors’ 
accounting expertise not only as of the date when accounting misstatements begin (say, time t-1) but 
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also at the time of announcement of an accounting restatement (say, at time t). The time-gap between 
these two critical event dates is typically two or more years. If a higher proportion of independent 
directors with AE indicates better corporate governance and more effective monitoring over a firm’s 
incentives to commit irregularities, it is important to investigate whether investors react to the AE of 
independent directors measured as of the date when misstatements are detected, in addition to when 
they are committed. We should expect that investor reaction to the restatement announcement would 
be more positive the higher the percentage of independent directors with accounting expertise at time 
t-1 (commission) as well as time t (detection). In addition, an improvement in the proportion of 
directors with accounting expertise from the date of commission to detection should be positively 
associated with market reaction to restatements. These arguments lead us to the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 3: Investors react more negatively to the announcement of accounting irregularities as 
compared to accounting errors. However, market reaction to financial misstatements increases with 
the proportion of independent directors with accounting expertise measured when misstatements are 
committed as well as detected.  
 
3. Empirical Design 
3.1 Bivariate probit model 
Investors are unaware of financial misstatements at the time when they are actually committed 
(t-1), they come to learn about the beginning of misconduct only at a later time if and when the 
misstatements are disclosed or detected (t). Therefore, the occurrence of financial misconduct is only 
partially observable to investors. We follow WWY and use a bivariate probit model to address the 
partial observability (incomplete detection) concern. There are two latent variables, whether firms 
intentionally misstate financial statements (M) and whether the misconduct is disclosed or detected 
(D). We only observe misstatements that have been committed and detected/restated. That is, both M 
and D equal one. In addition, the probability of observed misstatements is different from the 
probability of committed misstatements if the detection/disclosure process is not perfect. Bivariate 
probit model is designed to address those issues. 
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For each firm i, Mi is the incentive to intentionally misstate financial reports and Di is the 
potential disclosure conditional on having misreported. The reduced form model is  
𝑀𝑖 = 𝒙𝑀,𝑖𝜷 + 𝑢𝑖 
𝐷𝑖 = 𝒙𝐷,𝑖𝜸 + 𝑣𝑖 
where  𝒙𝑀,𝑖 is a row vector with elements that explain firm i’s incentives to issue intentional 
misreports, and  𝒙𝐷,𝑖 is a row vector with elements that explain firm i’s incentives for potential 
disclosure. 𝑢𝑖 and 𝑣𝑖 are zero-mean disturbances with a bivariate normal distribution. 𝜌 represents 
the correlation between 𝑢𝑖 and 𝑣𝑖.  
We only observe disclosed accounting irregularities but not undisclosed ones. 𝑍𝑖 = 𝑀𝑖𝐷𝑖, where 
𝑍𝑖 = 1 if firm i's irregularities are detected, and 𝑍𝑖 = 0 if firm i does not commit any irregularity or 
does commit an irregularity but that has not been detected. The bivariate standard normal cumulative 
distribution function is Φ. Then 
𝑃(𝑍𝑖 = 1) = 𝑃(𝑀𝑖𝐷𝑖 = 1) = Φ(𝒙𝑀,𝑖𝜷, 𝒙𝐷,𝑖𝜸, 𝜌) 
𝑃(𝑍𝑖 = 0) = 𝑃(𝑀𝑖𝐷𝑖 = 0) = 1 −Φ(𝒙𝑀,𝑖𝜷, 𝒙𝐷,𝑖𝜸, 𝜌) 
The log-likelihood function for the model is 
𝐿(𝛽, 𝛾, 𝜌) = ∑ log(𝑃(𝑍𝑖 = 1)) +
𝑍𝑖=1
∑ log(𝑃(𝑍𝑖 = 0))
𝑍𝑖=1
 
=∑{𝑍𝑖 log[Φ(𝒙𝑀,𝑖𝜷, 𝒙𝐷,𝑖𝜸, 𝜌)] + (1 − 𝑍𝑖)log⁡[1 − Φ(𝒙𝑀,𝑖𝜷, 𝒙𝐷,𝑖𝜸, 𝜌)]}
𝑁
𝑖=1
 
Our objective is to estimate 𝜷 and 𝜸. To test our first hypothesis about the impact of investor 
beliefs about business conditions on the likelihood of accounting irregularities we use the following 
bivariate probit models: 
 
Commission of Misstatements Equation:  
M = {Proxies for Investor Beliefs, Proxies for Investor Prior Beliefs Squared, Proxies for AE, ST 
Compensation/LT Compensation ROA, Leverage, External Financial Need, Insider Ownership, 
Big Auditors, M&A, Capital Expenditure, R&D, Log Assets, Analyst Coverage, SOX } 
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Detection of Misstatements Equation:  
D = {M&A, Capital Expenditure, R&D, Log Assets, Analyst Coverage, Abnormal Restate Risk, 
Disastrous Stock Return, Abnormal Volatility, Abnormal Turnover, SOX } 
 
Our second hypothesis posits a negative relation between the likelihood of accounting 
irregularities and the proportion of independent directors (on the board) with accounting expertise. To 
examine this hypothesis, we add measurements of AE in the commission model and interact them 
with investor beliefs about industry prospects. Variable definitions, including data sources, are 
provided in Appendix A.
8
 In the commission model, we analyze market sentiment at the time when 
misstatements begin, instead of the time when misstatements are detected or announced. In the 
irregularity detection model, variables are constructed when misstatements are detected or announced. 
To mitigate endogeneity concerns, we exclude firms with misstatements when computing these 
proxies for investor beliefs.   
 
3.2 Proxies for investor beliefs 
Following WWY, we construct two time-varying measurements for investors’ prior beliefs about 
business conditions at the Fama-French 49 industry level. We use the industry median analyst forecast 
of a firm’s annual EPS growth (Ind. ESP Growth), and industry median Tobin’s Q (Ind. Q). Ind. ESP 
Growth captures the consensus of analysts for a particular industry. Ind. Q reflects investors’ 
expectation on the growth opportunities for an industry.  
Our first hypothesis predicts a hump-shaped relation between investor prior beliefs and the firm’s 
propensity to issue intentional misstatements. Therefore, we expect to find positive coefficients on Ind. 
ESP Growth and Ind. Q and negative coefficients on their squared terms.      
 
3.3 Proxies for Monitoring Costs 
Greater accounting expertise of independent directors (higher %AE) should lower the monitoring 
                                                             
8
 We winsorsize all continuous variables at 1% and 99% to remove the effects of outliers in our model estimations. 
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costs of investors. We construct three proxies for the monitoring of managerial behavior by 
independent directors with AE. The first variable, AE dummy, equals one if there is at least one 
independent director with AE for a given firm-year and zero otherwise. It captures the presence of AE 
on the board of directors. However, this measurement is highly correlated with the size of the board, 
and it fails to capture how many independent directors possess accounting expertise. Therefore, we 
construct another variable, %AE, measured as the number of independent directors with AE divided 
by the total number of independent directors for a given firm-year. Because some industries entail 
complex accounting practice, %AE might be closely related to industry characteristics (Bills, Jeter and 
Stein, 2013). To mitigate this potential concern, we construct the third proxy, Excess AE, which equals 
one if %AE is greater than industry median %AE for a given firm-year.  
Our second hypothesis predicts a negative relation between the likelihood of accounting 
irregularities and the proportion of independent directors with accounting expertise. So we expect 
negative regression coefficients on all three monitoring proxies discussed above.  
 
3.4 Control Variables in Misstatement Commission 
We construct our ex ante control variables in the misstatement commission regression following 
Wang (2013) and Wang and Winton (2014). The ex-ante variables are measured prior to the 
commission. All variable definitions and data sources are summarized in Appendix A. We measure 
performance by return on assets (ROA) because previous studies find that manipulating firms had 
strong financial performance prior to the misstatements (see Crutchley, Jensen and Marshall, 2007; 
Dechow, Ge, Larson and Sloan, 2010; Wang, 2013; Wang and Winton, 2014). Beasley (1996) finds 
that companies reporting repeated losses are more likely to engage in financial fraud. Kinney and 
McDaniel (1989) find that less profitable companies are more likely to misreport. But Summers and 
Sweeney (1998) find a positive association between misstatements and profitability, and Erickson, 
Hanlon and Maydew (2006) find insignificant or mixed evidence.  
We control for leverage based on the debt covenant hypothesis (DeFond and Jiambalvo; 1994, 
Sweeney, 1994; Dichev and Skinner, 2002). However, the empirical evidence on the impact of 
leverage is mixed (DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Skinner, 1994; Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney, 1996; 
109 
 
DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1991; Dechow, Larson and Sloan, 2011). 
High external financing needs affect earnings management as well as the commission of 
accounting misstatements (Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney, 1996; Teoh, Welch and Wong, 1998; Wang, 
2013; Wang and Winton, 2014). As our analysis focuses on accounting misstatements instead of fraud, 
we construct this measurement based on Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1996).
9
 Ext. Fin. Need is a 
dummy variable equal to one if the firm’s free cash flow is less than –0.5 and zero otherwise. Dechow, 
Sloan and Sweeney (1996) suggest that, as free cash flow becomes more negative (i.e., the firm is 
closer to exhausting its internal funds), the firm is more likely to manipulate earnings. For example, 
when free cash flow is equal to -0.5, a firm will consume all of its available current assets within two 
years. Free cash flow is defined as cash from operations minus average capital expenditures during 
the previous three years and then divided by prior year current assets. Cash from operations equals 
earnings minus accruals. Accruals is changes in current assets minus changes in current liabilities 
minus changes in cash/cash equivalents plus changes in debt included in current liabilities, and minus 
depreciation and amortization expense.  
Warfield, Wild, and Wild (1995) find that greater insider ownership is associated with greater 
earnings informativeness and better accruals quality. However, Goldman and Slezak (2006) and Denis, 
Hanouna and Sarin (2006) suggest that a positive relation between firm performance and insiders’ 
compensation can induce misreporting. Previous studies (such as Bhattacharya and Marshall, 2012; 
Agrawal and Cooper, 2014) generate mixed results. We construct this proxy using the percentage of 
shares owned by insiders.
10
 
We control for M&A expenditure. Kinney, Palmrose, and Scholz (2004) suggest that acquisitions 
may increase the probability of a misstatement because of new accounting issues and possible 
business integration problems. We also add capital expenditure (CAPX), R&D expenditure and analyst 
coverage following Wang (2013) and Wang and Winton (2014). 
Since we analyze accounting misstatements, we also include a dummy variable for big 4 or big 5 
                                                             
9
 Wang (2013) and Wang and Winton (2014) focus on accounting fraud. 
10
 Armstrong, Jagolinzer and Larker (2010) suggest potential selection bias because of missing observations in ExecuComp. 
We do not have access to the Compact Disclosure database. We hence construct FF 49 industry median for each fiscal year 
and replace missing observations with industry median. 
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auditors to control for audit firm quality. We also include Log Assets as the logarithm of book value of 
total assets, and SOX as a dummy variable that equals one for misstatements committed in 2002 or 
after and zero otherwise. 
Hertzberg (2005) posits that positive investor beliefs lead to more short-term executive 
compensation, which, in turn, increases the likelihood of fraud. Consistent with these arguments, 
WWY find a positive and significant relation between short-term managerial compensation and a 
firm’s fraud propensity. Yet, investors’ prior beliefs (emphasized by PSW) remain robust in their tests 
after controlling for the compensation effect. In addition, Burns and Kedia (2006) report that the 
sensitivity of the CEO’s option portfolio to stock price is significantly positively related to the 
propensity to misreport.
11
 Therefore, we add the following two executive compensation variables as 
controls: ST Compensation (industry median short-term incentive defined as (salary + bonus + other 
annual compensation)/ (total expected compensation) and LT Compensation (industry median long 
term incentive measured as (restricted stock grants + option awards)/ (total expected compensation)).  
 
3.5 Determinants of the Probability of Misstatement Detection 
Similar to Wang (2013) and Wang and Winton (2014), we include a set of ex-ante detection 
factors as well as a set of ex-post detection factors. The ex-ante variables are measured prior to the 
detection, and the ex-post variables are measured as of the year of detection.
12
 All variable definitions 
and data sources are summarized in Appendix A.  
Our ex-ante determinants of misstatement detection include mergers and acquisitions 
expenditures (M&A), R&D expenditures (R&D), capital expenditures (CAPX), number of analysts 
following (Analyst Coverage), firm size (Log Asset) and SOX dummy. Wang (2013) suggests that 
R&D investment, capital expenditure and mergers and acquisitions tend to affect the likelihood of 
detection. Dyck, Morse and Zingales (2010) suggest that analysts are important external monitors of 
firms. We hence include Analyst Coverage as the number of stock analysts that follow an industry. 
                                                             
11
 Related studies on the impact of compensation on misconduct incentives include Hass, Muller and Vergauwe (2014) and 
Li (2014). 
12
 As a robustness test, we also follow Wang (2014) and test our model by using information at year t-1 to construct ex-ante 
factors of detection and t+1 to construct ex-post factors of detection, given year t is the beginning year of misstatement. The 
results are similar. 
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Similar to WWY and Wang (2013), we include firm size and SOX dummy. 
Our ex-post determinants of misstatement detection follow WWY and Wang (2013). We replace 
litigation risk in WWY by misstatement risk (defined as the logarithm of the sum of the market value 
of restated firms in an industry) to control for industry misstatement intensity. Abnormal Restatement 
Risk is the yearly deviation from the industry average restatement intensity. Regulators and investors 
pay more attention to a particular industry which has more misstatements. Firms that experience large 
negative returns, high stock turnover and high return volatility are more likely to be watched by 
investors and shareholders. Disastrous Stock Return is an indicator variable equals one if the firms’ 
stock return is in the bottom 10% of all the firm-year return observations in the COMPUSTAT-CRSP 
merged database.
13
 Abnormal Return Volatility is the difference between the yearly standard deviation 
of the firm’s returns and its time-series average. Similarly, Abnormal Stock Turnover is the difference 
between the monthly share turnover from the firm’s time-series average. 
 
4. Data and Sample Construction 
Our misstatement sample is collected from three sources, Federal Securities Regulation (FSR) 
(provided by Karpoff, Koester, Lee and Martin (2012)), General Accounting Office (GAO) and Audit 
Analytics (AA).
14
 This sample is more comprehensive than GAO or AA (or both) used by most of the 
previous literature GAO published two reports, one in 2002 and the other in 2006. The two GAO 
reports contain financial restatements from January 1997 to September 2006. AA includes 
restatements from January 2000. The FSR data is based on any violations of 13(b) provisions of the 
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, which we consider as more relevant to our analysis of 
accounting irregularities.
15
 We cross-check the three databases and delete duplicate cases. As one 
case might be associated with more than one event, we carefully investigate each case and only keep 
the earliest event. Our sample consists of unique firm-year observations.  
Our sample includes financial misstatements occurring between 1996 and 2010. We restrict our 
                                                             
13
 We also test for other cutoff points such as the bottom 5%, 15% and 20% and obtain similar results.  
14
 We are grateful to Jonathan M. Karpoff, Allison Koester, D. Scott Lee and Gerald S. Martin who generously shared with 
us the FSR database they used in their paper, Karpoff, Koester, Lee and Martin (2012). 
15
 Karpoff, Koester, Lee and Martin (2012) find that 87.5% of cases in GAO and 97.8% of cases in AA are non-misconduct 
cases, compared with 0% in FSR. 
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sample to misstatements after 1996 because the passage of the Private Securities Litigation Reform 
Act in 1995 might affect a firm’s incentives to engage in fraudulent behavior. For each misstatement, 
we collect information on both the year of commission and the dates of detection. Since the median 
length of the misstated period (from commission to detection) in our combined sample of 
irregularities and errors is about two years in our sample, our commission and detection sub-samples 
terminate in years 2010 and 2012, respectively. Following Hennes, Leone and Miller (2008), we 
classify each case of misstatement into either an irregularity or an error.
16
 The final misstatement 
sample includes 830 accounting irregularities and 4,360 accounting errors.  
Our control sample includes all firms in the COMPUSTAT-CRSP merged database except firms 
that are in the misstatement sample. We also delete firms with the two-digit SIC code equal to 99 
because these firms are shell holding companies and acquisition vehicles whose characteristics change 
dramatically after acquisition. Since our control sample is based on the population of COMPUSTAT 
firms for which data are available, we address the concern over matched sample problem raised by 
Jones, Krishnan, and Melendrez (2008) and Burns, Kedia, and Lipson (2010). The control sample 
includes 64,734 firm-year observations. After we delete missing observations of control variables, the 
control sample drops to 39,801 firm-year observations. 
To test our (second) hypothesis on the monitoring role of accounting expertise of independent 
directors, we hand collect AE data from proxy statements. Since manual data collection is quite 
time-consuming, we focus on S&P1500 firms to generate a reasonable sample on accounting 
expertise. This choice reduces the sample used in firm-level analyses of monitoring by independent 
directors with AE to 174 accounting irregularities, 828 accounting errors, and 8,707 control (with no 
misstatement) firm-year observations. In order to utilize the best available sample, we test our 
hypotheses using the full sample of all firms in the COMPUSTAT-CRSP merged database (with about 
25,000 firm-year observations on all variables used in our multivariate tests). 
                                                             
16
 The GAO data on the classification of errors versus irregularities was generously provided by Professor Andrew J. Leone 
(http://sbaleone.bus.miami.edu/) In AA dataset, there are two variables help us distinguish irregularity from errors. One is 
“Res_fraud”, which equals 1 if the restatement identified financial fraud, irregularities and misrepresentations. The other is 
“Res_sec_investigation”, which equals 1 if the restatement disclosure identified that the SEC, PCAOB or other regulatory 
body is investigating the registrant. Including “Res_sec_investigation” is consistent with the procedure to distinguish 
irregularities from errors by Hennes, Leone and Miller (2008), where the first step is self-disclosure of irregularity or fraud, 
the second step is SEC investigation and the third step is non-SEC investigation. (pp.1494 of Hennes, Leone and Miller 
2008). 
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5. Results 
5.1 Summary Statistics 
Panel A of Table 1 reports the annual frequency of accounting irregularities and errors in the full 
sample, both measured as of the year of commission. There is a declining trend in the incidence of 
both irregularities and errors after 2000, but the drop-off appears more pronounced in intentional 
misstatements.  
Panel B reports the annual frequency and percentage of independent directors with AE (%AE) in 
the S&P 1500 sub-sample. Entries in the “N” column indicate the number of firms with accounting 
irregularities and those in the “Mean” column represent the average percentage of independent 
directors with accounting expertise. For example, there are 10 firms in the S&P 1500 sub-sample 
reporting irregularities beginning in 1996. On average, only 4.07% of independent directors of these 
firms have accounting expertise. The remaining entries show that only a small fraction of independent 
directors on the board qualifies as accounting experts. For both irregularities and errors commission, 
we find that %AE increases after the passage of SOX in 2002. 
Panel A of Table 2 presents the mean and median of variables for the three sub-samples, control 
(no-misstatements), irregularities and errors. The test results on the differences in means and medians 
of the key outcome and test variables between the sub-samples are shown in Panel B. Industry median 
EPS growth in the irregularities sample (13%) is significantly higher relative to the control (11%) and 
error (11%) sub-samples. We find a similar pattern for industry median Q. These base-level test 
results are supportive of our first hypothesis that more positive investor beliefs about industry 
prospects lead to higher incidence of accounting irregularities. Unreported results show that, among 
firm-years with no misstatements, 52.6% have accounting expertise on average, as compared with 
only 38.77% of firm-years with irregularities. The difference in means is highly significant as shown 
by the t-test in Panel B. Further, the industry median percentage of independent directors with 
accounting expertise (% AE) is 4 among firm-years with irregularities, which is significantly lower 
than 7% for firm-years without misstatements. We find similar results with respect to Excess AE, with 
30% of firm-years with irregularities having excess AE, compared with 39% of firm-years with errors 
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and 39% of firm-year without misstatements. Overall, these univariate tests indicate that firms 
committing accounting irregularities are marked by fewer independent directors with accounting 
expertise.   
Compared with the control sample, firms associated with irregularities and errors have higher 
M&A expenditures, higher ROA, higher leverage, higher external financing needs, higher M&A 
expenditure, higher capital expenditure, lower R&D expenditure, lower analyst coverage, larger size, 
higher industry restatement risk and higher likelihood of being audited by the 5 largest auditing firms. 
Turning to the executive compensation variables, firms associated with irregularities are marked by 
higher but insignificant short-term incentives and lower long-term incentives, consistent with 
Hertzberg (2005). However, we find a similar pattern in the subsamples on no-misstatements and 
errors.  
 
5.2 Investor Beliefs and Propensity for Irregularities 
Panel A (irregularities) and Panel B (errors) of Table 3 report the regression results for our first 
hypothesis. Bivariate probit model is used to mitigate the partial observability problem. Our test 
variables are the investor belief proxies and their squared terms in the commission equation (P(M)). 
P(D|M) includes variables in detection equation. The dependent variable in P(M) is a latent variable 
equal to one if a firm committed an accounting misstatement, and zero otherwise. The dependent 
variable in P(D|M) is a latent variable equal to one if a firm committed an accounting misstatement 
and then restated or got caught, and zero otherwise. For each regressor, coefficient estimates and 
standard errors (in parentheses) are reported. Standard errors are clustered at firm level. 
The investor belief proxy in Models 1 is industry median EPS growth rate. In Panel A, the 
probability of committing an irregularity is significantly positively related to the level of prior 
investor beliefs about business conditions (with a coefficient estimate of 0.4750), but significantly 
negatively related to the squared term (-0.6660). We find that the predicted probability of fraud peaks 
at the industry median EPS growth forecast of 0.36. For any industry median EPS growth forecast 
exceeding 0.36, a higher level of investor beliefs is associated with a lower probability of fraud. In 
Panel B, the probability of committing an accounting error is insignificantly related to both industry 
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median EPS growth and its squared term, suggesting that the likelihood of errors is unrelated to 
investor beliefs about business conditions. When we replace industry median EPS growth with 
industry median Q to represent investor beliefs, we find similar results in Models 2.  
The remaining estimates with respect to our control variables in the commission of irregularities 
and errors (P(M=1)) model are consistent with the previous literature. ROA is significantly positive, in 
line with Summers and Sweeney (1998) who note that firms with higher profitability are more likely 
to misstate their financial reports. Consistent with Kinney, Palmrose, and Scholz (2004), M&A 
Expenditures is positive and significant. Leverage is positive and insignificant in the irregularity 
sub-sample but significantly positive in errors sub-sample, suggesting that the debt covenant 
hypothesis has explanatory power for the variable in accounting errors across firm-years but not for 
irregularities. Similar to leverage, external financing need is also positive and insignificant in the 
irregularity sub-sample, and significantly positive in the error sub-sample. Consistent with Wang and 
Winton (2014), firms with higher insider ownership tend to have a higher likelihood of fraud 
commission. In addition, larger capital expenditure, smaller size and less analyst coverage tend to 
increase the probability of misstatement commission. 
All variables in the detection model (P(D=1|M=1)) have the expected signs. Opposite to 
commission, smaller capital expenditure, larger size and more analyst coverage tend to increase the 
probability of misstatement detection. Abnormal restatement risk is positive and highly significant. In 
addition, disastrous stock return increases the probability of being watched because of investors’ 
concerns about potential investment losses. Abnormal return volatility is positive but insignificant. A 
high turnover means more investors are affected and hence it increases the detection risk. A positive 
and significant coefficient on SOX dummy suggests that the incidence of disclosure of misconduct 
increases after SOX. We find a similar pattern in the determinants of detection in the error 
sub-sample.  
 
5.3 Monitoring Costs and Propensity for Irregularities 
Although PSW predict that lower monitoring costs of investors are on average associated with 
higher fraud propensity in good times, our second hypothesis posits that monitoring by independent 
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directors (who are obligated to act in the best interests of shareholders) should lower the likelihood of 
misconduct, consistent with Sherman (1999).  
To test this hypothesis, we first repeat the tests in Table 3 while adding the percentage of 
independent directors with accounting expertise (% AE) as a proxy for monitoring by independent 
directors. In unreported results, we find that the coefficient estimate on Ind. EPS Growth is positive 
and significant and that on the squared term is negative and significant in the irregularities sub-sample. 
By contrast, both coefficient estimates are insignificant in the errors sub-sample. These results show 
that our first hypothesis remains robust after controlling for the percentage of accounting experts on 
the board of directors. In Model 1, the coefficients on % AE are negative (-1.3802 and -1.6127) and 
significant at 1% in both the irregularities and errors sub-samples. These findings suggest that the 
probability of misstatements decreases with the proportion of independent directors with AE.
17
 
PSW and Shleifer and Vishny (1997) suggest that more optimistic beliefs about business 
conditions lead to lower investor monitoring of managers, encouraging financial misconduct. To 
investigate whether investor monitoring through the appointment of independent directors with AE is 
the underlying mechanism affecting the relation between irregularity propensity and investor beliefs, 
we utilize a two-stage regression approach. In the first-stage, we regress firm-level %AE of 
independent directors against investor beliefs for the entire Risk Metrics database. We construct other 
control variables following Agrawal and Chadha (2005) and Krishnan and Visvanathan (2008) which 
examine the determinants of monitoring by accounting experts. 
We include board size because larger boards are more likely to include a board member of any 
type. G Index, developed by Gompers, Ishii, and Metriek (2003), measures the strength of a firm’s 
governance system and is constructed based on a simple counting of 24 corporate governance 
provisions. Since the data on G Index is not available after 2008, we use the 2008 index data for 2009 
as well 2010 – the last two years in our sample period. A low (high) G Index is associated with a 
strong (weak) governance system. Previous literature (see, for example, DeFond, Hann and Hu, 2005 
and Krishnan and Visvanathan, 2008) suggests a negative relation between the appointment of a 
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 In unreported results, we find similar results when we replace % AE with AE dummy. 
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financial expert and the G Index.
18
 
Agrawal and Chadha (2005) predict that firms that are more capital intensive are likely to have a 
greater need for financial expertise on the board. We measure capital intensity as total assets scaled by 
number of employees. We include Debt and Prior ROA because more leveraged firms with poor 
performance are likely to have a greater need for external financing, which requires boardroom 
financial expertise. Agrawal and Chadha (2005) also predict that firms with greater earnings volatility 
tend to face greater asymmetric information problems in raising external finance. We measure 
Earnings Volatility as the standard deviation of earnings per share including extraordinary items for 
the past five years. Following Agrawal and Chadha (2005), and Krishnan and Visvanathan (2008), we 
include Sales Growth, measured as annual percentage change of sales, and Size, measured as log of 
assets. In order to capture regulatory change, we include SOX dummy. All variable definitions and 
data sources are summarized in Appendix A. All firm characteristics are lagged. We control for firm 
fixed effect and cluster standard errors at firm levels.  
In Panel A of Table 4, we observe a negative relation (significant at 1%) between investor beliefs 
about business condition and firm-level %AE (our proxy for monitoring by independent directors on 
behalf of investors), consistent with our Hypothesis 2A. When prior beliefs are fairly optimistic, 
investors do not seem to monitor firms carefully. The coefficient estimates of control variables suggest 
that there is more %AE when the firm has larger size, larger board size, better corporate governance, 
poor prior performance and lower sales growth. More mature firms tend to have more %AE on the 
board. The presence of AE and the percentage of AE tend to increase significantly after SOX. The 
R-squared is over 65% in Model 1 and over 82% in Model 2.  
In the second stage (Panel B of Table 4), we include the industry median predicted percentage AE 
calculated from the first stage. Similar to WWY, we include industry median compensation variables. 
Hertzberg (2005) posits that positive investor beliefs lead to more short-term executive compensation, 
which increases the likelihood of fraud. Consistent with Hypothesis 2B, the coefficient estimates of 
Predict % AE suggests a negative and significant impact of AE on a firm’s irregularity propensity. The 
economic significance is quite large. In unreported results, the marginal effect of Predicted % AE in 
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 We find similar results by replacing G Index with BCF Index, developed by Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell (2009). 
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Model 1 (Panel B of Table 4) is -0.1032 with a predicted conditional probability of 0.0517 at the mean 
values of the regressors. It means that 10% increase in Predicted % AE reduces the predicted 
conditional probability by 19%.
19
 The level of investor beliefs about the state of the economy 
continues to have a hump-shaped impact on the incidence of irregularity, suggesting that the 
monitoring mechanism, together with investor beliefs, plays an important role in explaining 
intentional financial misconduct. There is an important interplay between investor beliefs and 
monitoring. Neither can provide a complete explanation to irregularity propensity. Furthermore, we 
find a significantly positive (negative) relation between actual industry median predicted ST 
compensation (industry median predicted LT compensation) and the probability of misstatements. In 
contrast, the coefficient estimates of Predict % AE are insignificant in the error sub-sample. 
Reverse causality is a potential concern. It is possible that firms with incentives to manipulate 
financial statements intentionally reduce the number of independent directors with accounting 
expertise before issuing misleading reports. We argue that our results are not likely driven by reverse 
causality because (1) we use predicted %AE instead of actual %AE; (2) predicted %AE is ex ante; (3) 
predicted %AE in year t is calculated by using ex ante information in year t-1; (4) we use industry 
median measurements of AE instead of firm-level measurements. We also perform robustness tests by 
using two-year, three-year and four-year lagged measurements of %AE. In unreported results, the 
level of investor beliefs continues to have a hump-shaped impact on the incidence of irregularity. 
More important, the coefficient estimates (p-value) of %AE are -0.902 (0.091) for lagged-two-year, 
-1.292 (0.035) for lagged-three-year and -1.219 (0.055) for lagged-four-year.     
Since PSW suggest that the impact of monitoring costs varies with the degree of investor prior 
beliefs, we construct an indicator variable for each quintile of investor beliefs and interact it with 
predicted % AE. The first (fifth) quintile corresponds to the lowest (highest) level of investor beliefs. 
In addition, we control for the level of investor beliefs and compensation. In Panel A of Table 5, the 
coefficient estimates on the interaction terms are negative in all the quintiles and significant in most of 
the quintiles. They suggest that, consistent with our Hypothesis 2B, monitoring by independent 
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 Because the industry median %AE is essentially categorical instead of continuous, the traditional interpretation of 
economic significance using one-standard-deviation change of independent variables is inappropriate.   
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directors with AE is effective across different levels of investor beliefs. The likelihood of irregularities 
decreases as the proportion of independent directors with AE increases, regardless of the level of 
investor beliefs. We still find a significantly negative impact of AE on irregularity propensity, even 
after controlling for the mechanism between investor beliefs and monitoring. We do not find a similar 
pattern for errors in Panel B.  Coefficient estimates of control variables in the misstatement 
commission model (P(M=1)) and those in the detection model (P(D=1|M=1)) are consistent with 
Table 3 and Table 4. 
To assess the sensitivity of the above estimates to our approach to constructing predicted 
proportion of directors with accounting expertise, we replace Predicted % AE with Excess AE, an 
indicator variable that takes a value of 1 for % AE greater than the industry median and 0 otherwise, in 
Table 6. Since Excess AE is based on firm-level observations, our sample size drops to about 7,000 
firm-year observations. We use the same control variables in commission and detection equation as in 
previous tables. To save space, coefficient estimates of control variables are suppressed. Similar to 
results in Panel A of Table 5, the coefficient estimates on Excess AE (Model 1) and the interactions 
between Excess AE and quintile dummies of investor beliefs (Model 2) continue to be negative and 
significant in the irregularity sub-sample in Panel A of Table 6, though not always significant. It is 
possibly due to a much smaller sample size. In contrast, the coefficient estimates become insignificant 
in the error sub-sample in Panel B. In summary, our findings suggest that an increase in the proportion 
of independent directors with accounting expertise is associated with a lower propensity of intentional 
accounting misreporting after controlling for investor beliefs about industry prospects and standard 
regulatory, firm and industry characteristics. The negative impact of AE of independent directors on 
irregularity propensity still persists even after controlling for investor beliefs. 
 
5.4 Compensation, Monitoring Costs and Propensity for Irregularities 
Hertzberg (2005) posits that positive investor beliefs lead to more short-term executive 
compensation, which, in turn, increases the likelihood of fraud. WWY test the link between investor 
beliefs and firm’s fraud incentives and find that more optimistic beliefs lead to more short-term 
compensation. Further, to scrutinize whether compensation is the dominant mechanism, they run a 
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two-stage regression by examining the relationship between investor beliefs and the structure of 
executive pay in the first stage and then use the predicted compensation in the second stage.  
In a similar fashion, we run a two-stage regression and report our results in Appendix B. In the 
first-stage, we regress the firm-level short- and long-term executive compensation against industry 
median investor beliefs (Ind. EPS Growth) for the entire ExecuComp database, and calculate the 
predicted firm-level short- and long-term compensation. We then calculate industry median pedicted 
ST compensation and industry median predicted LT compensation, which are industry median 
predicted compensation in the commission equation of the bivariate probit analysis. 
In Panel A of Appendix B, we observe that more optimistic beliefs are associated with more 
short-term compensation (Model 1) and less long-term compensation (Model 2). These findings are 
consistent with Hertzberg (2005) and WWY. In Panel B, we find that industry median predicted ST 
compensation (industry median predicted LT compensation) is positively (negatively) associated with 
the probability of misstatements, including both irregularities and errors. After controlling for 
executive incentives, we still observe a hump-shaped relation between investor beliefs and irregularity 
propensity, consistent with our first hypothesis. More important, %AE is still negative and significant 
in both the irregularity commission model and the error commission model, suggesting a salient 
monitoring role of independent directors with accounting expertise.  
 
5.5 Market Reactions 
Table 7 reports preliminary results on our third hypothesis predicting negative investor reactions 
to the announcement of accounting restatements and positive reactions to the proportion of 
independent directors with accounting expertise. Since we collect firm-level proxies for AE in S&P 
1500 firms, our sample of market reactions includes all accounting restatements announced by those 
firms from 1996 to 2012.
20
 After we merge with the CRSP market data, our sample includes 1,005 
restatement announcement dates. We subtract the CRSP market index return (equally weighted, with 
dividends) from a company’s daily stock return to estimate its daily abnormal return. The daily 
abnormal returns are summed over the event window to obtain the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) 
                                                             
20
 We only look at restatements from GAO and AA and exclude misstatements from FSR.    
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for each firm. 
In Panel A of Table 7 we examine CAR over the (-2,2) and (-1,1) windows for the sub-samples of 
irregularities and errors. The average three-day abnormal returns is about -6% for irregularities, 
compared with roughly -1% for errors. The differences in means and medians are highly significant. 
This evidence is consistent with our third hypothesis that investors react more negatively to the 
announcement of irregularities as compared with errors. Since we limit our sample to S&P 1500 firms, 
the mean abnormal returns are less negative compared with previous papers which include both small 
and big firms. This is consistent with the existing evidence indicating that large firms tend to have 
smaller market reaction to restatements (Collins, Kothari and Rayburn, 1987; Freeman, 1987; 
Bhushan, 1989; O’Brien and Bhushan, 1990; El-Gazzar, 1998).  
Panel B of Table 7 compares CAR for firms with above-median % AE with firms with 
below-median % AE. Carcello, Neal, Palmrose and Scholz (2011) suggest that an audit committee 
with financial experts indicates good corporate governance and hence might mitigate negative stock 
price reaction to restatement announcements. However, they fail to find any significant relation 
between investor reactions and the audit committee financial expertise. We broaden the measure of 
accounting expertise by covering all independent directors on the board with AE, not just those 
independent directors who serve on the audit committee. In addition, Carcello et al measure financial 
expertise of independent directors as of the date when firms begin misreporting their accounts. As 
noted previously, in our combined sample of irregularities and errors the median time-gap between the 
beginning of misconduct and its subsequent detection is about two years.
21
 Given this wide window, 
the proportion of independent directors with AE can vary between the date of commission and the 
subsequent detection of misconduct. Hence, it is important to investigate whether investors react 
differently to AE as of the date of disclosure of restatements, and whether any potential improvement 
from commission to disclosure in the proportion of independent directors with accounting expertise 
helps mitigate negative market reaction. Therefore, we look at %AE when misstatements begin and 
when misstatements are detected separately. When we compare firms with (1) below-median %AE 
                                                             
21
 In the irregularities sample, the median (mean) length from commission to detection is 2.64 (2) years and the upper (lower) 
quartile is 4 (1) years. In the errors sample, the median (mean) length from commission to detection is 2.17 (2) years and the 
upper (lower) quartile is 3 (1) years.  
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with (2) those with above-median %AE measured when misstatements begin in both cases, we find 
that investors react more negatively to firms with lower %AE. Both mean and median differences are 
highly significant.  
Next we compare firms with (3) below-median %AE with (4) their peers with above-median %AE 
measured in both cases when misstatements are disclosed. Again, investors seem to react more 
negatively to firms with lower %AE. However, only the five-day mean difference in CARs is 
significant. Overall, consistent with our third hypothesis, these mean difference test results indicate 
that market reaction to financial misstatements increases with the proportion of independent directors 
with accounting expertise measured when misstatements begin as well as when they are detected. 
Panel A of Table 8 reports the results of multivariate regressions. Since we include the change in 
the proportion of independent directors with accounting expertise from the date of commission to 
disclosure of misstatements, we exclude observations on AE that we can measure only at the time of 
commission or detection. This reduces the number of observations to 981. There are four main test 
variables: IRR, a dummy variable equal to one for misstatements that are irregularities and zero 
otherwise, AE_commit (percentage of AE when misstatements begin), AE_detect (percentage of AE 
when misstatements are detected), AE_change (change in the percentage of AE between the time of 
detection and commission of misstatements). In addition, we consider interactions between the three 
AE variables and IRR. Consistent with the univariate analysis presented in Table 7, the coefficient 
estimates on IRR are all negative and highly significant, indicating that investors react more 
negatively to intentional misstatements. Both AE_commit and AE_detect are positive and significant. 
These estimates suggest that a high percentage of independent directors with AE mitigate the average 
negative market reaction to restatements. However, the interaction terms are not significant.  
When we track the change in the percentage of AE between detection and the beginning of 
misconduct, the coefficient estimate of AE_change is not significant but its interaction with IRR is 
positive and marginally significant. This evidence suggests that an improvement in the proportion of 
independent directors with accounting expertise between the time of detection and the beginning of 
misconduct serves to mitigate negative reaction to the disclosure of irregularities.     
The coefficient estimates on control variables are consistent with those reported by previous 
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literature. Palmrose, Richardson, and Scholz (2004) find that more negative returns are associated 
with restatements attributed to auditors or management but not to the SEC.
22
 We find positive and 
highly significant coefficients on the SEC dummy (which flags restatements prompted by SEC). Also, 
we find positive and highly significant coefficients on firm size, consistent with Collins, Kothari and 
Rayburn (1987), Freeman (1987), Bhushan (1989), O’Brien and Bhushan (1990), and El-Gazzar 
(1998) who report that stock price reactions to earnings news is attenuated for large firms and 
magnified for small firms.  
To verify the robustness of the above results, we construct two alternative measures of accounting 
expertise: dummy variables of excess accounting expertise relative to the industry median measured 
when misstatements are committed and when they are subsequently detected. The estimates presented 
in Panel B indicate that both Excess AE_commit and Excess AE_detect are positive and significant but 
their interactions with IRR are not significant.
23
  
Overall, the above results offer strong support for our third hypothesis which predicts negative 
market reactions to the announcement of accounting irregularities but positive reactions to the 
percentage of independent directors with accounting expertise when misstatements begin as well as 
when they are detected.  
 
6. Conclusion 
The causes and consequences of accounting misconduct have been widely studied, but our 
understanding of what factors influence a firm’s incentives to issue misleading reports and the 
effectiveness of various monitoring mechanisms is rather limited. This paper empirically tests two key 
determinants of intentional accounting misconduct proposed by Povel, Singh and Winton (2007), 
investors’ prior beliefs about business conditions and monitoring costs. We use industry medians of 
Tobin’s Q and analyst growth forecasts of earnings per share to capture investor beliefs and the 
industry median proportion of independent directors with accounting expertise on the board as our 
                                                             
22
 Table 4 in Palmrose, Richardson, and Scholz (2004) show that the average market reaction is -18% if the restatement is 
attributed to auditor, -13% if the restatement is attributed to company and -4% if the restatement is attributed to SEC.  
23
 Numbers of observations (N) in Panel B of Table 8 (1,037 in Models 1 and 2, and 1,083 in Models 3 and 4) are greater 
than those in Panel A (981) because we do not exclude observations on AE that we can measure only at the time of 
commission or detection.  
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primary proxy for monitoring on behalf of investors.   
Using a sample of U.S. firms which intentionally misstate their financial reports from 1996 to 
2010, we find that the probability of accounting misconduct is hump-shaped in investor beliefs about 
business conditions, increasing in the level of investor beliefs but decreasing when beliefs are 
sufficiently positive. However, this pattern does not exist in (unintentional) accounting errors. Turning 
to monitoring mechanisms, we present strong evidence indicating that optimistic investor beliefs 
about business conditions lower the proportion of independent directors with accounting expertise. In 
addition, the incidence of irregularities decreases with the proportion of independent directors with 
accounting expertise regardless of investor prior beliefs about business conditions. This highlights the 
important interplay between investor beliefs and monitoring. 
Finally, consistent with previous literature, we find that the stock market reacts more negatively to 
announcement of irregularities. More importantly, the magnitude of market reaction to restatements is 
positively correlated with the percentage of independent directors with accounting expertize, 
measured when misstatements begin as well as when they are disclosed. These findings highlight the 
effectiveness of monitoring by independent directors with accounting expertise in reducing the 
incidence and severity of accounting misconduct.  
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Appendix A: Variable Definitions 
 
Variable Source Definition 
Ind. EPS Growth I/B/E/S = Industry median forecasted EPS growth. 
 
EPS growth = (Forecasted annual EPS / prior year realized 
EPS) – 1   
Industries are defined based on the Fama–French 49 industry 
classification 
   
Ind. Q COMPUSTAT = Industry median Tobin’s Q. 
Q = (book value of assets + market value of equity−book 
value of equity) / book value of assets 
   
% AE Proxy 
Statements 
= Industry median % of independent director with accounting 
expertise 
   
Excess AE Proxy 
Statements 
= 1 for firm-level % AE greater than industry median; = 0 
otherwise 
   
ROA COMPUSTAT = Net income before extraordinary items / total assets. 
   
Leverage COMPUSTAT = Long-term debt / total assets  
   
Ex. Fin. Need COMPUSTAT = 1 if the firm’s free cash flow is less than –0.5; = 0 otherwise. 
   
Free cash flow = (cash from operations – average capital 
expenditures during the previous three years) / current assets  
 
Cash from operations = earnings – accruals 
 
Accruals = change in current assets – change in current 
liabilities – change in cash/cash equivalents + change in debt 
included in current liabilities – depreciation and amortization 
expense 
   
Insider 
Ownership 
ExecuComp % of shares owned by officers 
   
Big N COMPUSTAT = 1 if the firm is audited by Big4 or Big5 auditors; = 0 
otherwise. 
   
M&A COMPUSTAT = M&A expenditure / total assets. 
   
CAPX COMPUSTAT = Capital expenditure / total assets 
   
R&D COMPUSTAT = R&D expenditure / total assets. 
   
Log Asset COMPUSTAT = log (total book assets) 
   
Analyst 
Coverage 
I/B/E/S = log (1 + total number of analyst following) 
   
SOX  = 1 for 2002 and after; = 0 otherwise 
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Abnormal 
Restatement 
Risk 
Audit Analytics 
GAO 
FSR 
= yearly deviation from the average restatement risk in an 
industry. 
 
Restatement Risk = log (total market value of misstated firms 
in an industry-year) 
   
Disastrous Stock 
Return 
CRSP = 1 if stock return is in the bottom 10% of all the firm-year 
return observations in the COMPUSTAT database; = 0 
otherwise. 
   
Abnormal 
Return Volatility 
CRSP = the difference between the yearly standard deviation of the 
firm’s stock returns and its time-series average. 
   
Abnormal 
Turnover 
CRSP = the difference between the monthly share turnover of the 
firm’s stock returns and its time-series average. 
 
 
  
ST- 
Compensation 
ExecuComp = Industry median short-term incentive.  
 
Short-term incentive = (salary + bonus + other annual 
compensation) / total expected compensation 
 
Total expected compensation = salary, bonus, other annual 
income + value of restricted stock granted + value of stock 
option grants + long-term incentive payouts + and all other 
total income 
   
LT- 
Compensation 
ExecuComp = Industry median long-term incentive.  
 
Long-term incentive = (value of stock option grants + value of 
restricted stock granted) / total expected compensation 
   
Prior ROA COMPUSTAT = Prior three-year average return on assets 
   
Debt COMPUSTAT = Long-term debt / total assets 
   
Sales Growth COMPUSTAT = Annual percentage change in sales 
   
Board Size Risk Metrics = Natural logarithm of number of directors in the board 
   
Capital Intensity COMPUSTAT = Total assets / number of employees 
 
 
 
 
  
G Index Risk Metrics = An index developed by Gompers, Ishii, and Metriek (2003), 
measures the strength of a firm’s governance system and is 
constructed based on a simple counting of 24 corporate 
governance provisions. 
   
Earning 
Volatility 
COMPUSTAT = Earnings volatility for the past five years 
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Age COMPUSTAT 
Prof. Jay Ritter’s 
Website 
= Age of the firm from the date of listing in number of year 
   
%AE_commit Proxy 
Statements 
= percentage of AE when misstatements begin 
   
%AE_detect Proxy 
Statements 
= percentage of AE when misstatements were 
detected/announced 
   
%AE_change Proxy 
Statements 
= change in percentage of AE between misstatement detection 
and commission (%AE_change =%AE_ detect less %AE_ 
commit) 
   
IRR Audit Analytics 
GAO 
FSR 
= an indicator variable equal to 1 if the misstatement is 
intentional and 0 if the misstatement is unintentional 
   
Core Audit Analytics 
GAO 
FSR 
= an indicator variable equal to 1 if revenue and/or expense 
was impacted by the restatement, and 0 otherwise 
   
Length Audit Analytics 
GAO 
FSR 
= total number of years between the beginning of 
misstatements and their detection 
   
SEC Audit Analytics 
GAO 
FSR 
= an indicator variable equal to 1 if the SEC prompted the 
restatement, and 0 otherwise 
   
Prior_returns CSRP = prior year excess returns 
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Appendix B: Investor Beliefs, Accounting Experts and Predicted Executive Compensation 
 
In Panel A, the dependent variable is firm-level ST Compensation in Model (1) and (3) and firm-level 
LT Compensation in Model (2) and (4). Firm EPS Growth is contemporaneous. All firm 
characteristics are lagged. Time Trend ranges from 1 to 15, where Time Trend = 1 for 1996 and 15 for 
2010. Other variables are defined in Appendix A. Panel B reports bivariate probit regression results. 
The dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to Z=1 if a firm committed an irregularity (error) 
and then got caught later, zero otherwise. The estimation of misstatement propensity is indicated by 
P(M=1), and the estimation of misstatement detection likelihood by P(D=1|M=1). “Ind. Predicted ST 
Compensation” is the industry median of predicted value of Firm ST Compensation in Model (2) of 
Panel B. “Ind. Predicted LT Compensation” is the industry median of predicted value of Firm LT 
Compensation in Model (4) of Panel B. Other variables are defined in Appendix A. Control variables 
in P(M=1) and in P(D=1|M=1) are the same as previous tables and suppressed. Robust standard errors 
are clustered by firm. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. 
 
Panel A Determinants of Executive Compensation  
 
 (1) (2) 
 Firm ST Compensation Firm LT Compensation 
   
Firm EPS Growth 0.0051*** -0.0039** 
 (0.0016) (0.0016) 
Sales growth -0.0130** 0.0099* 
 (0.0057) (0.0059) 
ROA -0.0854*** 0.0995*** 
 (0.0158) (0.0164) 
Stock Return -0.0062*** 0.0086*** 
 (0.0022) (0.0023) 
Tobin’s Q -0.0217*** 0.0244*** 
 (0.0015) (0.0015) 
Log Asset -0.0426*** 0.0406*** 
 (0.0030) (0.0031) 
Time Trend 0.0010** -0.0010** 
 (0.0004) (0.0004) 
Constant 0.9187*** 0.0229 
 (0.0216) (0.0224) 
   
Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes 
Number of Firms 2,914 2,914 
Observations 22,889 22,889 
R-squared 0.5117 0.5127 
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Panel B: Monitoring, Executive Compensation and Irregularity Propensity 
 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES P(M) P(M) 
   
Ind. EPS Growth 0.9271*** 0.9822*** 
 (0.1731) (0.1743) 
Ind. EPS Growth Squared -1.3199*** -1.3725*** 
 (0.3290) (0.3264) 
% AE -0.8556** -0.7378* 
 (0.3884) (0.3887) 
Predicted ST Compensation 7.8017***  
 (0.8293)  
Predicted LT Compensation  -8.8445*** 
  (0.8794) 
   
Control variables in P(M=1) and in P(D=1|M=1) (suppressed) 
   
Log Likelihood -2660 -2647 
Observations 26,231 26,231 
 
 
Panel C: Monitoring, Executive Compensation and Error Propensity 
 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES P(M) P(M) 
   
Ind. EPS Growth 0.3565*** 0.3904*** 
 (0.0653) (0.0639) 
Ind. EPS Growth Squared -0.0953 -0.1170 
 (0.0801) (0.0796) 
% AE -1.4800*** -1.4513*** 
 (0.1811) (0.1807) 
Predicted ST Compensation 4.0340***  
 (0.3526)  
Predicted LT Compensation  -4.6283*** 
  (0.3578) 
   
Control variables in P(M=1) and in P(D=1|M=1) (suppressed) 
   
Log Likelihood -8272 -8256 
Observations 28,108 28,108 
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Table 1: Distribution of Accounting Misstatements and Percentage of Independent Directors 
with Accounting Expertise  
 
This table presents the distribution of accounting misstatements and percentage of independent 
directors with accounting expertise. Irregularities (errors) are intentional (unintentional) accounting 
misstatements. Panel A displays time trend in accounting irregularities and errors in the 
COMPUSTAT-CRSP merged sample. N is the number of firms in a given year that committed 
irregularities (errors). Panel B shows time trend in the percentage of independent directors with 
accounting expertise in the S&P 1500 sub-sample.  
 
Panel A: Distribution of Irregularities and Errors (full sample) 
 
 Irregularities Errors 
Year of 
Commission 
N  N  
1996 50  55  
1997 73  133  
1998 77  171  
1999 98  322  
2000 118  405  
2001 83  486  
2002 66  460  
2003 57  450  
2004 62  399  
2005 48  321  
2006 22  263  
2007 18  252  
2008 26  222  
2009 18  237  
2010 14  184  
Total(firm-years) 830  4,360  
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Panel B: Distribution of Percentage of Independent Directors with Accounting Expertise (S&P 1500 
sub-sample) 
 
 Irregularities  Errors  
Year % AE % AE 
 N Mean Median N Mean Median 
1996 10 0.0407 0 13 0.0333 0 
1997 28 0.0551 0 34 0.0861 0 
1998 32 0.1017 0 39 0.0795 0 
1999 33 0.0567 0 88 0.0575 0 
2000 50 0.0898 0 94 0.0765 0 
2001 21 0.0592 0 120 0.0757 0 
2002 17 0.0754 0 109 0.0814 0 
2003 17 0.1257 0.1169 92 0.1304 0.1111 
2004 15 0.1132 0.1250 81 0.1368 0.1222 
2005 8 0.0823 0.0625 62 0.1808 0.2000 
2006 2 0.1667 0.1667 43 0.1887 0.1667 
2007 7 0.1964 0.1964 46 0.1934 0.1667 
2008 3 0.1875 0.1875 59 0.2185 0.2500 
2009 3 0.2250 0.2250 52 0.2356 0.2222 
2010 10 0.2095 0.2000 44 0.2483 0.2500 
Total(firm-years) 246   976   
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
 
This table presents mean and median of variables for the control sample with no misstatements, irregularity sample and error sample. Irregularities 
(errors) are intentional (unintentional) accounting misstatements. Non-misstated firm-years are taken from the COMPUSTAT-CRSP merged 
sample after deleting firms that commit irregularities or errors during the sample period. All variables are defined in Appendix A. Panel B presents 
t statistics (t-stat) for mean differences and Wilcoxon z statistics (z-stat) for median differences. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% levels.   
 
Panel A: Means and medians of variables for the non-misstated sample, irregularity sample and error sample 
 
 (1) Control (firm-years) (2) Irregularities (firm-years) (3) Errors (firm-years) 
Variables N Mean Median N Mean Median N Mean Median 
Ind. EPS Growth  39,801 0.08 0.11 618 0.11 0.13 3,306 0.08 0.11 
Ind. Q 39,801 1.55 1.37 618 1.61 1.38 3,306 1.52 1.35 
ST Compensation 39,801 0.55 0.55 618 0.55 0.55 3,306 0.55 0.55 
LT Compensation 39,801 0.38 0.38 618 0.38 0.38 3,306 0.39 0.38 
% AE 39,801 0.07 0.00 618 0.04 0.00 3,306 0.07 0.00 
Excess AE 8,707 0.39 0.00 175 0.30 0.00 828 0.39 0.00 
ROA 39,801 -0.02 0.05 618 0.02 0.07 3,306 0.00 0.05 
Leverage 39,801 0.17 0.10 618 0.20 0.14 3,306 0.19 0.13 
Ext. Fin. Need 39,801 0.33 0.00 618 0.41 0.00 3,306 0.38 0.00 
Insider Ownership 39,801 0.02 0.01 618 0.02 0.01 3,306 0.01 0.01 
Big N 39,801 0.80 1.00 618 0.87 1.00 3,306 0.81 1.00 
M&A 39,801 0.03 0.00 618 0.05 0.00 3,306 0.04 0.00 
CAPX 39,801 0.06 0.03 618 0.07 0.04 3,306 0.07 0.04 
R&D 39,801 0.00 0.00 618 0.00 0.00 3,306 0.00 0.00 
Log Asset 39,801 5.81 5.71 618 6.06 5.91 3,306 5.87 5.82 
Analyst Coverage 39,801 8.18 8.34 618 8.11 8.29 3,306 8.16 8.33 
Abnormal Restatement Risk 39,801 -0.99 -0.75 618 -0.78 -0.75 3,306 0.39 0.37 
Disastrous Stock Return 39,801 0.00 0.01 618 -0.01 0.00 3,306 -0.01 0.01 
Abnormal Return Volatility 39,801 0.12 0.00 618 0.19 0.00 3,306 0.20 0.00 
Abnormal Turnover 39,801 0.69 -0.71 618 2.06 -1.10 3,306 1.20 -0.69 
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Panel B - Tests for differences in means and medians of variables for the control sample (1), irregularity sample (2), and error sample (3) 
 
 (1)–(2) (1)–(3) (2)–(3) 
Variables t-stat z-stat t-stat z-stat t-stat z-stat 
Ind. EPS Growth  -3.61*** -6.05*** -0.38 -1.01 -3.13*** -5.23*** 
Ind. Q -2.63*** -3.00*** 3.31*** 1.91* -3.99*** -3.63*** 
ST Compensation -1.08 -1.22 0.97 0.39 -1.39 -1.28 
LT Compensation 1.58 1.60 -0.98 -0.82 1.86* 1.82* 
% AE 8.95*** 9.06*** 4.94*** 5.03*** 6.63*** 6.79*** 
Excess AE 2.54** 2.54** -0.04 -0.04 2.37** 2.36** 
ROA -3.55*** -3.77*** -3.13*** 1.16 -2.35** -4.29*** 
Leverage -3.30*** -4.13*** -5.51*** -6.17*** -0.74 -1.20 
Ext. Fin. Need -4.088*** -4.08*** -6.63*** -6.62*** -1.00 -1.00 
Insider Ownership -0.12 -4.08*** 2.39** -1.47 -1.37 -3.49*** 
Big N -5.15*** -5.73*** -4.77*** -4.67*** -2.35** -3.22*** 
M&A -4.35*** -4.35*** -1.04 -1.04 -3.72*** -3.71*** 
CAPX -3.25*** -6.10*** -4.52*** -7.10*** -1.07 -2.65*** 
R&D 6.05*** 3.83*** 2.92*** 2.82*** 3.39*** 1.96* 
Log Asset -2.71*** -2.60*** -1.57 -2.58*** -2.02** -1.36 
Analyst Coverage 1.75* 3.15*** 1.05 1.54 1.21 2.25** 
Abnormal Restatement Risk -1.61 -0.72 -24.27*** -20.70*** 10.37*** 8.62*** 
Disastrous Stock Return 1.03 1.00 0.12 -2.55*** 0.84 1.81* 
Abnormal Return Volatility -4.93*** -4.92*** -13.12*** -13.09*** 0.77 0.77 
Abnormal Turnover -2.26** 0.09 -1.92* -1.76* -1.24 0.68 
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Table 3: Investors Beliefs and Misstatement Propensity  
 
The dependent variable is a dummy variable, Z equal to 1 if a firm committed an irregularity (error) 
and then got caught later, zero otherwise. The estimation of misstatement propensity is indicated by 
P(M=1), and the estimation of misstatement detection likelihood by P(D=1|M=1). All variables are 
defined in Appendix A. Coefficient estimates and standard errors (in parentheses) are reported. 
Standard errors are clustered by firm. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels. 
 
Panel A: Irregularities 
 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES P(M) P(D|M) P(M) P(D|M) 
     
Ind. EPS Growth 0.4750***    
 (0.0916)    
Ind. EPS Growth Squared -0.6660***    
 (0.1665)    
Ind. Q   0.4079***  
   (0.1332)  
Ind. Q Squared   -0.0785***  
   (0.0291)  
ROA 0.1491**  0.2195***  
 (0.0668)  (0.0757)  
Leverage 0.0469  0.0841  
 (0.0583)  (0.0653)  
Ext. Fin. Need 0.0340  0.0381  
 (0.0228)  (0.0239)  
Insider Ownership 0.5122**  0.5824*  
 (0.2374)  (0.3011)  
Big N 0.0591  0.0586  
 (0.0370)  (0.0394)  
M&A 0.3304** -0.1457 0.3328** -0.1239 
 (0.1418) (0.1592) (0.1562) (0.1702) 
CAPX 1.0080*** -1.1852*** 0.9362*** -1.1203*** 
 (0.2783) (0.3662) (0.2920) (0.3712) 
R&D 1.3700 -3.6538* 1.9945 -3.4592 
 (4.5624) (2.0720) (4.8003) (2.2836) 
Log Asset -0.1036*** 0.1239*** -0.1029*** 0.1294*** 
 (0.0163) (0.0152) (0.0201) (0.0183) 
Analyst Coverage -0.0409 0.0814*** -0.0546* 0.0771** 
 (0.0293) (0.0284) (0.0305) (0.0303) 
SOX -2.5092*** 4.2467 -2.5228*** 3.4802*** 
 (0.0704) (7.3890) (0.0948) (1.3125) 
Abnormal Restatement Risk  0.0778***  0.0835*** 
  (0.0151)  (0.0197) 
Disastrous Stock Return  0.4323***  0.4810*** 
  (0.1514)  (0.1697) 
Abnormal Return Volatility  0.0376  0.0648 
  (0.0385)  (0.0422) 
Abnormal Turnover  0.0010  0.0008 
  (0.0009)  (0.0009) 
Constant 0.9683*** -1.2499*** 0.6803* -1.2750*** 
 (0.2670) (0.2501) (0.3472) (0.2788) 
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Log Likelihood  -1986  -2003 
Observations  25,103  25,103 
Panel B: Errors 
 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES P(M) P(D|M) P(M) P(D|M) 
     
Ind. Q 0.1317    
 (0.1873)    
Ind. Q Squared -0.0695    
 (0.0495)    
Ind. EPS Growth   0.1011  
   (0.0726)  
Ind. EPS Growth Squared   0.0452  
   (0.0884)  
ROA 0.0005  0.0499  
 (0.0644)  (0.0636)  
Leverage 0.2904***  0.3226***  
 (0.0862)  (0.0850)  
Ext. Fin. Need 0.1349***  0.1250***  
 (0.0301)  (0.0300)  
Insider Ownership -0.6948  -0.5702  
 (0.5197)  (0.5013)  
Big N -0.0300  -0.0469  
 (0.0433)  (0.0428)  
M&A 0.3019** 0.4118 0.2836** 0.4118 
 (0.1414) (0.2737) (0.1407) (0.2737) 
CAPX 0.1403 -0.3656 0.1320 -0.3654 
 (0.2081) (0.2970) (0.2092) (0.2970) 
R&D -14.3096** 0.7139 -10.7894* 0.7142 
 (5.6239) (5.3865) (5.6707) (5.3863) 
Log Asset -0.0447*** 0.0330*** -0.0403*** 0.0330*** 
 (0.0095) (0.0113) (0.0094) (0.0113) 
Analyst Coverage -0.0489*** 0.0573** -0.0538*** 0.0573** 
 (0.0180) (0.0248) (0.0179) (0.0248) 
SOX -7.1798*** 6.9551*** -4.0996*** 1.2329*** 
 (0.0194) (0.1318) (0.1534) (0.1594) 
Abnormal Restatement Risk  0.4101***  0.4101*** 
  (0.0143)  (0.0143) 
Disastrous Stock Return  1.0766***  1.0766*** 
  (0.2790)  (0.2790) 
Abnormal Return Volatility  0.1062  0.1062 
  (0.0769)  (0.0769) 
Abnormal Turnover  -0.0019  -0.0019 
  (0.0016)  (0.0016) 
Constant 6.3362*** -0.9703*** 3.2938*** -0.9703*** 
 (0.2057) (0.2148) (0.2271) (0.2148) 
     
Log Likelihood  -7489  -7500 
Observations  27,329  27,329 
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Table 4: Investors Beliefs, Predicted Accounting Expertise and Misstatement Propensity  
 
Panel A reports panel regression results of monitoring by independent directors with accounting 
expertise. The dependent variables are a) a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm has any independent 
directors with accounting expertise and 0 otherwise in Model (1); and b) firm-level percentage of 
independent directors with accounting expertise in Model (2). All firm characteristics are lagged, and 
all variables are defined in Appendix A. Standard Errors are clustered at firm level. Panel B and Panel 
C report bivariate probit regression results. The dependent variable is a dummy variable Z equal to 1 
if a firm committed an irregularity (error) and then got caught later, zero otherwise. The estimation of 
misstatement propensity is indicated by P(M=1), and the estimation of misstatement detection 
likelihood by P(D=1|M=1). “Ind. Predicted AE” is the industry median of predicted value of Firm % 
AE in Model (2) of Panel A. Standard errors are clustered by firm. *, ** and *** indicate significance 
at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. 
 
Panel A: Determinants of Monitoring 
 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Firm AE Dummy Firm % AE 
   
Ind. EPS Growth -0.0144 -0.0208*** 
 (0.0252) (0.0045) 
Log Asset 0.0770*** 0.0112*** 
 (0.0228) (0.0027) 
Prior ROA -0.3149** -0.0980*** 
 (0.1335) (0.0151) 
Debt 0.0106 -0.0231*** 
 (0.0738) (0.0089) 
Sales growth -0.0478* 0.0031 
 (0.0258) (0.0034) 
Board Size 0.1358** 0.0022 
 (0.0687) (0.0078) 
Capital Intensity -0.0124 0.0007 
 (0.0138) (0.0014) 
G Index -0.0177 -0.0042*** 
 (0.0118) (0.0012) 
Earning Volatility -0.0064 -0.0011 
 (0.0137) (0.0019) 
Age 0.2986*** 0.1454*** 
 (0.0474) (0.0060) 
SOX 0.1156*** 0.0639*** 
 (0.0247) (0.0029) 
Constant -0.9029*** -0.3489*** 
 (0.2079) (0.0228) 
   
Firm Fixed Effect Y Y 
Number of Firms 1,066 1,066 
Observations 6,485 6,485 
R-squared 0.687 0.8259 
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Panel B: Predicted Accounting Expertise and Irregularity Propensity 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES P(M) P(D|M) P(M) P(D|M) P(M) P(D|M) 
       
Ind. EPS Growth 0.4781***  0.4632***  0.4535***  
 (0.1181)  (0.1182)  (0.1203)  
Ind. EPS Growth 
Squared 
-0.8186***  -0.8069***  -0.7946***  
 (0.1974)  (0.1892)  (0.1862)  
Predicted % AE -0.9527*  -0.9874*  -1.1415**  
 (0.5773)  (0.5673)  (0.5655)  
ST Compensation   0.8858***    
   (0.2270)    
LT Compensation     -0.9843***  
     (0.2096)  
ROA 0.1630**  0.1187  0.1198  
 (0.0828)  (0.0824)  (0.0834)  
Leverage 0.1786*  0.1514  0.1439  
 (0.0965)  (0.0957)  (0.0943)  
Ext. Fin. Need 0.0288  0.0382  0.0386  
 (0.0369)  (0.0367)  (0.0365)  
Insider Ownership 10.1046***  7.0947***  7.2738***  
 (2.2240)  (2.2850)  (2.2575)  
Big N 0.0611  0.0616  0.0694  
 (0.0556)  (0.0552)  (0.0550)  
M&A 0.3198 0.0832 0.3174 0.0759 0.3148 0.0570 
 (0.2290) (0.2983) (0.2205) (0.2855) (0.2194) (0.2790) 
CAPX 1.0435*** -1.2569*** 1.0556*** -1.2857*** 1.0035*** -1.2444*** 
 (0.3242) (0.4143) (0.3157) (0.4091) (0.3149) (0.4128) 
R&D -15.2419 4.4442 -15.4920* 3.9066 -16.1128* 3.7349 
 (9.5558) (4.3149) (9.3970) (4.1702) (9.4154) (4.1481) 
Log Asset -0.0741*** 0.1133*** -0.0728*** 0.1114*** -0.0751*** 0.1119*** 
 (0.0197) (0.0167) (0.0190) (0.0163) (0.0185) (0.0161) 
Analyst Coverage -0.0347 0.0929** -0.0178 0.1247*** 0.0007 0.1209*** 
 (0.0316) (0.0362) (0.0317) (0.0368) (0.0320) (0.0365) 
SOX -2.5678*** 6.1722*** -2.6132*** 6.3445*** -2.6037*** 5.9512*** 
 (0.1267) (0.8613) (0.1187) (0.7410) (0.1120) (1.4732) 
Abnormal Restate 
Risk 
 0.1713***  0.1745***  0.1770*** 
 (0.0360)  (0.0326)  (0.0306) 
Disastrous Stock 
Return 
 0.5759**  0.5178**  0.5228** 
 (0.2725)  (0.2633)  (0.2613) 
Abnormal 
Volatility 
 0.1261*  0.1223*  0.1236* 
 (0.0654)  (0.0634)  (0.0634) 
Abnormal 
Turnover 
 0.0011  0.0014  0.0014 
 (0.0012)  (0.0012)  (0.0012) 
Constant 1.1329*** -1.4661*** 0.6015 -1.6994*** 1.3891*** -1.6649*** 
 (0.3914) (0.3502) (0.3841) (0.3512) (0.3873) (0.3445) 
       
Log Likelihood  -1801  -1791  -1786 
Observations  24,790  24,790  24,790 
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Panel C: Predicted Accounting Expertise and Error Propensity 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES P(M) P(D|M) P(M) P(D|M) P(M) P(D|M) 
       
Ind. EPS Growth 0.1426*  0.1474*  0.1403*  
 (0.0802)  (0.0827)  (0.0811)  
Ind. EPS Growth 
Squared 
0.0813  0.0956  0.0829  
 (0.0868)  (0.0860)  (0.0863)  
Predicted % AE 0.0101  -0.1492  -0.1517  
 (0.5194)  (0.5337)  (0.5325)  
ST Compensation   0.4346*    
   (0.2434)    
LT Compensation     -0.2611  
     (0.2005)  
ROA 0.0084  -0.0089  -0.0021  
 (0.0651)  (0.0656)  (0.0654)  
Leverage 0.2899***  0.2844***  0.2856***  
 (0.0880)  (0.0883)  (0.0881)  
Ext. Fin. Need 0.1232***  0.1256***  0.1239***  
 (0.0318)  (0.0320)  (0.0319)  
Insider Ownership 4.0928*  3.6769  4.2134*  
 (2.3802)  (2.3836)  (2.3891)  
Big N -0.0422  -0.0406  -0.0396  
 (0.0439)  (0.0441)  (0.0441)  
M&A 0.3137** -0.0745 0.3192** -0.0749 0.3190** -0.0747 
 (0.1425) (0.4053) (0.1427) (0.4055) (0.1426) (0.4054) 
CAPX 0.2668 -0.9754** 0.2819 -0.9769** 0.2676 -0.9759** 
 (0.2153) (0.4297) (0.2154) (0.4301) (0.2153) (0.4299) 
R&D -11.0862* 10.1858 -11.7331** 10.1936 -11.6227** 10.1876 
 (5.6843) (6.4930) (5.6938) (6.4954) (5.6852) (6.4940) 
Log Asset -0.0344*** 0.0316* -0.0344*** 0.0316* -0.0349*** 0.0316* 
 (0.0102) (0.0162) (0.0102) (0.0162) (0.0102) (0.0162) 
Analyst Coverage -0.0518** 0.1548** -0.0398* 0.1551** -0.0409* 0.1549** 
 (0.0202) (0.0669) (0.0211) (0.0670) (0.0219) (0.0669) 
SOX -6.9040*** 6.9405*** -4.8369*** 6.9185*** -5.1342** 6.9669*** 
 (1.1907) (0.2949) (1.5966) (0.2969) (2.3461) (0.3061) 
Abnormal Restate 
Risk 
 0.5160***  0.5162***  0.5161*** 
 (0.0315)  (0.0317)  (0.0316) 
Disastrous Stock 
Return 
 1.3018***  1.3029***  1.3022*** 
 (0.4021)  (0.4025)  (0.4023) 
Abnormal 
Volatility 
 0.0497  0.0496  0.0497 
 (0.1040)  (0.1040)  (0.1040) 
Abnormal Turnover  -0.0032*  -0.0032*  -0.0032* 
 (0.0017)  (0.0017)  (0.0017) 
Constant 5.9865*** -1.5420*** 3.6606** -1.5434*** 4.3058* -1.5425*** 
 (1.3434) (0.5359) (1.7871) (0.5362) (2.4254) (0.5361) 
       
Log Likelihood  -7233  -7230  -7232 
Observations  26,938  26,938  26,938 
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Table 5: Investors Beliefs, Accounting Expertise and Misstatement Propensity  
 
The dependent variable is a dummy variable, Z equal to1 if a firm committed an irregularity (error) 
and then got caught later, zero otherwise. The estimation of misstatement propensity is indicated by 
P(M=1), and the estimation of misstatement detection likelihood by P(D=1|M=1). All variables are 
defined in Appendix A. Coefficient estimates and standard errors (in parentheses) are reported. 
Standard errors are clustered by firm. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels. 
 
Panel A: Irregularities 
 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES P(M) P(D|M) P(M) P(D|M) 
     
Ind. EPS Growth 0.4384***  0.4189***  
 (0.1318)  (0.1319)  
Ind. EPS Growth Squared -0.8125***  -0.7884***  
 (0.1792)  (0.1733)  
Predicted % AE*Q1_EPS -0.1088  -0.2576  
 (0.8085)  (0.8098)  
Predicted % AE*Q2_EPS -1.1578**  -1.2100**  
 (0.5750)  (0.5519)  
Predicted % AE*Q3_EPS -0.5471  -0.5902  
 (0.6319)  (0.6214)  
Predicted % AE*Q4_EPS -2.5011***  -2.4807***  
 (0.4824)  (0.4772)  
Predicted % AE*Q5_EPS -1.6162***  -1.6531***  
 (0.4854)  (0.4838)  
ST Compensation 0.9354***    
 (0.2375)    
LT Compensation   -0.9440***  
   (0.2218)  
ROA 0.1315  0.1373  
 (0.0843)  (0.0865)  
Leverage 0.0788  0.0702  
 (0.1171)  (0.1179)  
Ext. Fin. Need 0.0258  0.0248  
 (0.0367)  (0.0368)  
Insider Ownership 8.8824***  9.3773***  
 (2.2833)  (2.2873)  
Big N 0.0343  0.0431  
 (0.0538)  (0.0541)  
M&A 0.3407 0.0292 0.3338  
 (0.2134) (0.2707) (0.2125)  
CAPX 1.1658*** -1.2938*** 1.1145***  
 (0.3031) (0.4188) (0.3045)  
R&D -14.8401* 3.8485 -15.6202*  
 (8.9178) (3.8805) (9.0202)  
Log Asset -0.0717*** 0.1110*** -0.0745***  
 (0.0190) (0.0164) (0.0189)  
Analyst Coverage -0.0104 0.1204*** 0.0080  
 (0.0315) (0.0371) (0.0320)  
SOX -2.5915*** 6.2292*** -2.5943*** 5.9673*** 
 (0.1173) (0.7559) (0.1149) (1.7044) 
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Table 5 Panel A (continued) 
 
 
Abnormal Restatement Risk  0.1680***  0.1700*** 
 (0.0292)  (0.0280) 
Disastrous Stock Return  0.4150  0.4156 
Table 5 Panel A (continued) 
 
 
  (0.2588)  (0.2604) 
Abnormal Return Volatility  0.1076*  0.1093* 
  (0.0627)  (0.0630) 
Abnormal Turnover  0.0013  0.0013 
  (0.0012)  (0.0011) 
Constant 0.2046 -1.6659*** 0.9511*** -1.6026*** 
 (0.3116) (0.3288) (0.2828) (0.3232) 
     
Log Likelihood  -1784  -1781 
Observations  24,921  24,921 
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Panel B: Errors 
VARIABLES P(M) P(D|M) P(M) P(D|M) 
Ind. EPS Growth -0.0317  -0.0336  
 (0.0964)  (0.0930)  
Ind. EPS Growth Squared 0.0452  0.0486  
 (0.0933)  (0.0921)  
Predicted % AE*Q1_EPS -0.5773  -0.6365*  
 (0.3753)  (0.3326)  
Predicted % AE*Q2_EPS -0.2838  -0.1770  
 (0.3668)  (0.3314)  
Predicted % AE*Q3_EPS -0.9337***  -0.9184***  
 (0.2959)  (0.2849)  
Predicted % AE*Q4_EPS 0.1114  0.1116  
 (0.2893)  (0.2839)  
Predicted % AE*Q5_EPS -0.3854  -0.3731  
 (0.3329)  (0.3258)  
ST Compensation 0.5681**    
 (0.2314)    
LT Compensation   -0.2731  
   (0.2313)  
ROA -0.0258  -0.0240  
 (0.0660)  (0.0659)  
Leverage 0.2778***  0.2813***  
 (0.0888)  (0.0888)  
Ext. Fin. Need 0.1250***  0.1256***  
 (0.0315)  (0.0314)  
Insider Ownership 3.3094  3.3318  
 (2.2988)  (2.3044)  
Big N -0.0475  -0.0470  
 (0.0440)  (0.0440)  
M&A 0.3446** 0.3139 0.3451** 0.3139 
 (0.1419) (0.3115) (0.1419) (0.3115) 
CAPX 0.2673 -0.4287 0.2645 -0.4287 
 (0.2144) (0.3545) (0.2142) (0.3545) 
R&D -11.5298** 7.2496 -11.6173** 7.2508 
 (5.6698) (6.0314) (5.6659) (6.0312) 
Log Asset -0.0328*** 0.0152 -0.0333*** 0.0153 
 (0.0098) (0.0151) (0.0098) (0.0151) 
Analyst Coverage -0.0335 0.0318 -0.0347 0.0318 
 (0.0217) (0.0347) (0.0216) (0.0347) 
SOX -5.4026*** 6.8977*** -5.3627*** 6.7689*** 
 (1.5061) (0.1624) (1.4203) (0.1522) 
Abnormal Restatement Risk  0.5133***  0.5133*** 
  (0.0235)  (0.0235) 
Disastrous Stock Return  0.7812**  0.7812** 
  (0.3283)  (0.3283) 
Abnormal Return Volatility  0.1637*  0.1637* 
  (0.0847)  (0.0847) 
Abnormal Turnover  -0.0024  -0.0024 
  (0.0017)  (0.0017) 
Constant 4.0973** -0.6214** 4.0641*** -0.6215** 
 (1.6336) (0.2779) (1.5473) (0.2779) 
Log Likelihood  -7096  -7095 
Observations  26,888  26,888 
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Table 6: Investors Beliefs, Excess Accounting Expertise and Misstatement Propensity  
 
The dependent variable is a dummy variable, Z equal to 1 if a firm committed an irregularity (error) 
and then got caught later, zero otherwise. The estimation of misstatement propensity is indicated by 
P(M=1), and the estimation of misstatement detection likelihood by P(D=1|M=1). All variables are 
defined in Appendix A. Coefficient estimates and standard errors (in parentheses) are reported. 
Control variables in P(M=1) and in P(D=1|M=1) are the same as previous tables and suppressed. 
Standard errors are clustered by firm. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels. 
 
Panel A: Irregularities 
 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES P(M) P(M) 
   
Ind. EPS Growth 0.1111** 0.1496** 
 (0.0494) (0.0741) 
Ind. EPS Growth Squared -0.2633** -0.2236** 
 (0.1120) (0.1012) 
Excess AE -0.0145***  
 (0.0041)  
Excess AE*Q1_EPS  0.0515 
  (0.0582) 
Excess AE*Q2_EPS  -0.0795* 
  (0.0439) 
Excess AE*Q3_EPS  -0.0203** 
  (0.0103) 
Excess AE*Q4_EPS  -0.0067 
  (0.0047) 
Excess AE*Q5_EPS  -0.0233** 
  (0.0118) 
   
Control variables in P(M=1) and in P(D=1|M=1) (suppressed) 
   
Log Likelihood -505 -503 
Observations 6,780 6,780 
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Panel B: Errors 
 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES P(M) P(M) 
   
Ind. EPS Growth 0.3285* 0.2577 
 (0.1865) (0.2018) 
Ind. EPS Growth Squared -0.6214 -0.6434 
 (0.5046) (0.4774) 
Excess AE 0.0633  
 (0.0553)  
Excess AE*Q1_EPS  0.0159 
  (0.1226) 
Excess AE*Q2_EPS  0.0923 
  (0.1009) 
Excess AE*Q3_EPS  0.0171 
  (0.1075) 
Excess AE*Q4_EPS  0.0502 
  (0.0888) 
Excess AE*Q5_EPS  0.1355 
  (0.0921) 
   
Control variables in P(M=1) and in P(D=1|M=1) (suppressed) 
   
Log Likelihood -1872 -1875 
Observations 7,358 7,358 
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Table 7: Market Reactions to Restatement Announcements 
 
This table presents mean and median cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) over three (five) days 
surrounding the announcement of restatements for the misstated firms drawn from the S&P 1500 
sample. Panel A shows CAR for the misstatement sample, irregularity sample and error sample. 
Irregularities (errors) are intentional (unintentional) accounting misstatements. Panel B compares 
CAR for firms with above-median and below-median percentage of accounting expertise (AE). 
AE_commit is percentage of AE when misstatements begin. AE_detect is percentage of AE when 
misstatements are detected. N denotes the number of firm-year observations. t-stat is t statistics for 
mean difference. z-stat is Wilcoxon z statistics for median difference. *, ** and *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. 
 
Panel A: Abnormal Returns: Irregularities versus Errors 
 
  N CAR CAR 
   (-2,2) (-1,1) 
Misstatement 
Sample (1)+(2) 
Mean 1,005 -0.0196 -0.0193 
Median 1,005 -0.0072 -0.0075 
     
(1) Irregularities Mean 159 -0.0563 -0.0604 
 Median 159 -0.0297 -0.0327 
     
(2) Errors Mean 846 -0.0126 -0.0116 
 Median 846 -0.0044 -0.0044 
     
Difference (1)-(2) t-stat  -5.69*** -5.68*** 
z-stat  -5.23*** -4.92*** 
 
 
 
Panel B: Abnormal Returns based on Accounting Expertise 
 
  N Window Window 
   (-2,2) (-1,1) 
(1) %AE_ commit Mean 520 -0.029 -0.027 
Low Median 520 -0.012 -0.011 
     
(2) %AE_commit Mean 485 -0.011 -0.003 
High Median 485 -0.010 -0.002 
     
(3) %AE_ detect Mean 541 -0.024 -0.023 
Low Median 541 -0.090 -0.009 
     
(4) %AE_detect Mean 464 -0.014 -0.015 
High Median 464 -0.005 -0.003 
     
Difference (1)-(2) t-stat  -3.02*** -2.77*** 
z-stat  -3.064*** -3.113*** 
Difference (3)-(4) t-stat  -1.94** -1.39 
z-stat  -1.56 -1.55 
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Table 8: Accounting Expertise and Market Reaction to Accounting Restatements 
 
The dependent variable is cumulative abnormal return (CAR) within 3 days around accounting 
restatements. All variables are defined in Appendix A. Coefficient estimates and robust standard errors 
(in parentheses) are reported. N denotes the number of firm-year observations. Control variables in 
Panel B are the same as Panel A and suppressed. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% levels. 
 
Panel A: Accounting Expertise Measured by % AE 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES CAR (-1,1) CAR (-1,1) CAR (-1,1) CAR (-1,1) CAR (-1,1) CAR (-1,1) 
%AE_commit 0.0333*** 0.0367***     
 (0.0120) (0.0128)     
%AE_commit*IRR  -0.0265     
  (0.0353)     
%AE_detect   0.0221** 0.0201*   
   (0.0108) (0.0116)   
%AE_detect*IRR    0.0151   
    (0.0321)   
%AE_change     -0.0147 -0.0297 
     (0.0189) (0.0207) 
%AE_change*IRR      0.0819* 
      (0.0460) 
IRR -0.0240*** -0.0222*** -0.0242*** -0.0256*** -0.0248*** -0.0263*** 
 (0.0040) (0.0047) (0.0040) (0.0049) (0.0040) (0.0041) 
Core -0.0014 -0.0014 -0.0019 -0.0020 -0.0023 -0.0024 
 (0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0025) (0.0025) 
Length 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0000 -0.0000 
 (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0008) 
SEC 0.0168*** 0.0172*** 0.0172*** 0.0170*** 0.0166*** 0.0169*** 
 (0.0046) (0.0046) (0.0046) (0.0046) (0.0046) (0.0046) 
Leverage -0.0011 -0.0013 -0.0018 -0.0017 -0.0033 -0.0033 
 (0.0084) (0.0084) (0.0084) (0.0084) (0.0084) (0.0084) 
Log_Assets 0.0031*** 0.0031*** 0.0030*** 0.0030*** 0.0030*** 0.0030*** 
 (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) 
Prior_returns 0.0007 0.0006 0.0007 0.0008 0.0006 0.0007 
 (0.0044) (0.0044) (0.0044) (0.0044) (0.0044) (0.0044) 
Constant -0.0369*** -0.0371*** -0.0341*** -0.0339*** -0.0315*** -0.0313*** 
 (0.0094) (0.0094) (0.0093) (0.0093) (0.0092) (0.0092) 
       
Observations 981 981 981 981 981 981 
R-squared 0.0560 0.0566 0.0526 0.0528 0.0491 0.0522 
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Panel B: Accounting Expertise Measured by Excess AE 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES CAR (-1,1) CAR (-1,1) CAR (-1,1) CAR (-1,1) 
     
Excess AE_commit 0.0063*** 0.0074***   
 (0.0024) (0.0026)   
Excess AE_commit*IRR  -0.0075   
  (0.0068)   
Excess AE_detect   0.0060** 0.0049* 
   (0.0024) (0.0026) 
Excess AE_detect*IRR    0.0079 
    (0.0067) 
IRR -0.0234*** -0.0211*** -0.0216*** -0.0243*** 
  (0.0038) (0.0044) (0.0038) (0.0044) 
     
Control variables (suppressed)     
     
Constant -0.0339*** -0.0343*** -0.0287*** -0.0283*** 
 (0.0091) (0.0091) (0.0088) (0.0088) 
     
Observations 1,037 1,037 1,083 1,083 
R-squared 0.0544 0.0555 0.0428 0.0441 
 
 
 
 
  
